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Abstract 
This research aims to study the relationship between economic performance, 
economic reforms, corruption, ethnic diversity and business environment.  
In chapter two, meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis methods are applied to 
study the relationship between economic growth and corruption. This shows that 
despite severe publication bias, there seems to be a genuine negative effect of 
corruption on growth. This impact is systematically affected by whether the authors 
are academics and whether the study controls for endogeneity and heterogeneity. As 
for mechanisms, the findings show that corruption significantly undermines the 
positive influence of institutions and trade openness on economic growth.  
Chapter three investigates the effect of dynamic ethnic diversity as endogenous 
variable on economic growth in the transition context. For this purpose, a unique 
data set is constructed based mostly on primary data (national censuses). Once 
diversity is instrumented; it shows a significant negative impact on economic growth 
which is robust to different specifications, polarization measures, econometric 
estimators, as well as to the use of an index of ethnic-religious-linguistic 
fractionalization. 
Chapter four provides evidence of the role of economic reforms on economic 
performance in developing countries measured by economic growth and industrial 
growth. This research focuses on, and constructs individual indicators for the 
following reforms: external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial 
development, trade liberalization and institutional quality. The main finding is that 
economic reforms strongly support growth in the long-run. They mostly have mixed 
effects in the short-run. Moreover, institutions are imperative to boost economic 
performance over the long run.  
Finally, chapter five demonstrates the relationship between firm performance and 
business environment, ownership, competition and exports in Syrian industrial 
private sector. Performance is measured in level and growth variables. The main 
findings show that firm performance is positively boosted by finance and technology 
and hindered by poor investment climate, in particular, corruption. However, 
competition and foreign ownership seem to not have first-order effects. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivations  
Investigating economic growth and its determinants is at the heart of economics and 
other social science disciplines. The determination of economic growth, as an 
indicator of economic performance, is a sophisticated and continuous process. Most 
economists devote economic growth studies to demonstrate the sources of that 
growth and to explain its variation between countries.  
However, agreement in the literature has not been reached about the main issues 
regarding economic growth. Bosworth and Collins (2003), for example, mention 
some unsolved issues: the role of capital accumulation versus total factor 
productivity (TFP) in accounting for differences in economic growth and increased 
education versus the importance of economic policy as determinants of economic 
growth. In the same context, Durlauf et al. (2008) state that there is no unique growth 
strategy; they find little evidence of the importance of fundamental growth theories. 
However, they state that macroeconomic policies and regional heterogeneity have an 
important role.  
Recently, the role of institutions in driving economic change and growth has come 
back to the debate (Nelson, 2008). In particular, economists study the effect of 
institutions on the variation of development between nations and determine the 
factors behind economic growth. The research suggests that there is a strong positive 
role for institutions in economic organizations and systems (Gagliardi, 2008). Also, 
economic reforms and improvements in business environments are considered vital 
to boost economic performance, particularly in developing countries.  
This thesis follows the path of other researches by applying new methods, datasets 
and econometric estimators, to determine to what extent corruption, ethnic diversity, 
economic reforms and business environment impact economic performance. 
In analyzing the relationship between economic growth and corruption, one of the 
dominant debates in the literature is whether corruption greases or sands the wheels 
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of economic development and growth. In this research, we quantitatively evaluate 
the empirical literature on the effects of corruption on economic growth using meta-
analysis techniques. We first construct a unique data set comprising 460 estimated 
effects of corruption on growth from 41 studies. We then carry out an econometric 
survey, focusing on whether there is a genuine effect, as well as the existence and 
severity of reporting bias, and on whether differences in estimation method, 
measurement issues and specification features affect the magnitude and significance 
of the corruption effect.  
As to effects of ethnic diversity on economic growth, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
identify two main directions for future research. One is to improve the measurement 
of diversity and the other is to treat diversity as an endogenous variable. This 
research tries to address these two issues by investigating the effects of ethnic 
diversity on economic growth across countries using unique time-varying measures.  
We first replicate the finding of a weak effect of exogenous diversity on growth and 
then we show that accounting for how diversity changes over time and treating it as 
an endogenous variable makes a difference. Diversity is instrumented (with lagged 
diversity and latitude), and different estimators are applied. 
As to the influence of economic reforms, one important question that remains in the 
debate is how these reforms impact economic performance. This research uses a 
panel of 56 intermediate income level developing countries, over the period 1980-
2006, to investigate the effect of reforms on economic performance; in particular, 
economic growth and industrial growth. This research focuses on, and constructs 
individual indicators for the following reforms: external stability, macroeconomic 
stability, financial development, trade liberalization and institutional quality. 
Moreover, Pooled Mean Group estimator is applied to study short- and long- run 
effects and to take advantage of panel data. 
In the last chapter, we analyse the relationship between firm performance and 
investment climate, competition, ownership and exports in Syria. The newly 
available micro level datasets encourage further research to link business 
environment to firm performance, which would lead to a better understanding of 
economic growth. This research also investigates the main factors driving firm 
performance in Syria.  
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For this purpose, we use 2009 survey data from 508 firms to try to provide a detailed 
picture of the main constraints faced by the Syrian private sector. We also use an 
investment climate assessment survey data (ICA) to assess the effect on performance 
of ownership, competition, exports, technology and business environment. The 
analysis shows that firm performance is measured in levels and growth of sales and 
productivity. Moreover, the instrumental variable method is applied to overcome the 
endogeneity problem. 
1.2 The aim and the objectives of this research 
This aim of this research is to study the relationship between economic performance, 
measured mainly by economic growth, and the role of economic reforms, 
institutions, diversification and fractionalization, and investment climate. Various 
methods using different datasets are applied to investigate the interdependence 
between these relationships. Corruption and ethnic diversity are good examples to 
deeply understand the role of institutions and their impact on economic growth. 
The objectives of this research are firstly to provide an econometric survey of the 
relationship between economic growth and corruption using meta-analysis and meta-
regression analysis. The second objective is to investigate the effect of dynamic 
ethnic diversity on economic growth. The third objective is to understand the impact 
of different economic reforms on economic performance. The last one is to 
investigate the role of different business environment themes on firm performance.  
1.3 Contributions of the research 
The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows: 
1. We apply meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis methods to study the 
relationship between economic growth and corruption. This allows 
uncovering the publication bias and the existence of genuine effect and the 
most important factors that drive the large heterogeneity of results available 
in the literature.  
2. We use panel data to study the effect of dynamic ethnic diversity as 
endogenous variable on economic growth in the transition context. Moreover, 
we construct a unique data set based mostly on primary data (national 
censuses). 
3. We use panel data to provide evidence of the role of economic reforms on 
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economic performance in developing countries measured by economic 
growth and industrial growth. This research concentrates on the analysis of 
long-run and short-run effects. 
4. We demonstrate the relationship between business environment and firm 
performance in the Syrian industrial private sector. Performance is measured 
in level and growth variables. 
1.4 Chapters outline 
This research is organised into six chapters as follows:  
Following this introduction, chapter two provides an econometric survey of the 
relationship between economic growth and corruption. This chapter uses meta-
analysis and meta-regression techniques to find out whether that relationship is 
genuine and/or whether it is tainted by publication bias. Moreover, we try to 
disentangle the most important factors that drive the large heterogeneity of results 
available in the literature. 
Chapter three investigates the relationship between economic growth and ethnic 
diversity in transition economies in the period of 1989-2007. The main focus is to 
consider ethnic variables as endogenous and also to use panel data. Moreover, this 
research constructs a unique data set based mostly on primary data (national 
censuses) to measure ethnic diversity over time for a sample of countries in 
transition. 
Chapter four shows the effect of economic reform on economic performance in 
developing countries. The reform areas are external stability, macroeconomic 
stability, financial development, trade liberalization and institutional quality. 
Moreover, we apply short and long- run analyses using Pooled Mean Group 
estimations to take advantage of panel data of 56 countries. 
Chapter five explores which factors impact Syrian industrial private firm 
performance. This research uses firm-level data survey taken in 2009. The main 
focus is on investment climate, competition, exports and ownership. Firm 
performance is measured by level and growth of sales and productivity. 
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Chapter six summarises the main findings of this research and highlights the main 
contributions. Also, the chapter shows the limitations of the research and ends with 
further suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
An Econometric Survey of the Literature on Corruption and 
Growth  
2.1 Introduction 
Corruption happens. It occurs in all countries and over time. Although corruption is 
more common in poorer countries, it does exist everywhere. It is now widely 
appreciated that corruption is not restricted to specific regions or levels of economic 
development (Abed and Gupta, 2002) and that the most pressing questions are which 
mechanisms it employs and how severe it actually is as a constraint on economic and 
political activities (Basu, 2006).  
One of the defining debates in the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of 
corruption has been whether it greases or sands the wheels of economic growth and 
development. Those in favour of the greasing hypothesis argue that corruption 
facilitates trade that would not have happened otherwise and promotes efficiency by 
allowing private sector agents to circumvent cumbersome regulations (Leff, 1964; 
Huntington, 1968). Numerous examples support this view, showing that in highly 
restrictive regulatory environments, corruption can enhance economic growth by 
stimulating entrepreneurship and efficiency (De Soto, 1990; Egger and Winner, 
2005; Levy, 2007).  
Opponents of this view have constructed a solid theoretical rebuttal to these 
arguments by arguing that the greasing effect of corruption is only possible as a 
second best option in a malfunctioning institutional setting. Thus, in order to 
properly evaluate the effects of corruption one has to recognize its endogeneity with 
respect to institutions (Aidt, 2009). Theoretical analyses and empirical evidence 
supporting the alternative view is abound, showing that corruption works sands the 
wheels of growth. Rock and Bonnett (2004) argue that corruption reduces investment 
in most developing countries and particularly in small open economies. Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004; 2005) find that it has detrimental effects on human capital 
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accumulation. Concerning its magnitude, Fisman and Svensson (2001) estimate that 
a one percent increase in corruption leads to a three percent reduction in firm growth. 
This body of evidence informs the position of key international policy actors like the 
IMF, World Bank and the OECD and the ever increasing number of anti-corruption 
agencies and campaigns at both national and international fora (Méon and Weill, 
2010).  
Yet the body of empirical evidence on the economic consequences of corruption is 
still far from conclusive (Svensson, 2005; Aidt, 2009). For example, the literature 
continues to provide support to phenomena such as the Asian paradox (a positive 
correlation between corruption and growth in a number of fairly successful Asian 
economies, including China) even after accounting for the crucial intermediate effect 
of institutions that shape the more recent versions of the greasing the wheels 
hypothesis (Wedeman, 2002; Rock and Bonnett, 2004; Li and Wu, 2007 & Vial and 
Hanoteau, 2010).   
The inconclusiveness of the evidence on the relationship between corruption and 
growth can be driven by several factors. Econometrically, regressions that attempt to 
infer a causal relationship between corruption and growth are often fraught with 
reverse causality and omitted variable problems, which have so far not found a 
satisfactory resolution (Aidt, 2009). In addition, the most popular measures of 
corruption in the empirical literature are based on expert opinions, which are often 
loaded with ideological bias and generate a corruption ranking of countries biased 
towards general perceptions of current or past politico-economic performance 
(Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010). The inconclusiveness can also be driven by 
reporting bias: although it is understandable that not all econometric results are 
reported, their very selection for reporting purposes may be affected by either the 
preferences of journal editors or the agenda of the various international development 
institutions (interestingly, we find in this paper that such biases are significantly 
smaller in peer-reviewed publications). Finally, as well known for instance from the 
empirical literature on inequality and growth, cross-country correlations in the 
growth-related literature are generally clouded in data quality and other problems 
that tend to hide the welfare implications of any economic phenomena or policy 
(Ravallion, 2001).  
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The objective of this chapter is to provide a rigorous and systematic survey of the 
empirical literature of the effects of corruption on economic growth.
1
 Here we try to 
(a) uncover whether there is a genuine relationship between corruption and growth, 
(b) evaluate the direction of this relationship and (c) identify the main factors or 
determinants that may help explain the variance in the observed effects of corruption 
on growth. For these purposes, we put together a unique data set comprising a total 
of 460 empirical estimates of the effect of corruption on growth from 41 different 
studies. Figure 1 shows that about 32 percent of these estimates support a significant 
and negative impact of corruption on growth, 62 percent suggest a statistically 
insignificant relationship, while approximately only 6 percent support a positive and 
significant relation. On this account alone, one may be tempted to argue that the 
support for the sanding hypothesis is greater larger than that for the greasing 
hypothesis, yet the vast majority of the results lead us to argue that the evidence is 
not conclusive. Why? This chapter uses meta-analysis and meta-regression 
techniques to establish the depth, extent and the reasons behind this 
inconclusiveness.   
Our main conclusions refer to the identification of the main factors that explain the 
variation we observe in Figure 1. We find that these principal factors are authors’ 
affiliation (academics systematically report smaller and less negative effects), the use 
of fixed-effects (which interestingly tend to increase the negative effect of corruption 
on growth), the type of corruption measure, the presence of MENA countries in the 
sample (which also tends to increase the overall negative effect) and the inclusion in 
the model of trade and institutions which both tend to deflate the negative effect of 
corruption on economic growth. We also find that although publication bias seems to 
be severe in the corruption-growth literature, there is plenty of evidence supporting a 
genuine negative effect of corruption on growth.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we examine whether 
there is evidence for a genuine relation between corruption and growth, as well as 
the existence and severity of reporting bias. In Section 3 we present the data set we 
                                                 
1
 There are various excellent surveys of the literature on the causes and effects of corruption, for 
example Bardhan (1997), Svensson (2005), Pande (2008), Aidt (2009) and Treisman (2007). Yet ours 
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first quantitative survey of the econometric evidence on the 
corruption-growth nexus. 
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constructed covering a large number of factors that can potentially explain the 
variation in results on this relationship available in the literature. In Section 4, we use 
meta-regression analysis tools to investigate the main determinants of the variation 
of the results in the literature. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Is there a genuine relationship between corruption and growth? 
For this chapter, we put together a data set comprising 460 estimated effects (that is, 
coefficients) of corruption on economic growth from 41 different empirical studies 
(the studies are listed in Appendix 1). The selection criteria we used are as follows. 
In order to be included, a paper has to investigate econometrically the relationship 
between corruption and economic growth across countries and it has to report 
regression coefficients and their t-values or standard errors. In addition, it has to 
report the number of observations and/or degrees of freedom and to report sufficient 
information that allows us to create the explanatory variables we require (listed in 
Appendix 2). We also include in the data set all reported regression results from each 
study as opposed to selecting one set of results as representative or preferred. This is 
because very few authors single out a set of preferred results. Notice that among the 
excluded studies are those that deal with only one country (“case studies”) and those 
focusing on the effect of corruption on various macroeconomic variables other than 
economic growth (such as FDI, investment, inflation, government expenditures, aid 
and income inequality).  
One explanation for the existence of bias in the literature is the alleged tendency for 
the evidence in academic papers to lean towards statistically significant results. The 
simplest and most commonly used method to detect such bias is the informal 
examination of a funnel graph, which is a scatter plot of the treatment effect size 
(e.g. the coefficient in a regression analysis) against a measure of the precision 
(Stanley, 2005; Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoģlu, 2008). Since in the absence of 
publication selection, estimates will vary randomly (or symmetrically) around the 
“true” effect, the funnel plot’s asymmetry is the key for identifying publication bias.2 
Figure 2 shows the funnel plot for our data, which is clearly asymmetric, pointing to 
the existence of bias. Given that visual inspections are subjective and hence 
                                                 
2
 The intuition is that studies with a smaller sample size should have larger sampling error, while 
studies with a larger sample size should have lower sampling errors.  
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potentially misleading, we next use meta-regression analysis to answer whether there 
is a genuine association between corruption and growth in a more rigorous fashion.  
Stanley (2001; 2005) argues that if there is a genuine association between two 
variables, there should be a positive relationship between the natural logarithm of the 
absolute value of the t-statistic and the natural logarithm of the degrees of freedom in 
the regression:  
iii dft   lnln 10  (1) 
where it  and idf  denote the t-statistics and degrees of freedom in study i, 
respectively.
3
 Stanley (2005) also develops a meta-significance test (MST) and 
shows that the value of the slope coefficient in equation (1) contains information on 
the extent of a publication bias and on the existence of a genuine effect. If the slope 
coefficient is less than zero, the evidence is said to be contaminated by publication 
bias and there is no genuine association between the two variables. If the slope 
coefficient is larger than zero, it is said that there is a genuine empirical effect. 
Finally, if 5.00 1  there is a genuine association, as well as a publication bias in 
the underlying body of evidence.  
Given that random, large-sample misspecification biases may cause MST to identify 
a genuine effect too frequently, Stanley (2008) recommends complementing MST 
with FAT (funnel asymmetry test) and PET (precision effect test). This amounts to 
regressing the t-statistics of the estimated effects on the inverse of their standard 
errors (Egger et al., 1997):  
iii uSet  /110     (2) 
where iSe  denotes the standard error of the estimated coefficients. Testing for the 
statistical significance of the intercept coefficient represents a test of publication 
bias.
 
Note that this is a direct and more rigorous test of funnel plot asymmetry 
Moreover, Egger et al. (1997) argue that the sign of the intercept indicates the 
                                                 
3
 The intuition is that as the sample size rises, the precision of the coefficient rises as well and hence 
the standard error falls. 
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direction of the bias. A significant slope coefficient, on the other hand, points to the 
existence of a genuine effect, irrespective of the possible publication bias (Stanley, 
2008).  
Table 1 shows the results from the MST and FAT-PET (equations 1 and 2, 
respectively). The coefficient of the degrees of freedom variable in the MST 
regression is statistically significant, with a value which lies between zero and 0.5, 
indicating that despite the presence of a publication bias, there is evidence for a 
genuine relationship between corruption and growth. The intercept coefficient in the 
FAT-PET regression is also statistically significant, thus confirming the presence of 
a publication bias. Moreover, the negative sign of this coefficient suggests that the 
bias is negative, indicating that the “true” corruption-growth relationship is less 
negative than that commonly reported in the literature.  
Yet, the MST estimates deliver a non significant slope coefficient in the FAT-PET 
regression (Table 1, columns 3 and 4) this failing to confirm the existence of a 
genuine effect in the corruption-growth literature. In order to explore this 
relationship further, we separate the sample in published and unpublished research 
and re-estimate the FAT-PET equation. Notice that out of the 41 studies in our data 
set, 20 are published in peer-reviewed academic journals, while 21 are working 
and/or policy papers/reports. The results, reported in Table 2, indicate that the slope 
coefficient is not statistically significant only in the unpublished research sample and 
it is significant at the 1% level in the published research sample. This suggests a 
genuine relationship between corruption and growth in published research as well as 
the absence of such genuine relationship in unpublished studies. This is a very 
important result because it suggests the possibility that unpublished studies (which 
may be more policy oriented) tend to tolerate, substantially more than published 
studies, a lenience towards a negative and significant link between corruption and 
growth. Put it differently, our data shows that peer-reviewed papers are 
systematically more likely to report a genuine yet less negative effect of corruption 
on growth than that of the literature as a whole. In what follows, we investigate this 
issue further, but first we must present the full data base we put together to try to 
understand the variance we find in these corruption-growth effects.  
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2.3 How does the average corruption-growth study look like?  
The preceding analysis suggests that the body of evidence exploring the relationship 
between corruption and economic growth may be biased and that this bias may be 
negative. Existing studies are systematically more likely to report negative and 
statistically significant estimates. We do find some evidence that despite the bias, the 
message that the broad literature on corruption and growth conveys is genuine. If 
anything, there seems to be greater prejudice among peer-reviewed published studies 
against reporting negative results than among unpublished papers and reports.  
While our results are fairly instructive, a more rigorous view on the quality of the 
message conveyed by the existing literature on corruption and growth is needed. In 
keeping with the MRA literature, we attribute the potential differences in these 
results to either differences in the research process (e.g. differences in specification, 
measurement and methodology) or differences in real-world factors (e.g. regional 
and time differences) (Babetskii and Campos, 2010; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 
2008). The variables we construct to capture these differences are described in 
Appendix 2, their basic statistics are reported in Appendix 3. 
In order to describe the differences in econometric methodology we construct 
dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if the coefficients originate from a cross- 
sectional model (0 if from panel), if fixed effects are used (0 otherwise), if there is an 
attempt to correct for endogeneity (0 otherwise), if the focus of the paper is 
exclusively on one region (0 otherwise) and if the paper has been published in an 
academic journal (0 otherwise)4. Given that the approach and potential ideological 
bias may differ across researchers belonging to academic and non-academic 
environments, we also include a dummy variable that takes the value of zero if there 
is at least one author’s affiliation is not academia. 
We find that academic authors wrote 25 of the papers in our sample providing 378 
estimates, thus representing 82% of the total. The regressions for only one region 
represent just 36 observations and 7.74% of the total. Slightly more than half of the 
estimates in our data set were obtained using cross sectional (54%) while the 
                                                 
4
 One of the problems, encountered in the MRA literature is that many of the observations used in a 
regression analysis are not statistically independent. In meta-analysis, empirical estimates are 
considered statistically independent if they are reported by different authors, or if the same author 
reporting them uses different samples. Doucouliagos (2005) recommends the use of bootstrap to 
address the statistical dependence problem (reported below).  
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remaining use panel data. In 151 regressions, accounting for 32.47% of the total, 
there is an explicit attempt to correct for endogeneity through the use of IV, 2SLS, 
3SLS or GMM techniques. Moreover, fixed effects were used in 160 regressions, 
that is, in 34.41% of the total. About half of the estimates are reported in journal 
articles and the other half in working papers, 43% of these being working papers of 
policy oriented institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.  
Measurement is an important issue, especially in light of the growing literature that 
questions the validity of global corruption indicators based on the perceptions of so-
called experts (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010). In order to assess whether the 
impact of corruption on growth is significantly driven by the choice among measures 
of corruption, we construct dummy variables that take into account the differences in 
corruption indexes used in each study/model. The most widely used measure is from 
Transparency International (the Corruption Perception Index, CPI)5 which has been 
used in about 36 percent of the cases (or for 165 estimates). The index is available 
since 1995 and covers approximately 150 countries. The CPI score is an “expert 
perception” measure, reflecting the degree of corruption perceived by business 
people and country analysts. It ranges from 10 (“highly clean”) to 0 (“highly 
corrupt”). The second most popular measure of corruption is from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the Political Risk Group, which is used in about 28% 
of the regressions in our sample (130 cases). This index gives lower values for 
higher levels of corruption. It has monthly frequency and is available since 1984. 
The CTC (Control for Corruption) index of the World Bank is used in 43 cases 
(9.68% of the total) and ranges from -2.5 (high corruption) to 2.5 (low corruption).6 
The COMB variable captures the use of a mixture of different measures constructed 
by different organizations (WB, ICRG, and TI).7 It was used in 16 cases representing 
3.44% of total. The CPC variable captures whether or not corruption is measured by 
a composite indicator, constructed by principal component analysis. The remaining 
                                                 
5
 One difficult issue is that the Transparency International index has been improved over time. In 
other words, there have been various changes in the underlying methodology and although these 
changes are vastly and carefully documented, they do generate difficulties in terms of comparing 
studies that use different “vintages” or “cohorts” of the CPI. We have explored this matter through 
interactions with time trends and it does not qualitatively affect our main results. For more details see 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
6 See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006).  
7 This measure is used, for instance by Rock and Bonnett (2004) and Fitzsimons (2003).  
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measurement variable OTHER8 proxies measures not covered by the above 
categories. It was used in 94 cases accounting for 20% of our sample.9  
In so far as econometric specification issues are concerned, our choice is driven by 
the importance of controlling for a robust set of growth determinants so that the 
corruption effects are not unduly affected by omitted variable problems. This also 
allows us to investigate the relative importance of various potential channels. To this 
end, dummy variables were constructed taking the value of 1 if trade or trade 
openness is presented in the model (0 otherwise), if institutional variables are 
included in the model (0 otherwise) and similarly for human capital, investment, 
political institutions (or democracy) and government expenditures or consumption. 
Trade or openness variables are included in 32 percent of the cases (i.e., in 149 
regressions) while different institutional quality variables are used in 43 estimations 
accounting for only 9.25% of the total. Human capital or population variables are 
used in 337 estimations of the corruption effect, which represents 72.63% of our 
sample. Investment is included in 155 estimations (33.3%) while political 
institutions (or democracy) are included 84 times, that is, in 18% of our sample. 
Government spending or consumption is included 185 times (40% of our sample). 
Finally, we also create a dummy variable for whether initial conditions are included 
in the model specification and find that they are included in 361 regressions 
representing 77.63% of the sample. 
In order to capture the geographical focus of these corruption effects on growth, a 
series of dummy variables are constructed that take the value of 1 if the coefficient 
comes from a regression which contains transition countries (0 otherwise), and 
similarly for Latin America (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia 
(ASIA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR). Note that these variables are to capture 
sample composition, and not whether a study is based on a single region. Transition 
countries were included in 401 regressions accounting for 86% of the total. Latin 
American countries were included 430 times representing 92.5% of the total. Middle 
East and North African countries were included in 401 regressions representing 86% 
of the total. Asian countries were included 431 times (92.7%) and African countries 
                                                 
8 See for example, Li et al. (2000) which uses corruption data from IRIS.   
9 For example, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Mauro (1995) use measures from Business International 
(BI), now incorporated into The Economist Intelligence Unit.   
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were included in 424 estimations (91% of the total). The variable OTHERS is used 
for estimations containing other country groupings (or different ways of splitting 
samples) such as OECD countries (which is used 403 times or in 86.7% of the 
cases). Finally, a mid- point of the time period covered by each study is calculated to 
try to capture time effects.10  
We observe that the simple pair-wise correlation between corruption and growth, 
reported in the literature, is negative both in itself and across different types of 
methodologies, specifications, measurement choices, regions and time periods 
included in the underlying econometric studies. There is also a positive correlation 
between the length of the time window of the study and the growth-corruption 
relationship. 
How would a typical piece of empirical research on the effect of corruption on 
economic growth look like using our data set? Firstly, the typical study is likely to be 
written by authors in academia. The time window it covers is somewhat short, with 
an average of nine and a half years. The typical paper does not control for 
endogeneity nor include country dummy variables or fixed effects. There is an 
almost equal chance to use panel or cross-sectional data. Yet the typical paper would 
favor Transparency International as its main corruption measure. It is also likely to 
use a large multi-region sample and have human capital among its explanatory 
variables. Variables controlling for institutional quality are among those least likely 
to be found in a typical study, which is a serious omission in light of the attention 
this factor receives in attempts to assess the grease versus sand debate in the 
corruption and growth literature (Méon and Weill, 2010).  
2.4 Meta regression analysis 
Many believe that the empirical literature on the effects of corruption on growth is 
inconclusive. Indeed Figure 1 seems to support such views: there is an awful lot of 
variation within the set of empirical estimates the literature has made available. Yet 
standard meta-analysis tests discussed above show that although the underlying 
                                                 
10
 We have also tried to deal with the difficult issue of paper quality. We collected data on the number 
of Google Scholar citations (excluding self-citations). It ranges from zero to 3816 (for Mauro, 1995) 
as in 2007. We used it in our empirical analysis below as the yearly average number of citations and 
found that it is not robust (that is, our set of explanatory variables does a good job at capturing the key 
elements of paper quality). See the results at appendix 4 which repeats the regressions in tables 3 &4 
by adding cite variable. 
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relationship seems to be genuine, the available empirical evidence seems biased 
towards reporting negative effects of corruption on growth. This makes it even more 
pressing to try to pinpoint the factors that are most important in explaining the 
variation in the underlying corruption-growth effects. In order to do so, we estimate 
the following baseline equation: 
       iii XY   10       (3) 
where Yi is the partial correlation between corruption and economic growth and Xi is 
a vector of explanatory variables, which were described in section 3 above.
11
  
In keeping with the MRA literature, we estimate both a fixed effects and a random 
effects version of equation (3). The fixed effects model assumes that the 
heterogeneity in results is due to systematic differences across studies and to 
sampling error, while the random effects model assumes, in addition, that there are 
unobserved factors which cannot be captured by the set of explanatory variables.
12
 
We also estimate a Weighted Least Square model (WLS), attaching greater weights 
to observations with higher precision.
13
 Finally, as indicated earlier, we use standard 
error bootstrapping to account for the interdependence between observations in each 
study (Dougouliagous, 2005). The main results from our empirical analysis are 
reported in Table 3 (and Table 4 provides further confirmation of these main results). 
Column (1) shows the fixed effects estimates, column (2) has the OLS Bootstrap 
estimates, the WLS estimates are reported in column (3) and the random effects (RE) 
estimates are in column (4). Results using the general to specific method on the WLS 
and RE estimators are reported in columns (5) and (6). 
Table 3 identifies that the main factors that help explain the observable variation in 
the corruption-growth effects are the following (in parentheses are the respective 
coefficients taken from Table 3, column 6): the affiliation of the authors (0.14), 
control for endogeneity (0.07), the use of fixed-effects (-0.21), the source/type of 
corruption measure, the presence of MENA countries in the sample (-0.25), the 
                                                 
11
 For the advantages of using partial correlation as dependent variable in meta-regression analysis, 
see Rosenthal (1991) and Meyer and Sinani (2005).  
12
 The tests developed in Higgins and Thompson (2002) point to the appropriateness of the random- 
over the fixed-effects model in this case. For sensitivity purposes, we report both models. 
13
 See Longhi et al. (2005). 
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inclusion of trade variables in the model (0.16) and controlling for institutions in the 
econometric specification (0.23). Let us now interpret these findings. 
The positive and significant coefficient of the authors’ affiliation variable across the 
different specifications indicates that non-academic authors tend to find the impact 
of corruption on growth to be more harmful than that found by academic authors, all 
else the same. This is an important result and is consistent with our finding that 
unpublished papers, about half of which are policy papers, tend to be more averse to 
report non-negative corruption-growth estimates. Also notice that although the 
coefficient on publication type carries the expected sign (the reported effects of 
corruption on growth are systematically smaller, or more negative, than those 
reported in peer-reviewed publications), differently from authors’ affiliation, these 
are not robust across the different estimators   
We also find that econometric models that try to control for the endogeneity of 
corruption with respect to economic growth tend to report more positive results than 
studies that do not take endogeneity into account. This suggests that the negative 
bias in this literature may be indeed driven by confusing correlation and causality. 
By contrast, studies that control for unobserved heterogeneity with the use of fixed-
effects tend to report more negative effects than studies that do not account for these. 
Wherever significant, the signs of the measures of corruption variables are negative, 
which may be explained by expert perceptions being unduly driven by ideological 
biases (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010), translating into a larger negative 
reported correlation between corruption and growth. 
Possibly one of the most interesting effects meta-analysis allows one to explore is 
that of the “channel” variables, in this case trade or trade openness, institutional 
quality, human capital, investment, political/democracy effects and government 
consumption. The inclusion of these variables produces coefficients of corruption 
that measure its direct effect on growth. On the other hand, the exclusion of these 
variables results in the corruption variable measuring its total effect on growth. In 
other words, if the channel variable has a negative (positive) sign, the direct effect of 
corruption on growth would be smaller (larger) than the total effect (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam, 2006; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008.) The coefficients of the 
trade openness and institutions variables are consistently positive and significant 
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indicating that if trade openness and institutions are positively related to growth, 
corruption affects these two channels negatively, thus undermining their positive 
growth effect.
14
 This latter finding provides some support for the latest versions of 
the grease the wheels hypothesis, whereby corruption may have a positive impact on 
growth predominantly in the context of malfunctioning institutions (Méon and Weill, 
2010).  
Finally, we examine the impact of the regional variables in our MRA analysis of the 
effects of corruption on growth effects. The most consistent result across 
specifications is that of a negative and significant impact of the MENA region on the 
relationship between corruption and growth and, to a somewhat lesser extent, that of 
a positive and significant impact of the ASIA region. This implies that corruption 
has a more negative impact on growth in MENA and a more positive impact on 
growth in ASIA. The latter result is consistent with the Asia paradox in the 
corruption-growth literature.  
For sensitivity purposes, we re-estimate all four MRA models for each group of 
variables separately (Table 4). The results are mostly consistent with those in Table 
3, except that the presence of a government expenditures variable is now significant 
and that the coefficients on controlling for endogeneity and the Asian variable are no 
longer significant.    
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter tried to provide a rigorous assessment of the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth, using a data set comprising 460 estimates of this 
effect from 41 different econometric studies. We use this unique data set to carry out 
an econometric survey and try to throw light on the role of differences in estimation 
methods, econometric specification, measurement issues, and factors like regional 
focus and time periods, on the distribution of overall effect of corruption on 
economic growth.   
Maybe unsurprisingly to some, we detect a bias in the literature towards reporting 
negative and significant effects of corruption on growth. However, we also find 
evidence of a genuine effect of corruption on growth, which seems to be stronger in 
                                                 
14
 Note that the opposite is true for the democracy variable. However, this variable is negative and 
significant in only two specifications. Our results for all other channels are even less conclusive. 
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academic than in non-academic studies. Further, the large degree of heterogeneity in 
the available corruption-growth results seems to be driven by whether the authors are 
affiliated to academic institutions and whether the underlying econometric model 
controls for potential endogeneity and uses fixed-effects. There seems to be support 
to the “sanding the wheels of growth” view of corruption, in that we do find 
evidence that corruption undermines the positive effect of institutions and trade 
openness on growth. Finally, we do find some evidence in favour of the Asian 
paradox (although it does not survive further sensitivity tests) and that countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa region are likely to experience more negative 
impacts of corruption on growth than countries elsewhere.  
Our results have important implications for future research. Firstly, we can not find 
enough convincing evidence supporting the view that corruption, on its own, is 
capable of greasing the wheels of economic growth and development. While the 
“true” relationship between corruption and growth may be less negative than that 
prevailing in the literature, non-academic authors seem systematically more likely to 
report a negative effect than academic authors. This effect seems to go beyond 
whether or not the study is published in a peer-reviewed journal and, unfortunately, 
generates a powerful bias in this body of empirical evidence. We also conclude that 
the application of more rigorous econometric methodologies may be needed to sort 
out the debate in this literature. In particular, we would much welcome studies that 
combine controls for endogeneity and fixed-effects with specifications encompassing 
various institutional and structural reforms dimensions. If these become the norm in 
the future, we think that this will contribute substantially to improve our 
understanding of the broad economic implications of corruption. 
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Chapter Three 
Dynamic Ethnic Diversity and Economic Growth in the Transition 
Economies from 1989 to 2007 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There are three fundamental dimensions to any process of change. One is timing. 
When change starts and when it ends matters. Detecting the first signs that the status 
quo is sliding away is as difficult as identifying the moment when the previous status 
quo ceased to exist and the new one has fully established itself. The second 
fundamental dimension is extent. It refers to how much change was actually 
accomplished, whether the change itself was deliberate or unintended. The ratio 
between these first two dimensions is the speed of change. The third fundamental 
dimension is depth. This refers to how deep the effects of change turn out to be, 
whether or not the original change itself was intentional. There is no reason to think 
of these three dimensions as independent from each other. A case in point is that 
deep causes of change are often the most difficult ones to time, measure and 
attribute. Of course, this does not make them less important (the opposite is true, if 
anything). Institutions are a good example. They change slowly, over long periods of 
time, but their effects are widespread, long-lasting, and deep. We argue that the 
degree of fractionalization of a society along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines is in 
the same category. Fractionalization changes very slowly but this does not mean it 
does not change. It is also very difficult to measure but this does not mean they are 
short-lived. And diversity is often an extraordinarily deep phenomenon, but this does 
not mean we can afford to ignore it.  
It was only in the last decade or so that ethnic fractionalization entered mainstream 
economics. There is now a burgeoning theoretical literature (see, e.g., Esteban and 
Ray, 1994, 1999 and Nehring and Puppe, 2002) and a very active empirical agenda. 
Although the seminal papers of Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997) offer 
econometric evidence showing that greater levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
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hinder economic performance, there has been less success in sustaining the evidence 
for such negative, direct effect. Easterly (2001) argues that the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization is conditional: it slows down economic activity only in countries 
with “sufficiently bad” institutions. Bluedorn (2001) and Alesina et al. (2003) show 
that the negative impact of diversity on growth is particularly strong in less 
democratic countries. Posner (2004) argues that the negative effect is supported only 
by a restricted polarization index: restricted in that it includes only “politically 
relevant” ethnic groups. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that the direct 
effect of fractionalization on economic performance is weak and suggest focusing on 
polarization instead. In summary, the initial negative first-order effect of ethnic 
diversity on economic growth has been challenged and the literature seems to have 
turned to identifying the main channels through which diversity may affect the 
economy (i.e., indirect effects).  
This large body of econometric evidence has two main features in common: diversity 
is measured using secondary data and diversity is often treated as a non-time 
varying, exogenous variable.
15
 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide an 
authoritative and thorough review of this empirical evidence and identify two main 
directions for future research: one is the need to improve the measurement of 
diversity and the other is the desirability of modelling diversity as an endogenous 
variable. The objective of this chapter is to try to address these two issues. In this 
chapter, we put together a data set that contains mostly primary, census-based, data. 
In terms of treating diversity as an endogenous variable, we make use of the genuine 
time variation shown by these indexes that, to the best of our knowledge, is unique to 
our data set. We propose lagged diversity and latitude as the instrument set and 
subject these to a comprehensive series of diagnostic tests (which they pass).   
 In what follows we report on the construction of a unique data set based mostly on 
primary data (national censuses) to measure ethnic diversity over time for a sample 
of countries that closely resemble a “natural experiment” (the 26 former centrally-
                                                 
15
 These two features are related as the secondary data used to measure diversity refers to the early 
1960s. The huge popularity of the index constructed by Soviet researchers and published in the Atlas 
Narodov Mira (Bruk and Apenchenko, 1964) is due in large part to its inclusion in Taylor and 
Hudson’s World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (1972). For studies that use this index, 
see Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Collier (2001), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) and Woo (2003a, 2003b).  
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planned economies, from 1989 to 2007).
16
 These are said to resemble a “natural 
experiment” because until 1989 they shared a very similar set of economic and 
political institutions (central planning under socialism), but have since followed 
radically different economic and political trajectories. Using these data, we are able 
to replicate the most recent results from the literature and show that static 
(exogenous) diversity is indeed not robustly correlated with economic growth. 
However, when we capture empirically how ethnic diversity changes over time and 
model it as an endogenous variable, we conclude that ethnic fractionalization is 
negatively related to growth and this is robust to the use of different econometric 
estimators, specifications, polarization measures as well as to an index of ethnic-
linguistic-religious fractionalization.    
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
collection effort and the measurement methods used. Section 3 discusses the 
econometric methodology, presents the main results and subjects them to various 
robustness tests. Section 4 concludes with some brief suggestions for future research. 
3.2 Measurement 
In this chapter, we collect primary data (census-based) to measure ethnic diversity 
(fractionalization and polarization) over time (from 1989 to 2007) for a sample of 26 
former centrally-planned economies.
17 
National censuses are the preferred and most 
reliable source of ethnic diversity data. Unfortunately they are only conducted once a 
decade, at best. Micro-censuses and demographic surveys, which are arguably the 
second best sources of primary diversity data, tend to be conducted at five-year 
intervals. With this in mind, we assess what would be the maximum number of time 
periods for which we could obtain a balanced panel data set on the demographic 
(ethnic) composition of these 26 transition countries. We identify four time periods: 
1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2007. This means we use primary data 
                                                 
16
  Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) examine the relationship between growth and diversity between 1989 
and 2002 within an endogenous growth framework, while this chapter uses the traditional Solow 
model to study the growth-diversity nexus between 1989 and 2007. 
17
  We divided the sample in five groups for exposition purposes (Figure 1). The transition countries 
in ASIA are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The BALKAN countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Moldova and Romania. The BALTIC countries are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The group called 
BUR comprises Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. The VISEGRAD countries are the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. CEEB stands for Central and Eastern European and Baltic 
countries and which is the sum of the BALTIC, BALKAN and VISEGRAD sub-groups. 
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from national censuses for the first and third period and data from micro-censuses 
and demographic surveys for the second and fourth period.
18
 
We collect data on the percentage of the population belonging to each ethnic group 
in each country for each of these four periods. This generates a panel with 104 
observations. Census data are available for about half of the observations.
 
Once all 
the data were collected, we note that for some countries there were more than one 
estimate for a given time period, so a decision rule was needed. If two or more 
sources gave identical information up to the third decimal place, we first single out 
these sources. From them, we chose the combination that gave the most balanced 
distance among the indices over time. This was done to have the largest possible 
time span within the sample periods.
19
 If we still have a tie, that is, if the remaining 
sources diverged up to the second decimal place, we used the one that caused less 
variability of the indices for the country in question over time. This rule of most 
balanced distance attempts to minimize source-variability bias as much as possible. 
For the computation of the fractionalization indices, we apply the commonly used 
formula capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to 
different ethnic groups (e.g., Alesina et al., 2003): 

n
i
isF 21         (1) 
where si is the share of total population belonging to ethnic group i. The index takes 
values between zero (for a perfectly ethnically homogeneous country) and one 
(highly heterogeneous country).  
One shortcoming of this measure is that the same value of the index can correspond 
to different distributions (Fearon, 2003).
 
This sensitivity of the index to the total 
number of underlying groups requires attention. We compare two approaches. First, 
                                                 
18
 Although it is difficult to objectively judge the quality of these different sources of data, note that in 
each country collection of these data was done by the same agency, with comparable methodologies. 
They differ in that censuses cover the entire population and micro-censuses cover a representative 
sample. These figures were checked against various additional sources, including Rosenko (1999) 
Nasii I Etnosi V Sovremennom Mire (Nations and Ethnicity in Today’s World) and Natsionalniy 
Sostav Naseleniya SSSR (Ethnic Composition in The USSR, Finansi I Statistika, 1991). 
19
 For example, we found data on the ethnic composition of the population in Latvia for the years 
1994, 1995 and 1996 from different sources, whose indices were identical up to third decimal place. 
Hence, according to our rule, the time series 1989-1994-2000 was preferred to 1989-1996-2000. 
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we use an unrestricted set with all disaggregated data allowing the number of ethnic 
groups for each country to vary over time. In the second approach, we restrict the 
number of groups for each country to be the same over time.
20
 We find the 
differences are small.
21 
 
Figure 1 shows that these countries end up much more ethnically homogenous than 
they started with over a short period of time. This suggests that there may be value in 
re-thinking the assumption of exogeneity. Why does diversity change over time? 
One general cause is, of course, migration flows. These may be driven by better 
economic performance and opportunities in the destination country as well as by 
inferior economic performance and/or civil war and ethnic cleansing in the origin 
country. In developing countries, such a process should surely take decades to 
unfold. However, there are special circumstances in our sample of transition 
countries which allow for this process to take place in a much shorter period of time. 
Firstly, with the collapse of communism, workers become free to move to other 
countries (while under communism mobility restrictions often referred to the city, let 
alone country) in search of better economic opportunities (Campos and Coricelli, 
2002). Secondly, the ubiquitous Russian minorities seem to have been made to feel 
unwelcome and the new economic and political situation after 1991 results in return 
migration, causing the share of Russians to fall in every country in our sample, with 
the exception of Moldova.
 
It is only after 1945 that Russians become the second 
largest ethnic group in most of the Republics (one example is Kazakhstan, where the 
national census of 1989 shows that the shares in total population are 37.8% to 39.7% 
for Russians and for Kazakhs, respectively.) A third important factor is violent 
conflict, for example, the wars in the Caucasus and former Yugoslavia. Because of 
                                                 
20
 The average number of ethnic groups in the restricted sample was 5.19 and in the unrestricted 
sample 7.04. Alesina et al.’s and Fearon’s analogous figures for Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union countries are 6.48 (27 observations) and 4.55 (31 observations), respectively. The lowest 
number of groups in our data, including “others”, is 3 (in several cases), while the largest is 8 (12 for 
Mongolia in the unrestricted sample). In addition to data quality, we must also be concerned with data 
comparability. In this respect, there are few dimensions over which researchers can exert some 
control. One of the few, however, refers to the number of groups used in the computation of the 
diversity indexes. Here we explore different ways of using this information across countries and over 
time. We find that these variations do not affect our main conclusions. 
21
 For instance, the mean of this ethnic fractionalization index declines from 0.3726 (0.3768) in the 
first period to 0.345 (0.3538) in the second period to 0.3147 (0.3154) in third period to 0.30145 
(0.30314) in the fourth period (values using the unrestricted number of groups are in parenthesis). For 
comparison, Alesina et al.’s value for the early 1990s is 0.3696, while Fearon’s is 0.3723. 
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the latter, for example, the share of Serbs in Croatia declines from 12.2% in 1991 to 
4.54% in 2001.
 
 
Another concern about the existing ethnic fractionalization indices is that the 
definition of ethnic groups may change for political reasons. Alesina et al. (2003) 
remark that Somalia was counted as a homogeneous country prior to the civil war in 
1991 with the notion of linking clans to ethnic groups coming into being only after 
that. Note that there are no disputes about group definitions in our data. Census 
questionnaires enumerate a fixed number of ethnic groups and let the respondent 
indicate to which she belongs. The residual option of “others” or “none of the above” 
is provided and taken into account (as one single group) when computing our 
diversity measures. 
The emerging consensus is that polarization is the theoretically appropriate concept 
for measuring diversity.
22
 The family of polarization measures developed by Esteban 
and Ray (1994; 1999) has been implemented in various ways. The one proposed by 
Alesina et al. (2003) is as follows: 

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where K is a scaling factor and α is a constant between 0 and 1.6. Note that this 
formulation requires a measure of distance between groups (the last term in the right-
hand side). Conceptually, distance can be thought of, for instance, as differences in 
median incomes. Because of data constraints, distance is often assumed to be 
constant.
23
 
An alternative, yet related, implementation is the one proposed by Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2003):  
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Fractionalization measures increase in the number of groups, while polarization maximum is 
reached with two groups of equal size. 
23
To be more precise, the ADEKW index of polarization is the original index of polarization of 
Esteban and Ray (1994). The Alesina et al. (2003) index are obtained using different values of α and 
under the assumption that distance is constant and equal to 1. 
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Notice that although Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2003) may look similar they are rather different. Esteban and Ray deal with the 
calculation of polarization when distances are continuous while Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol provide an index to calculate polarization when distances are 
discrete. 
We use equations (1), (2), and (3) to calculate various measures of fractionalization 
and polarization. Appendix 1 shows that the pair-wise correlations between our 
measures, on the one hand, and investment, human capital and labor growth rates, on 
the other, is small (the largest is 0.11). Notice that the simple correlation among our 
measures of fractionalization and polarization is high (the smallest is 0.83). It is also 
worth noting that while the correlation coefficients between our diversity measures 
and human capital tend to be positive, the same with respect to investment and 
population growth tend to be negative (although in both cases they are not 
statistically significant). In between these extremes, the negative correlation between 
growth and all our measures of fractionalization and polarization is milder, ranging 
from -0.24 to -0.37. 
3.3 Results 
The objective of this section is to revisit the effect of ethnic diversity on economic 
growth. To do so, we estimate the standard augmented Solow model proposed by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
24
 MRW’s econometric specification is as follows:  
  ugnss
L
Y
hk  )ln(lnln)ln( 3210    (4) 
where Y/L is output per capita, sk is the rate of investment in physical capital, sh is 
the rate of investment in human capital, n is the population growth rate, g is the rate 
of technological change and δ is the depreciation rate.25 Subscripts for countries and 
(the four) time periods are omitted
26
. Notice that although the estimation in the 
original MRW paper was done by OLS, we here follow the more recent literature 
(e.g., McCleary and Barro, 2006) and first estimate (4) using SUR.  
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 In the fractionalization and growth literature, this approach is used by, for instance, Montalvo and 
Reynal-Queyrol (2003).  
25
We follow MRW in assuming that the sum of g and δ is constant. Although they assume it is 
constant at 5%, here we report results assuming that the sum of rates is 7.5% so as to reflect the larger 
depreciation observed in the capital stocks inherited from the socialist period. 
26
 See appendix 2 for definitions of variables 
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Table 1 has our results treating polarization and fractionalization in a manner similar 
to that of the literature, that is, as exogenous variables. The specifications in Table 1 
all include initial income while all of those in Table 2 exclude it.
 
Column 1 in Table 
1 shows that the coefficients on investment, human capital, and population carry 
their expected signs (positive, positive and negative, respectively). Initial income is 
negative, but insignificant.
27
 Exogenous ethnic fractionalization, however, has an 
almost negligible effect on growth.
28
 Column 2 shows that the ethnic 
fractionalization index has no effect on growth, while columns 3 and 4 show that 
diversity is also not significant when proxied by any of the two versions of the 
Alesina et al.’s polarization measure. The same conclusion holds for the Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol measure (column 5). These results may well be driven, for 
example, by ethnicity not being the appropriate dimension for conflict in these 
countries. In order to address this possibility, we computed two additional indexes. 
First, a principal components index of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalization dimensions was constructed.
 
Column 6 reports these results and 
shows that this broader index is also not statistically significant. Second, we 
constructed an average index of these three fractionalization dimensions. Column 7 
confirms that diversity is still statistically insignificant. 
Table 2 repeats the estimations of Table 1 but excluding initial income. Column 1 
shows that the coefficients on investment, human capital, and population are now all 
significant and carry their expected signs (positive, positive, and negative, 
respectively). However, the coefficients of all diversity indexes are still not 
significant, except column 4 which shows that the ethnic polarization index with 
=1.6 is negative and statistically significant.  
In sum, these findings on diversity are in line with most of the recent literature in 
that these estimates show that its direct effect on economic performance is weak. 
One possibility that the literature has not yet explored is that diversity changes over 
time and may also be endogenous (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Fast 
growing economies will attract migrants, while newly independent states may try to 
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  There are important data quality issues that should be kept in mind when interpreting these results 
(for a discussion see Campos and Coricelli, 2002). 
28
 The results from a standard Granger-causality test show that there is no evidence supporting the 
notion that growth (Granger-) causes diversity.  
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expel formerly dominant ethnic minorities (say, Russians). We now turn to 
econometric results that try to take these possibilities into account. 
Instrument selection is always a difficult matter. It is made more severe in this case 
by the fact that there has been little effort to explain theoretically or empirically the 
evolution of ethnic diversity over time. In this light, we tried a number of variables 
and combinations of variables and settled on the lagged diversity index and latitude 
(the absolute value of distance from the equator). We subject this choice to extensive 
testing and conclude that these two variables perform satisfactorily. 
We start by examining the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.  The 
objective of this test is to help establish the validity of the instruments, that is, that 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals and that their selection is 
justified.  A rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that the instruments are 
not valid. As it can be seen in the “diagnostics” panels of Tables 3 and 4, the null is 
not rejected in all cases at conventional (95%) confidence levels suggesting that 
these instruments are indeed valid. 
In terms of identification, next we report on tests for the relevance of the instrument 
set, that is, whether the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. 
We report the Shea Partial R-squared (with only one endogenous regressor, this 
statistic is equivalent to the more common partial R-square) and the F-test of the 
excluded instruments in the corresponding first-stage regression. The results from 
these two tests support the validity of our set of instruments. The R-square figures 
are very high and the value of the F-statistic is above 10 in all specifications of tables 
3 and 4. The Anderson canonical correlation likelihood-ratio test (CCLR) 
corroborates these conclusions.   
Finally, we also report the Pagan-Hall and RESET tests. The Pagan-Hall tests for 
heteroskedasticity in the IV context. Given the extraordinary variation in growth 
performance across these transition economies over time, some may worry that this 
can be an important source of bias. None of the results in tables 3 and 4 suggest 
heteroskedasticity problems in the estimated equations’ disturbance process. The 
RESET test we report is the Ramsey's regression error specification test as proposed 
by Pesaran and Taylor (1999). It shows all models in tables 3 and 4 are correctly 
specified in that omitted variables bias does not seem to be severe.  
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In Table 3, we report our estimates of the augmented Solow model using 
instrumental variables techniques. These allow us to treat ethnic diversity as an 
endogenous variable. With initial income in the specification, we find that the 
coefficients on investment, population, and initial income are not significant, 
although the one for human capital is positive and statistically significant. Column 1 
shows our results using dynamic (endogenous) diversity: the coefficient on ethnic 
fractionalization is now negative and significant. Columns 2 and 3 show that for the 
two versions of the Alesina et al.’s polarization measure and for the Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol’s index (column 4), the coefficients on ethnic fractionalization are 
also negative and now statistically significant. Column 5 shows that our principal 
components’ ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization index generates similar 
conclusions, namely that dynamic and endogenous fractionalization seem to have a 
negative and robust first-order effect on economic growth. Column 6 presents similar 
results for the average of the three diversity dimensions (ethnic, religious and 
linguistic).  
Table 4 presents similar results but excluding initial income from all specifications. 
As it can be seen, the only standard explanatory variable that remains significant is 
human capital. For the set of diversity indexes, we can see that all of the relevant 
coefficients are still negative and all except one (out of six) are statistically 
significant.  
For the sake of sensitivity analysis, we also apply the Blundell and Bond’s (1998) 
System GMM estimator. Table 5 presents GMM estimations for our augmented 
Solow model. The coefficients on investment, population, and human capital are 
statistically insignificant in all specifications (Table 5). The diversity indices are 
treated as exogenous and it can be seen that none of the various versions of the index 
is significant (the fractionalization index in Column 1, the Alesina et al. polarization 
index in column 2, the MRQ index in Column 3, and in columns 4 and 5, our two 
ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization indices). Notice that we were not able to 
generate results for the Alesina et al. 1.6 polarization index. Overall, these results in 
table 5 are similar to the one we discussed above in that exogenous diversity has no 
discernible first-order impact on economic growth.  
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Table 6 reports System GMM results when diversity is treated as endogenous. In this 
case, the coefficients on human capital are positive and now statistically significant. 
Population and investment are insignificant. Once the diversity indexes are treated as 
endogenous, the coefficients all carry the hypothesized negative sign and are 
statistically significant. The instruments applied are the lagged dependent variable 
and the latitude
 
variable. The system GMM estimator uses as instruments for the 
original equation, the first difference of all variables, while for the differenced 
equation, instruments are the lagged variables of the original model. In our case, 
investment, human capital, and population are considered as predetermined 
explanatory variables which are expected to be not correlated with the past and 
present value of the errors, while latitude is considered strictly exogenous. Notice 
that the test for the first-order residual serial correlation suggests that the model does 
not suffer from serial correlation.
29
 Moreover, the validity of the instruments in the 
system GMM results is supported by the Hansen test. Note also that we use the two-
step estimation, where the standard errors are corrected for panel specific auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity and we also apply the Windmeijer correction 
(Roodman, 2006).  In our view, we prefer the results in tables 3-4 to those in Tables 
5-6 (that is, we prefer the IV estimates to the System GMM ones) because our panel 
is very short both in terms of countries and especially in terms of time periods. 
Despite the potential problems with the GMM results, it is comforting to see that the 
main conclusions change little compared to the IV results, namely, that exogenous 
and static diversity seem to have little effect on growth while the same effect is much 
more statistically robust and economically meaningful from a model that takes into 
account the dynamics of diversity as well as of its exogenous component.  
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates a number of questions related to the behavior of ethnic 
diversity over time and across countries and its effects in terms of economic 
performance. We studied how much weight should be attached to the assumption 
that ethnic diversity does not change over time. We noted that this assumption is 
used widely. Paradoxically, the index of ethnic fractionalization that is commonly 
used in the literature was developed by researchers from former communist 
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   As our panel covers only four periods and we use the one-period lagged diversity as an instrument, 
we are unable to run the AR(2) test. 
 31 
 
countries, that turn out to experience most dramatic changes in ethnic diversity in a 
very short period of time. We use census or micro-census data to create such indices 
for four points in time for a sample of 26 transition economies. Using these 
measures, and in line with the recent literature, we find weak evidence of a direct 
effect of diversity in the standard augmented Solow growth model. On the other 
hand, our panel estimates show that dynamic (endogenous) ethnic fractionalization is 
negatively related to growth, with equally robust results obtaining for measures of 
ethnic polarization.   
As mentioned above, there are a number of issues that make the situation of ethnic 
groups in the transition countries somewhat special. In our view, those reasons 
support the dramatic changes in the ethnic composition we observe in such a short 
period of time. Although we do not think it is reasonable to expect that changes of 
this magnitude could be observed for other groups of developing countries over ten 
years or so, data may be available that would allow future research to relax the 
assumption that since 1960, that is over the last half-century, the degree of ethnic 
homogeneity has not change meaningfully in poorer countries. Such test can be 
accomplished, for instance, using decade averages of available ethnic diversity 
measures. This will be useful in re-assessing the recent discussion about the channels 
through which diversity (indirectly) affect growth. It is clear, however, that the 
construction of census-based measures for larger samples of developing countries 
over longer periods of time is still a rather demanding task. 
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Chapter Four 
Are Recent Reforms Enough for a Prosperous Performance? 
Developing Countries in Progress 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The growing literature on reform and growth aims to determine the ultimate factors 
that affect raising the prosperity and the achievements of higher economic 
development. Theoretically, reforms that lead to changes in economic structures are 
almost always accompanied by political and social shifts
30
. Reform targets are set to 
create appropriate rules and institutions for more effective economic systems. They 
do not just focus on specific variables that are supposed to be correlated with 
growth, or explain it, such as technology, FDI, public expenditure, and human 
capital which may yield a wrong or incomplete understanding of the growth 
process. Moreover, there is a consensus in the literature that reform is dynamic and 
changeable. Many studies distinguish between developing and developed countries 
in terms of reforms effects and policies, and divide them into regions. Most 
developing countries require better economic environments and more investments 
in both institutions and infrastructure. Forstner and Isaksson (2002) state that the 
growth differences between countries are obvious; particularly for manufacturing 
growth in both developed and developing countries. Also, technological 
developments form the main sources of productivity growth in the developed 
countries while in developing ones they are a minor factor. They also show that 
capital accumulation is very important at any stage for development, but 
productivity still accounts for the differences between countries. Furthermore, there 
is a continuous divergence between developed and developing economies in 
reforms and growth. Sachs and Warner (1995) explain a number of causes: firstly 
technology is more productive in the advanced countries; secondly convergence 
occurs between countries which have advanced human capital; thirdly poor 
countries have low long-run income levels. Moreover, liberalization, openness, and 
institutions are considered to be, to a large degree, the main channels to global 
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 For example; See Acemuglu et al. (2001) and Fanelli and Popov (2003). 
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integration, higher growth and more development; the South East Asia experience is 
an attractive example. This section concentrates on developing countries which 
have had intermediate income level in the last two decades
31
. 
The objective of this study is to provide evidence on the relationship between 
economic performance indicators, in particular economic growth and industrial 
growth, and on the other hand economic reforms by concentrating on the following 
aspects: external stability, macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization, financial 
development and institutional quality. More specifically, this study intends to test (1) 
the effect of structural reform on economic and industrial growth, (2) the effect of 
institutions on economic performance, and (3) to determine the most influential 
factors fostering economic growth and industry in developing countries. This chapter 
uses a panel dataset over the period 1980-2006. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section two presents a literature review of 
economic reform and the determinants of economic growth in developing countries; 
Section three provides the data and construction of the reform indicators; Section 
four explains the econometric methodology; Section five provides the results. 
Various economic reform aspects are measured and analysed. The last section is 
summary and conclusion. 
4.2 Literature background on reforms and growth 
This section concentrates on the literature related to developing countries’ reforms 
and growth. The main objective of reforms is to achieve high and sustainable growth 
(economic performance). This requires understanding the determinants of growth. 
According to the Solow model (1956), the steady-state of equilibrium will be 
reached by technology and exogenous saving rates and population growth. The 
determination of economic growth, as an indicator of economic performance, is a 
sophisticated and continuous process. Bosworth and Collins (2003), for example, 
mention that there is no consensus about the explanations of growth differences and 
whether capital accumulation or total factor productivity (TFP) accounts for such 
differences and also whether increased education versus the importance of economic 
policy as determinants of economic growth. In the same context; Durlauf et al. 
(2008) state that there is no unique growth strategy. On other words, they found that 
                                                 
31 World Bank classification in 2009 is considered here.  
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fundamental growth theories are not very important. However, macroeconomic 
policies and regional heterogeneity have an important role.  
The empirical studies also yield various and different results. Mankiw et al. (1992) 
show that the share of both physical and human capital with population growth 
account for 80 percent of international variation in per capita incomes, while Klenow 
and Andrés (1997) find that TFP accounts for 90 percent of cross national variation 
in growth rates. Studies about growth aim to determine the channels that influence 
economic growth. Bosworth and Collins (2003) argue that the differences in 
conclusions in the previous studies can be explained by measurement errors, 
differences of data or definitions, and misspecifications of regressions. Moreover, 
the rate of capital depreciation is more relevant as a proxy of change of capital than 
the rate of investment. The differences in initial conditions and governmental 
institutions account for the large variation of economic growth across countries. 
Also, the macroeconomic policies and S-W indicators of openness, used in many 
studies, are not typically associated with economic growth. Similarly, Easterly 
(2001) concludes that there are several possible explanations for the stagnant growth 
of developing countries in the 80s and 90s: (1) OECD slowdown growth may lead to 
LDC slowdown. (2) A common shock for both OECD and LDC has occurred. (3) 
Mis-specification regression during 80s, 90s yields the misleading results. He argues 
that the 60s-70s periods were exceptional and the 80s-90s is a continuation of the 
tendency of divergence between developed and developing countries. As for the last 
two decades, Easterly (2001) claims that most reforms have not been efficient.  
Economists and governments think of reforms as a solution to economic stagnation 
and to the divergence between developed and developing countries. The first insight 
of economic reform was in the 70s on liberalization of financial and trade sectors. 
After that, the Washington consensus was established in the 80s to include also 
industry, capital flows, exchange rates, privatization, and the like. In the 90s the 
packages of reform were expanded; the Washington consensus became part of a 
multi-reform agenda. The URP (Understanding Reform Project) extends such 
reforms as “movements towards more market oriented economic systems, usually in 
the context of more open political institutions”. Loayza and Soto (2003) define the 
market-oriented reform as a “policy measure that allows and induces the competitive 
participation of private agents in a sector, activity, or market”. The definition of 
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reform however, is still ambiguous and has been understood differently. Moreover, 
reform programs are varied and diversified broadly across countries, time, and 
circumstances. With regard to the Washington consensus, it is considered as a 
framework for reforms in the developing countries, launched firstly for the LAC 
countries in the 80s. Williamson (2004) develop his 1991 agenda taking into account 
the criticisms and he present a new strategy as follows: (1) Government intervention 
to enhance macrocosmic stabilisation especially regards inflation; (2) the 
complementarily of reforms and the continuity of privatisation programs that the 
more effective and better institutions, the more productive policies; (3) paying more 
attention for social sides and improving income distribution. 
The original suggested prescription of Washington consensus is as follows: fiscal 
discipline; reorientation of public expenditure; tax reform; financial liberalization; 
unified and competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization; openness to FDI; 
privatization; deregulation; and security property rights (Rodrik 2002 cited in 
Williamson 2004). However, Krugman (1995) cited in Easterly (2001) states that 
“the real economic performance of countries that had recently implemented 
Washington consensus policies was distinctly disappointing”.  
On the other hand, Rodrick (2008a; 2008b) argues that these recipes are not enough. 
They require a better and more organized environment allowing for active market 
mechanism (i.e. institutions) which Rodrick called “second best institutions”. 
Moreover,  Fanelli and Popov (2003) show that global concerns, particularly the 
crises in Mexican economy and East Asia caused by the financial and 
macroeconomic liberalization, require a Second Generation of Reforms (SGR), as a 
response to the shortcomings of the First Generations of Reforms (FGR), aiming to 
enhance the institutions’ quality and to secure sustainable growth. They try in their 
paper to provide a clear picture of the reform process by answering why, what, and 
how reforms were launched. It is important to know the incentives and goals of 
reforms, polices and resources, and technical and political evaluations. 
Another criticism for Washington consensus reforms is made by Liew et al. (2003). 
They conclude that reforms should not be standardized, but should differ across 
countries because structures and initial conditions are crucial. The success of reform 
depends mainly on local efforts of the concerned country. Moreover they mention 
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some factors that boost or hinder decisions to reform: ethnic and religious diversity 
in the country, international influences, influence of crises, political institutions. 
However, Staehr (2005) argues that initial conditions play an important role just in 
the first years of reforms and transitions. 
Moreover, the adoption of long-term reform plans depends on their targets; 
Dewatripont and Roland (1995) build a model of large-scale economic reforms 
based on Eastern Europe’s transition. They compare a gradualist with a big-bang 
strategy and found gradualist reform is more politically acceptable because the big-
bang strategy depends on raising “high reversal costs”. 
Transition to liberalization and integration into the global economy forces 
developing countries to adopt an effective property rights system especially for those 
who followed socialism before. As one of the solutions suggested to the 
maximization of national welfare is changing ownership structure (Currie, 2005). 
The private sector is considered more efficient than the public one for the following 
reasons as mentioned in (Helik, 1997): private ownership produces more efficiency, 
as it gives more incentives to managers leading to reduced costs and increased 
productivity; privatization allows for more competitions and less monopolism which 
leads to more gains; privatization encourages more efficiency by allowing firms to 
access capital markets; privatization reduces public sector domination of  productive 
resources. 
Critics of reform raise some significant issues. It is true reforms could negatively 
affect the interest of public employees, privatization could negatively affect the 
employees of public enterprises, reform of public sector pensions would reduce 
privileges of public employees, and trade liberalization would be detrimental to 
industrialists in the import substitution sectors. It is also true that the removal of 
public goods subsidies in the name of fiscal prudence, the adoption of cost recovery 
of social services to make them self-financing and lowering corporate taxation to 
promote investment could be detrimental to the poor and benefit the rich. But all 
reforms are costly to someone. Therefore, their merit should be judged by whether 
they make society better off or not, and whether the winners are made to compensate 
the losers. 
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 On measuring and evaluating reforms, it is a difficult and sophisticated course of 
action. Loayza and Soto (2003) present ‘‘policy and outcome based ways’’ to 
measure market-oriented reforms in first and second generation reforms; the policies 
involve domestic financial systems, international financial markets, international 
trade, labour markets, tax systems, public infrastructure and public firms, legal and 
regulatory frameworks, and governance. Fanelli and Popov (2003) mention some 
problems when measuring the reforms: black economy growth, declines in 
government revenues to GDP, financial weaknesses, increased inability of states to 
deliver public goods, and weak legal enforcement.  
Furthermore, reforms depend on their components. Economists pay attention to 
structural reform, macroeconomic stability, external stability, and in turn these 
components depend on their sub-components. Structural reform aims to increase the 
economy market orientation through more trades, openness, and enhancing the 
private investment environment. On the other hand, macroeconomic stability aims to 
keep the macro variables out of shock and to control the government role through 
public expenditure reduction and lower inflation (Nabli and Véganzonès-
Varoudakis, 2007).  
Empirically, a flood of research has been streamed to discuss the reform-growth 
nexus. Hausmann et al. (2005) define growth acceleration as “an increase in per 
capita growth of 2 percentage points or more”. Furthermore, the growth should be 
continuous for at least eight years and its rate after that is more than 3.5 percent per 
year. They conclude that the growth acceleration is not predictable and not related to 
economic reforms and political shifts. Also, reform does not lead to that acceleration.  
In the following part of this section, some evidence is presented about the main 
reform areas which determine economic performance: financial development, trade 
liberalization and institutional quality.  
First of all, accumulation of capital in the industrial sector is still of high importance 
for growth in developing countries. Dewan and Hussein (2001) conclude that the 
central government saving rate as a proportion of GDP is positively correlated with 
economic growth. They also find evidence between government spending on health 
and education and per capita growth. Moreover, the fluctuations in the agriculture 
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production sector in developing countries in which it forms a significant percentage, 
cause slowdown in growth. 
Many studies have focused on the relationship between growth and the financial 
sector. On a seminal work, Loayza and Ranciere (2006) employ short and long- run 
analyses using Pooled Mean Group estimations and state that there is a positive 
relationship between financial development and growth in the long-run with mostly 
negative effects in the short run. On the same line and using the same estimator, 
Demetriades and Law (2006) find that financial development also affect economic 
performance (GDP per capita) within a strong institutional environment. They apply 
panel data for 72 countries over 1978-2000, distinguishing between regions 
according to their income levels. 
Boulila and Trabelsi (2004) summarize the literature concerning the relation between 
financial development and economic growth; they state that there is a positive 
relationship but no causality determination was found. Furthermore, the time series 
approach used to support the causality between financial development and growth 
varies across countries and depends on the financial liberalization. Although there is 
weak evidence that finance boosts the economy, they support the causality from real 
to financial sector in MENA. Moreover, according to Achy (2005), there is a positive 
relationship between financial liberalisation and growth, but he find that there is a 
negative effect of financial depth on private investment because of the relationship 
between financial development and the development of mortgage and consumer 
credit markets.  
In theory, the second main reform area discussed here, trade liberalization has the 
virtue of increasing the degree of competition faced by domestic producers. 
Competition leads to improved products (as domestic product will have to compete 
with the inflow of imported goods), discipline of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
behaviour of domestic producers and thereby cheaper consumption. Thus it will 
increase welfare in the longer term. The reality is different in the sense that when 
competition becomes aggressive the tendency is that large foreign companies 
eliminate domestic rivals even when these companies are efficient. Apart from the 
theoretical arguments for trade liberalization, some benefits have also been identified 
such as access to new ideas and technology, political trade-offs. Experience has 
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shown that theories are always different from realities. Many developing countries 
that have adopted trade liberalization have started complaining that trade 
liberalization has had a negative impact on their economies. This argument is 
understandable when these countries practise only one of many forms of trade 
restriction/intervention in order to correct the imbalance noticed in their economies. 
Besides all the countries of the world practise trade intervention but the degree of 
intervention varies from one economy to the other. Trade restriction is carried out 
through the implementation of trade policies which are peculiar to a specific nation. 
Loayza and Soto (2003) conclude that government intervention is necessary when 
the market fails because of “asymmetries of information, moral hazards, or natural 
monopoly”.  
Dollar and Kraay (2003) argue those countries which trade more, grow faster. 
Moreover, they find a strong relationship between rapid growth in the very long run, 
high level of trade and relevant institutions. Moreover, Shachmurove (2004) says 
that trade openness is vital both for increases in per capita income and achieving 
economic progress. It has been indicated that trade liberalization is positively related 
to economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995); Kneller (2007) also argues against 
positive benefits by concluding that trade liberalization may be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for development. Trade liberalization effects growth indirectly 
through fiscal policy changes.  
Fanelli and Popov (2003) likewise, argue that there is no evidence that more trade, as 
a part of reforms, leads to more growth. However, the protection benefits are 
dependent on achieved technological advances. In addition, the wider the gap 
between the countries applying protection, and advanced countries, the greater the 
benefits obtained from restricted trade.  
Shafaeddin (2005) discusses the performance of a sample of developing countries 
that adopted trade liberalization and economic reform from 1980. Trade policy alone 
is not sufficient for rapid growth. Instead, institutional factors are important for 
success or failure of trade policies. Thus, it is important to draw policies whish raise 
productivity, especially through education and infrastructures. 
The role of institutions in driving economic change and growth has again come back 
to the debate in the recent years (Nelson, 2008). In particular, economists would like 
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to study the effect of institutions on variation in development between nations and to 
determine factors behind growth.  
The research, which has mostly been theoretically researched, suggests that there is a 
strong positive role for institutions in economic organizations and systems 
(Gagliardi, 2008). However, the increased available data and the tendency to 
measure the institutions’ effect via proxy variables allow empirical investigation of 
the role of institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) show, using different estimations, that 
the effects of institutions on economic performance are significant and robust. They 
also provide evidence that improving initiations is essential to better economic gains. 
Moreover, Acemoglu et al. (2005) prove that economic institutions encouraging 
economic growth when there are political power allocation to groups with interests. 
They illustrate their framework using a number of historical examples.  
Knack and keefer (1995) use an average ICRG index of five variables32 in their 
economic growth model over 1986-1995 periods. They demonstrate that institutions 
have positive effects on economic performance. 
In a seminal work, Hall and Jones (1999) show the effects of institutions on 
economic performance. They show that differences in economic performances 
indicators such as productivity and output per worker can be explained by the 
differences in institutions and government policies which they called “social 
infrastructure”. They use instrumental variables, such as latitude and language to 
measure the institutional effect on sample of 127 countries. Another important 
conclusion is the need to distinguish between the proximate and the fundamental 
variables which determine economic performance. 
Interestingly, Rodrik et al. (2004) find that institution’s role defeats geographic and 
trade variables in explaining income levels all over the world. They use instrumental 
techniques to explore the role of initiations. However, geography and trade were no 
longer significant and held wrong signs when all those three variables run together. 
Recently, Bhattacharyya (2004) find the same results when changing the dependent 
variable form level to growth.    
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 (rules of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of 
contracts) 
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Moreover, Law and Habibullah (2006) study the effect of institutional quality and 
financial development on economic performance in East Asian countries and they 
also found that the main results were that financial development is more influential 
when applied in a sound institutional environment. In addition, they stated that 
institutions are essential to boost economic performance.   
In a survey paper, Gagliardi (2008) concludes that the role of institutions is 
unavoidable for economic change and therefore for better economic prosperity.  
Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) use a panel of 44 developing countries 
over the period 1970-1999 to generate reform indicators by principal components 
analysis to study the relationship between economic reform and growth. The analysis 
shows: (1) Macroeconomic reforms achieved a small advance in the 1990s, as 
compared to 1980s, inflation and public deficit. (2) External stability: there was little 
improvement in the global sense, especially with the increasing foreign debt in the 
1980s. (3) Structural reform: a notable performance was achieved, but that does not 
mean active financial institutions existed. Also, trade openness was not sufficient. 
The estimation was consistent with theory; the more improvements and increases in 
investment, macroeconomic stability, external stability, structural reforms and the 
physical, human capital, the higher the growth rates achieved. 
Sekkat and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2004) determine that weak global integration is 
a major cause for the insufficient growth. The authors discuss the relationship 
between trade policy and FDI; types of investment incentives are mentioned. They 
conclude that trade and foreign exchange liberalization are very important for 
increasing FDI inflows both for the economy in general and the manufacturing 
sector.  
In their study on the relationship between industrial growth and quality of 
institutions, Grigorian and Martinez (2000) find a robust impact of institutions on 
industrial growth via either investment or TFP. 
Finally, in terms of the importance of measuring the effect of reform on industrial 
growth, few studies demonstrate this relationship in developing countries. Industries 
in developing countries are important because these countries still have potential for 
higher growth in this sector. This will enable them to solve some structural economic 
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problems such as unemployment, low growth rates, and also to exploit available 
natural resources. 
Rodrik (2009) states industrial activity and economic growth are highly correlated. 
Furthermore, Luken and Castellanos-Silveria (2009) find that those developing 
countries have adopted industrial transformation have ripped more industrial output, 
employment and reduction in energy intensity. Moreover, Grigorian and martinez 
(2000) show, in transition context, that institutional quality positively impacts 
industrial growth, in particular through investment and total factor productivity.  
They measure industrial growth by growth rate of industrial value added over the 
period 1997-1982 in 27 transition countries. Also, Dutta and ahmed (2004) apply 
cointegration and error correction model for Pakistan over the period 1973-1995. 
They find that there is a long-run relationship between the industrial value added 
growth and capital stock, labour force, real exports, import tariff collection rate 
human capital.  
4.3 Data and reform indicators 
The methodology widely used in previous literature is generating aggregated reform 
indexes by principal components analysis, normalization indexes or averaging 
related variables (Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2007). Oleh et al. (1998) cited 
in Staehr (2005) find that the aggregate reform index generally is more useful than 
any specific (individual) element. Otherwise, by substituting the variables with the 
associated components, the results would be poor. 
Following the classifications of Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) and 
Campos and Kinoshita (2009) and taking into consideration data availability, the 
aggregate economic reforms are defined as follows; external stability, 
macroeconomic stability, financial development, trade liberalization, and 
institutional quality.  
The main sources for data used in this chapter are: the World Bank dataset which is 
available from ESDS [Economic and Social Data Service], the updated version of 
the financial structure metrics with data through 2007, The Lost-decades-macro-
time-services dataset is also used, as well as Heritage Foundation, Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) and ICRG databases. However, many variables’ 
values are not available for the whole sample of 56 countries (see appendix 1) such 
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as human and physical capital indicators, military expenditure, and stock market 
capitalization. This limits the work in constructing and running the indicators and 
variables, especially in the cases of privatization and stock market development.  
This chapter attempts to construct external stability, macroeconomic stability and 
financial development by principal component analysis. The criterion is to keep all 
components which have an Eigenvalue equal to or bigger than one and to explain as 
much as possible the variance. On the other hand, trade liberalization and 
institutional quality indicators are constructed as averages of other variables as the 
data sets of these measures could provide averages indicators.  
All reform indicators manipulated to be that are the positively signed coefficients 
refer to a better effect on the economy. i.e. we convert the negative indicators which 
have positive effect to positive values.  
All reform indicators are defined as follows: 
The External Stability Indicator (ES) is a weighted index of the first two principal 
components which explain 85% of the variance. It consists of current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP, external debt as a percentage of GDP and total debt 
service as a percentage of GNI. This measure shows the external balance of the 
economy, its voluntarity to external shock, and dependence on foreign finances. The 
indicator shows that the higher the value, the better the situation of the economy.  
The Macroeconomic Stability Indicator (MS) is also a weighted index of the first 
two components which explain 78% of the variance. This index is a combination of 
log of inflation, log of black market premium, and log of general government final 
consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP. This indicator shows the 
macroeconomic balances. Controlling inflation and exchange markets are essential 
for a stable business environment and encouraging more investment. Moreover, 
government intervention is still vital in guiding the economy and providing the 
public goods for both individuals and business, especially in education, health care 
and infrastructure.   
The Financial Development Indicator (FD) is constructed as the first component that 
achieves an Eigenvalue bigger than 1 and explains 65% of variation. The composed 
variables are liquid liability as a percentage of GDP and the ratio of domestic credit 
 44 
 
issued to the private sector by banks and other intermediaries as a percentage of 
GDP
33
.  This measure shows to what extent the country has developed financially.  
The Trade Liberalization Indicator is constructed from the Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) database
34
 published by the Fraser Institution. It is only the component 
of Freedom to Trade Internationally database which is composed of many 
variables
35
of different trade aspects; barriers, regulations, taxes and the size effects 
of the countries. The higher the measure, the more the trade of a country is free.  
The Institutional Quality Indicator; ICRG political risk variables are used. To 
generate this indicator the average of 12 variables are calculated. This indicator 
measures to what extent institutions improved the country. The higher the value the 
better the institutions effects exist. This indicator is available for 130 countries since 
1984.  
Economic performance is measured by two variables; GDP growth rate and 
industrial value added growth rate. The association between the two variables is very 
high with a correlation of 0.6257. (See figure 1). 
4.4 Methodology  
Following the neoclassical model of economic growth
36
, human capital, investment, 
population and initial income variables in logarithm are included, in addition to the 
reform indicator variable. Different econometric approaches are applied to 
investigate and study this model. 
                                                 
33
 A commercial bank asset to the sum of both central and commercial bank assets is also tried. 
34
 http://www.freetheworld.com/index.html 
35 Variables of trade liberalization index as average. 
area 4: freedom to trade internationally component: 
aa taxes on international trade 
i. revenues from trade taxes (% of trade sector) 
ii mean tariff rate 
iii standard deviation of tariff rates 
b regulatory trade barriers 
i non-tariff trade barriers (gcr) 
ii compliance cost of importing and exporting (db) 
c size of the trade sector relative to expected 
d black-market exchange rates 
e international capital market controls 
i foreign ownership/investment restrictions (gcr) 
ii capital controls 
 
36
 See Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007). 
 45 
 
First, the Between Estimator is applied to show the long run effect of reforms on 
economic growth. This estimator takes the average of variables over time removing 
the trend effect of data. These kinds of estimations are widely used in growth 
literature
37
 to catch the steady-state relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables (Demetriades and Law, 2006). However, cross-section 
estimations suffer from some limitations. They do not take the advantage of panel 
data by allowing time series variation to increase the efficiency and they also hinder 
the information that could be obtained by either applying dynamic panel data or 
which is a result for the heterogeneity across countries and regions. Moreover, 
averaging data may not completely remove the trend and cyclical effects (Loayza 
and Ranciere, 2006). 
 Second, to overcome these limitations and to gain panel data advantages, 
estimations are done by using a panel error correction model (Loayza and Ranciere, 
2006) allowing the short-run and long-run effects to be derived from ARDL 
(Autoregressive distributed lag) model. 
Following Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
methodology we can keep away from requirements of cointegration tests and the 
validity of stationarity between the variables. This method allows estimations of 
different variables with different order of stationarity
38
; I(1) and I(0). Moreover, this 
model is appropriate for the panel with large N and T dimensions of data. 
Based on Pesaran et al. (1999), the panel regression model can be incorporated into 
error correction ARDL (p, q) and stated as following (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006):  
 
 
where, y is growth rate of economic performance, X is a set of independent variables 
including reform indicators, φ and  represent the short-run coefficients of 
                                                 
37
  For example, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiew et al. (1992). 
38
  All our data are either I(0) or I(1). When some variables are I(2) the estimations are not consistent. 
See Asteriou and Monastiriotis (2004) 
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dependent and independent variables respectively,  β for long-run coefficients, δ the 
coefficient of speed of adjustment to the long run status. 
The above model can be estimated by the pooled mean group (PMG) or the mean 
group (MG) estimators which both consider the long-run equilibrium and the 
heterogeneity of dynamic adjustment processes (Demetriades and Law, 2006). Also, 
these estimators computed by maximum likelihood estimations. The first estimator 
allows the intercepts, short-run and error correction coefficients to differ across 
countries. The long-run coefficients are restricted to be the same. Moreover, PMG 
yields a consistent mean short-run coefficient when N is large. The second estimator 
(MG) allows for all coefficients to vary in the long-run and short-run. However, this 
estimator is consistent in the long-run in the case of homogeneity which can only be 
tested after estimation using the Hausman test. The null of this test is that the 
difference between PMG and MG estimations is not significant, hence PMG is 
preferable (see table 5).  
The PMG estimator provides more efficient and consistent estimates in the long-run 
when homogeneity across countries is applied and short-run corrections differ 
regarding country specific characteristics such as shocks and stabilization policies. 
Moreover, as the time span in this study was only 27 years, the MG estimator had no 
enough degrees of freedom. Therefore, PMG estimations are more relevant for our 
analysis.  
Another important issue is that ARDL lag structure can be determined either by tests, 
such as Schwartz-Bayesian, or it might be imposed according to the data limitation, 
as is the case here in that the time dimension is not long enough to overextend the 
lags (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006). 
Third, for the sensitivity analysis, the panel instrumental variables estimator is 
applied. This allowed dealing with the possibility of endogeneity between growth 
measures and the targeted economic reforms. 
4.5 Results 
The data set consists of 56 countries over the period 1980-2006. All included 
countries are classified as “intermediate income level” according to the World 
Bank’s classification in 2009. The objective of this section is to understand how 
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different economic reforms would affect economic performance in developing 
countries. As a measure of economic performance, GDP growth rate is used 
following the main body in economic growth literature. Moreover, for industrial 
growth, the most used variables are growth rate of industrial value added to GDP and 
the share of industrial employment to the total employment (Rodrik, 2009).  
As discussed in the methodology section, empirical work starts by estimating panel 
data in the long-run model to show the effects of cross country approach when 
applying Between Estimator.  
Table 1 shows the regression results in the between effects model. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of GDP. All regressions include human capital, 
investment, population and initial income variables. Columns 1 through 5 include 
reform indicators (external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial development 
and trade liberalization). All would impact economic growth positively and 
statistically significant, except the institutional quality which is positive but 
statistically insignificant. It seems that economic reforms are matter for better 
economic growth. 
To investigate the difference between developing regions and how reforms could 
impact change; table 1A repeats the estimations in table 1 with dummy regions 
(MENA, LAC, ASIA and AFR)
39
.  As shown, all dummy regions have insignificant 
effects and the results do not change that all reforms still positively affect the 
economic growth even institutions.  
Table 2 provides also the results of applying Between Estimator. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of industrial value added to GDP. Column 1 shows that 
external stability has positive and significant effect on industrial activity in 
developing countries. Moreover, column 2 shows that macroeconomic stability is 
also important for growing the industry. Column 4 reports the positive and 
significant effect of trade liberalization index. However, columns 3 and 5 show that 
financial development, and institutional quality even though positive, but 
insignificant.   
                                                 
39
 MENA: Middle East and North Africa, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, ASIA: Asian countries 
and AFR: African countries. 
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Table 2A repeats the estimations of table 2 adding dummy regions. The results are 
positive and significant for all reform indicators and statistically significant.  
As the main task is to show the influence of reforms on economic performance in 
both long-run and short-run we turn to apply error correction panel model. 
Table 3 shows the estimations as GDP growth rate is the dependent variable. In the 
right hand side of the model, we include the neoclassical determinants of growth.  
For our estimations PMG estimator is applied which is more efficient and consistent 
as discussed earlier. Moreover, Hausman test states that the null of homogeneity is 
not rejected which means that there is no systematic difference between PMG and 
MG estimators and PMG is preferable as reported in table 5. The first panel reports 
long run effects, the second panel reports the error correction coefficients and the 
short run effects. Column 1 shows the results of external stability indicator, which is 
positive but insignificant in the long-run; the magnitude is very small. However, it 
affects growth positively and significantly in the short-run and the error correction 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant applying that there is a long-run 
relationship. Column 2 shows that macroeconomic stability is positive and 
statistically significant in the long run as a condition for launching further reforms. 
However, in the short run it seems insignificant. It can be noticed that there is a long-
run relationship as the error coefficient adjustment is negative and statistically 
significant. Column 3 states financial development affects economic growth 
positively in the long run and negatively in the short run. This result is consistent 
with other empirical research for example Loayza and Ranciere (2006). Moreover, 
the error correction coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Column 4 
shows the same results for trade liberalization. Finally, column 5 reports positive and 
significant effect of institutional quality on economic growth in long-run and short-
run. Also, the adjustment error is negative and significant. As noted that sometimes 
the short-run effects differ from those in the long run as a result of whether the effect 
is temporary or permanent and for the fluctuations and cyclical effects in the short-
run. In particular, it is clear for financial development and trade liberalization reform 
indicators. Also, it could be explained that on the short run, countries are not 
homogenous and not restricted to be the same, but it could be calculated by taking 
the average of the pooled mean. Furthermore, all reforms show convergence over 
time to catch up the developed courtiers’ path of growth as all adjustment 
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coefficients are negative and statistically significant. The error correction 
coefficients are relatively similar for all reforms.    
Table 4 repeats the regressions in table 3 replacing the industrial value added growth 
rate as dependent variable. Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 show the effect of reform 
indicators (external stability, macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization and 
institutional quality) on industrial progress. They have positive and statistically 
significant effect on the long-run. The exception is the financial development which 
seems to have adverse effect on industrial growth. This may be due to that more 
resources would be allocated to other activities in the economy. In addition, many 
industries in developing countries are state-owned and financed by government 
credit channels which mean more financial development will not affect them. 
However, macroeconomic stability and institutions only impact industrial growth 
positively in the short-run. Other reforms show insignificant effects. In spite of the 
strong correlation between GDP growth rate and industrial value added growth rate 
(0.62), they have been affected differently in the short run. Moreover, all reform 
indicators’ adjustment coefficients show negative and statistically significant 
confirm the long-run relationship. 
In sum, the finding of applying error correction panel data analysis of economic 
reform effects on economic performance is most consistent with the literature.  In the 
long-run most of reforms support growth in GDP and industrial value added 
measures (Rodrick, 2009 and Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2007). However, 
in the short-run, the reforms are affected by the cyclical and trend changes in the 
economy. The role of better institutions is highly significant in both long and short- 
run. 
For robust analysis, instrumental variable techniques were applied. This concern is 
emerged to show reforms as indirect channel would affect growth and to check to 
what extent the quality of institutions and other reforms would enhance the reform 
impact over the economy. 
In table 6, estimations of the panel augmented Solow model applying 2SLS are 
presented. Reforms treated as endogenous variables. The dependent variable is GDP 
growth rate. Investment variable has a positive effect on growth which is consistent 
with theory. However, human capital and population growth show mixed results. 
 50 
 
The main concern is the reform influence and when they are accompanied with 
institutional drive. Column 1 shows results for external stability: the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant. Column 2 reports also positive statistically 
significant effect of macroeconomic stability reform. Moreover, interestingly, 
column 3 states the financial development impact growth positively in the long run 
as endogenous variable; better institutions would enable economy to benefit from 
financial improvements. Column 4 shows that trade liberalization enhances growth 
as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Institutions, as measured by 
institutional quality indicator, are considered the main instrument. In addition, the 
lagged reform indicator is also considered as a good instrument which explains the 
incremental and continual effect of past reform on boosting and driving the current 
traces of reforms. Various reform indicators and variables, and other variables were 
treated such as infrastructure (fixed telephone lines per 1000). The selection of 
instruments is restricted to those pass a battery of diagnostic tests.  
Table 7 presents the instrumental variable results when dependent variable is the 
growth rate of industrial vale added to GDP as a measure of industrial performance. 
All columns from 1 to 4 show that different economic reforms (external stability, 
macroeconomic stability, financial development and trade liberalization) affect 
industry positively when these reforms are channelled through institutions and trade 
liberalization indicators. These results show the importance of building up better 
institutions to raise the industrial growth in developing countries. Moreover, more 
openness and reforming trade sector would increase the industrial output via exports 
and trade. This also shows the importance of integrating in the global economy and 
work within better institutional environment. 
Regarding the instruments tests, it is essential to check the validity and relevance of 
the instruments. First, all instruments reported in the regressions at tables 5 and 6 
passed Hansen test of overidentification. This test shows the validity of the 
instruments which are uncorrelated with the residuals so their selection is 
econometrically accepted. A rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that the 
instruments are not valid. As it can be seen in the “diagnostics” panels of Tables 3 
and 4, the null is not rejected suggesting that the instruments we use are valid. 
Second, to investigate the relevance of the instruments, that the excluded instruments 
are correlated with the endogenous variables. F-test results are significant and bigger 
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than 10 (as a rule of thumb). Moreover, The Anderson canonical correlation 
likelihood-ratio test (CCLR) corroborates these conclusions. Its null hypothesis is 
that the model is underidentified so a rejection of the null would suggest that the 
estimated models are identified. As it can be seen, this turns out to be the case for all 
columns in Tables 6 and 7.   
Table 6A & 7A repeat the regressions in table 6 & 7 respectively by adding the 
regional dummies to show the difference in different regions. The tables show the 
same results as previous and confirm that the reforms still important for better 
economic prosperity. 
In sum, the economic reforms would boost the economic performance in the long-
run indirectly, especially when institutions are well established and activated.   
4.6 Conclusions 
This section has discussed economic reforms, their impact on economic performance 
as measured by GDP growth rate and industrial value added growth rate, and the 
most influential reforms in developing countries. The economic reforms target to 
build appropriate rules and institutions for more effective economic systems. 
However, there are a lot of remarkable growth differences between developed 
countries and developing countries. Furthermore, the literature stresses that the long-
term growth is dependent on three main groups: human capital and its quality, the 
availability of physical resources and their efficient usages, and technological 
advancement. Moreover, the effect of reforms is considered as a main support for 
growth 
The main objective of this chapter is to study the inter-relationship between 
developing economies, reforms, and growth. The economic reform indicators show 
that most developing countries have reform programmes since the beginning of the 
80s; the reforms have had essential role as they positively impact growth in 
developing countries especially in the long-run.  
This study uses a panel of 56 developing countries, over the period of 1980-2006 in 
order to examine the effects of economic reforms as determinants of economic 
performance. The main reforms investigated are external stability, macroeconomic 
stability, financial development, trade liberalization and institutional quality. 
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The main contribution in this chapter is to analyse the short-run and long-run effect 
of reforms on economic performance. It has been shown that in the long-run, 
economic reform drives the economy and also boosts industry in developing 
countries. Moreover, the analysis shows that developing countries converge into 
developed countries paths in the long run equilibrium. Also, institutions play an 
essential role in driving reforms and enhancing the economic output either in total or 
in industrial sectors. Trade liberalization and global integration both encourage the 
industrial growth in developing countries. 
In sum, reforms are important for economic growth and industrial growth. They need 
to be more comprehensive, rapid, and accompanied with more institutional support. 
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Chapter Five 
Firm Performance and Business Environment, Competition, 
Ownership and Exports in Syrian Industrial Private Sector 
5.1 Introduction 
Although Syria is one of the most discussed economies of the Middle East, very little 
empirical evidence exists to inform this topic. The objective of this chapter is to help 
fill this gap. We tried to provide one of the first empirical assessments
40
 of an 
important aspect of the Syrian economy, namely the relationship between overall 
business conditions (the so-called “investment climate”) and various measures of 
economic performance. In order to do so, we use a survey administered in 2009 
which contains information on 508 firms (World Bank’s Investment Climate 
Assessment, ICA hereafter). This survey provides a detailed picture of the Syrian 
industrial private sector as most of the firms in our sample are privately-owned
41
 
(36.42 % are owned by individuals) and have on average of about 90 full-time 
employees (according to 2008 data at ICA survey data).  
Syria is an interesting country that has an attractive geographical location in the heart 
of the Middle East, suitable potentially for investment and trade. Its economy 
recently has been transited towards market-oriented reforms. Its economy is based on 
agriculture, which accounts for 20.63% of GDP in 2007
42
 while industry 
(manufacturing, construction and electricity and water) accounts for 23% of GDP. 
Manufacturing sector accounts for only 7.9% of GDP. After the independence in 
1947, and the Baath party leadership in 1970, there was strong government 
interference in economy with large state engagement in most of economic activities; 
in particular, infrastructure, education and manufacturing. However, private sector 
and public private partnership sectors were allowed to work under some laws and 
regulations. The need to boost the economy and to catch up with developed countries 
and also to overcome the poor productivity led to the adoption of more open 
economic policies and market-oriented reforms in 1990. The government issued a 
                                                 
40
  We did the first trail using 2003 survey data. We choose to update the analysis and to overcome the 
poor data quality. 
41
  10 firms are public state-owned over the whole sample (508). 
42
 Central Bureau of Statistics, Syria (2007)  
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new law (law no. 10 in 1990, improved in 2003 and in 2007) which allows more 
private sector involvement in the economy. Despite the new investment law, the 
participation of industry in GDP did not rise. 
The role of investment climate has increasingly become fashionable in the economic 
debate. Many studies have been devoted to show its relationship with firm 
performance especially in developing countries. The new available micro level 
datasets, collected mainly by World Bank surveys, encourage further research to link 
business environment to firm performance which would lead to better understanding 
of economic growth. Investment climate can be defined as “the location-specific 
factors that shape the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, 
create jobs, and expand” (WBR, 2005). 
The objective of this chapter is to address the relationship between firm performance 
and business environment in Syrian industrial private sector. In addition, ownership, 
exports and competition are considered in this study. 
Our main finding is that in terms of sales as well as productivity in levels, firm 
performance is positively boosted by finance, technology and hindered by poor 
investment climate, particularly corruption. However, competition and ownership 
seem to have no first-order effect. On the other hand, firm performance as measured 
in terms of growth of sales, employment and productivity is seemed to be inspired by 
technology and finance.  
This chapter is organized as follows: section two reviews related literature. Section 
three explains ICA data. Section four provides a detailed picture on business 
environment in Syrian industrial private sector. Section five shows the econometric 
analysis. Section six provides the results. Finally, section seven concludes and 
summarises the main findings. 
5.2 Literature review 
Most of studies have analysed, econometrically, the main factors impact firm 
performance by using firm level data and concentrating on industrial sector 
especially on the manufacturing sector. These studies concentrate on business 
environment themes. In addition, they investigate the role of the characteristics of the 
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firm which could affect its performance, such as ownership, size, age and export 
orientation.  
Hallward-Dreimer et al. (2006) use a survey of 1500 Chinese firms in five different 
locations. They showed that firm performance, measured by sales growth, 
employment growth, investment growth and TFP, is affected by foreign and 
domestic private ownership, regulatory burden, corruption, labour-market policies 
and technological factors. However, infrastructure and access to finance play a minor 
role. They assure the importance of using firm level data to better understand firm 
growth requirements. 
Banerji and Mcliesh (2002) use a survey of 947 Yemeni firms to study governance 
and investment climate. They found corruption and economic policy uncertainty 
were major problems for firm growth. However, the severity of these problems 
differs between locations. Large firms tend to suffer more than other firms.  
Focusing on manufacturing sector, Fernandes (2008) studies the correlation between 
firm total factor productivity and business environment. She finds that managerial 
quality and global integration impact TFP positively.  
In studying the transition economies, Commander and Svejnar (2010) use data from 
BEEPS
43
 to investigate the effect of ownership, competition, export orientation and 
business environment on firm performance. They conclude that foreign ownership 
and competition affect firm performance measured by level of firm sales. When 
controlling for ownership, exports have no effect. Investment climate indicators are 
found to have a minor effect on firm performance when controlling for country fixed 
effects. Moreover, they claim that investment climate effects have been exaggerated. 
Dollar et al. (2005) show that investment climate matters for firm performance (TFP) 
in developing countries. They use data in some manufacturing sectors (garment and 
similar industries) in five economies. One contribution of this work is confirming 
that institutional impact differs over locations, so local governance is important. 
Power outage and customs delays hinder productivity and profitability, while 
financial services are positively related to growth.  
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 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. Data collected in 2002 and 2005. 
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Dollar et al. (2006) study the relationship between investment climate and 
international integration. They use firm-level data from eight developing countries
44
 
to show that better investment climate enhances exports and foreign investments. 
Moreover, they find that constraints to growth are lower in china than South Asia or 
Latin America. 
To study the role of technology and business environment, Goedhuys et al. (2008) 
applied firm level data in Tanzania. They use survey of 275 manufacturing firms to 
evaluate the productivity drivers. The main findings are foreign ownership, ISO 
certification and higher education of management impact firm productivity. 
Howevere, constraints to access finance, governmental regulatory burden and 
deficiency of business services seem to circumvent firm productivity. Finally, they 
state that business association participation is correlated with higher productivity. 
Moreover, Commander et al. (2010) stated that ICT adoption and productivity are 
very strong in developing countries. They use data set of 1000 manufacturing firms 
in Brazil and India.  
In detecting the effect of financial, legal, and corruption constrains of firm growth, 
Beck et al. (2005) use dataset of 54 countries and concluded that small firms suffer 
more of these problems. They claim that better financial and institutional 
development would limit the effect of these constrains especially for the small firms.  
Batra et al. (2003) show that investment climate diversity over locations and firm 
characteristics would affect firm performance. They announce that policy, 
institutions and governance are correlated to firm outcomes taking into account 
whether firms work in informal economy or not. They use WBES data to confirm 
that growth and investment are connected to taxation, financing and corruption. 
Moreover, they show that universal generalization of policies is undesirable as 
differences between firms, locations and countries would reveal different results. 
Carlin et al. (2006) use firm-level data of 20000 firms in 60 countries to examine 
firm growth constraints. They conclude that infrastructure (transport and 
telecommunications) is not very crucial for firm growth. However, electricity, 
corruption and crime are important for most of countries.  Moreover, Ayyagari et al. 
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  Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Honduras, India, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru. 
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(2006) provide evidence that finance, crime and policy instability directly affect firm 
growth. They used WBES conducted in 1999 and 2000 in 80 countries. 
As shown, a growing empirical research shows that investment climate matters for 
firm performance whether measured in growth or level. Moreover, other factors 
seem to affect firm performance, such as: foreign ownership, size, exports, 
competition and technology. In addition, location would impact performance 
crucially. Finally, according to the nature of investment climate surveys, very few 
attempts have been done to apply panel data. Most studies either use single country 
data or pooled data
45
.  
In light of these studies, we attempt to determine the main driving factors which 
would boost the firm performance in the Syrian industrial private sector. This 
investigation is done by using the new available survey data released from World 
Bank (2009) and by also using instrumental variable techniques in cross-section data. 
5.3 ICA data 
The data we used comes from the ICA survey carried out by World Bank and is 
aimed to assessing investment climate and productivity differences in various 
regions and countries. One main concern here is to examine Syrian business 
environment and the main factors driving the Syrian private industrial sector 
productivity. Syria is a good proxy for the developing countries in Middle East 
region. There are very few studies concentrate on this region and also on the 
intermediate income level economies (Fernandes, 2008). 
The ICA survey is based on questionnaires applied through face to face interviews 
and encompasses three main blocks or types of questions: (a) those generating 
information for the overall profiling of businesses, (b) those used for profiling the 
investment climate in which businesses operate and (c) those generating indicators of 
firm performance. These contain quantitative as well as qualitative questions. ICA 
uses firm-level data to investigate the role of government and the market in 
improving the investment climate.   
With cooperation between the World Bank and the Syrian government (specifically, 
the Ministry of Economy and Trade), data collection was carried out by researchers 
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  There are very few papers report poolability test. 
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from Damascus and Aleppo Universities. The Investment Climate Survey used a 
stratified random sample which encompassed 508 firms from the industrial sector in 
5 locations (Mouhafadhats). “It significantly over-sampled exporters. Sectorally, the 
sample was composed mostly of manufacturing firms in diverse sectors, with the 
largest concentration was on food processing, textiles and garments. The sample 
frame was drawn within strata, using a statistically valid sample selection technique, 
from databases maintained by the Federation of the Chamber of Commerce and local 
Chambers of Industry.” (World Bank, 2005. p. 67) 
The typical ICA survey generates indicators of possible deficiency in various areas: 
the provision of physical infrastructure, the structure and functioning of factor and 
product markets, inter-business relations, the state of industrial regulation, law and 
order, tax and customs administration and other aspects of governance. As there are 
quite a lot of differences in terms of the various questionnaires that have been 
conducted throughout the world, it is worth mentioning that in the Syrian case, the 
questionnaire consists of 13 sections covering about 86 questions on general 
information, sales and supplies, investment climate constraints, infrastructure and 
services, finance, business-government relations, conflict resolution, capacity, 
production costs structure, labour relation and productivity. 
The Syrian ICA survey focused on private sector firms especially the manufacturing 
sector that accounts for 68.70 % of surveyed firms (349 firms). The sample size is 
508 firms which are geographically distributed over five provinces: Aleppo (95), 
Damascus
46
 (270), Hama (41), Homs (57) and Lattakia (44). The majority of the 
Syrian population lives in these cities and they are the places where most economic 
and market activities take place. Medium sized firms dominate the sample: about 
202 firms (39.84 %) have between 20-99 permanent workers; 184 (36.29 %) are 
small and have between 1-19 permanent workers and 121 (23.87 %) are large with 
more than 100 permanent workers. The individuals (sole proprietorship) count for 
36.42 % of the sample and the cooperative firms count for 33.27 %, while 
Shareholding companies represent just 2.76 % of the sample. Only 16 firms (3.15 %) 
are foreign owned, as the majority are domestic. 
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The sample is divided according to industry into 17 categories: 11 manufacturing, 5 
services and 1 other (construction). Namely they are: chemicals 36 (7.09%), food 
processing 79 (15.55%), textiles 64 (12.6%), garment 53 (10.43%), plastic & rubber 
17 (3.35 %), non metallic mineral products 11(2.17%), basic metals 6 (1.18%), 
fabricate metal products 5 (0.98 %), electronics 8 (1.57%), machinery and equipment 
19 (3.74%), other manufacturing 51(10.04%), construction 11(2.17%), wholesale 
37(7.28%), retail 10 (1.97%), other services 72 (14.17%), IT 8 (1.57%) and finally 
tourism 21(4.13%).  
Table 1 shows the distribution of firms according to their legal status and economic 
activity. The majority of firms (sole proprietorship and cooperative) concentrate on 
garments, textiles and food processing and these are traditional types of business in 
Syria. It is noted that shareholding companies are not common in Syrian economy 
and they are just 14 (2.76% of the sample). Also, there are only two holding 
companies that are active, one in manufacturing and the other in tourism. 
Table 2 shows the size and legal status distribution of the firms. Size is defined 
according to the survey classification. The firm is small if its total number of 
employees’ ranges from 5 to 19, medium if the number ranges from 20 to 99 and the 
firm is large if the number of the total employees is 100 or more. 85 (46.19%) of the 
small firms are sole proprietorship, and 52 (28.26%) are cooperative. While 37.13% 
of medium firms are sole proprietorship and 32.18% are cooperative. Large firms are 
also dominated by cooperative type (43%) and sole proprietorship (20.66%). 
Industry is concentrated in Damascus (and Rural Damascus) and Aleppo, which 
produces 24.4% of GDP in 2008.  
Table 3 states how firms are classified according to size and activity. While it is clear 
that small firms work mainly in services, 25 in wholesales and 38 in other services, 
medium-sized firms concentrate on manufacturing. 37 firms work in food 
processing, 29 in textiles and 25 in garments. Also large-sized firms invest mainly in 
manufacturing. 
5.4 Business environment in Syria 
The survey also provides details on the business environment (See appendix 1). In 
addition to subjective data by asking managers to scale the obstacles from 0 to 4, it 
provides objective data and quantitative measures of all aspects of investment 
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climate by asking for the real number of specific measures, (e.g. how many times 
have you experienced problems and delays in power outage, water, and 
telecommunications).  
Table 4 provides information about costs, durations, and losses for various 
constraints and business components. Infrastructure and services are considered very 
important for running businesses and for cutting costs. The average time lost due to 
power outages last year was 2.7 hours each time causing an average of 9.85% loss of 
sales in firms that experienced power losses. Insufficient water supply, unavailable 
main line telephones and transport failures were responsible for 7.28%, 3.88% and 
8% of losses in sales respectively.   
The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) average for value lost of sales due to 
power outages is 5.59% and for all countries it is 4.90%. It is clear that Syrian 
infrastructure measures lag behind both regional and world averages
47
. 
Moreover, 71.46 % of firms said they had their own generators (or shared it) 
indicating that power supply is indeed one main problem. About 33.41% of the 
firms’ consumption of electricity was generated by own generators. On average, the 
cost of a generator is S.P 545106.4 (approximately $11600) for small firms; S.P 
1971327 ($ 42000) for medium firms; S.P 14500000 ($ 308500) for large firms. 
Regarding water supply, 45.43% comes from public resources, 41.87% from their 
own wells and 12.7% is purchased from private vendors.  
Capacity innovation and learning is considered one of the productivity drivers. The 
Syrian ICA survey also collects information about technological activity and 
sourcing. This information show how the firm chooses to build up its capacity and 
develop production process either by bringing new product lines or by upgrading 
existing lines or products.  Moreover, internet utilisation would express also to what 
extent the firm has developed its own communication and technological base. 
ICA 2009 shows that 20.71% of firms have internationally-recognized certification 
and 7.30% are still in process to obtain the certification. In addition, 29.17% of firms 
say that they use at the present technology licensed from foreign-owned companies. 
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http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=183&year=2009 
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Regarding adopting new technology or upgrading existing lines or products, 55.75 % 
of firms developed important new product lines and 64.90% upgraded the existing 
ones.  
 Moreover, ICA 2009 shows data about using the internet, website and emails, to 
communicate with clients and suppliers. It reveals that website usage covers about 
67% of firms in the sample. It seems most of the firms use email for their 
communications since 81.66% of firms reported that they have emails. These ratios 
rise to 83% and 92.5% respectively in the large-sized companies, which may be 
interpreted as large firms are more able to use modern communications.  
Government-Business relations and regulations occupy an important part of ICA 
data. It tried to uncover these themes by asking about the time consumed to clear 
goods form customs, and how long the managers spent for inspections.  
In terms of imports, it took on average 10 days from the time goods arrived in their 
points of entry until they could be claimed from customs, with a range from 1 to 90 
days, while firms reported on average 30 days as the longest time in the previous 
year, with a range from 1 to 400 days.  For exports, on average it took 5 days from 
the time the goods arrived at their points of exit until they cleared customs, with a 
range from 0-30 days. It also, took on average 11.67 days as the longest time in the 
previous year, with a range from 0 to 120 days. Senior management spent in a 
typical week an average of 13.2% of their time dealing with requirements imposed 
by government regulations.  
On average, burden regulations seem to be higher in Syria than MENA and world 
indicators
48
. While in Syria it takes 5.14 and 9.16 days for export and import clearing 
respectively, it takes to 6.03 and 11.32 days in MENA and 6.15 to 10.85 in other 
countries. 
As shown in table 5, firms also reported the actual delays they suffered when 
obtaining access to main infrastructure services and required permits as shown 
below. The longest delay was to gain operation and construction licences. It is also 
shown that the use of informal means to obtain such licenses is widespread. 
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In terms of how many days were spent on inspections and mandatory meetings with 
officials in the context of business regulation, table 6 states that the majority of firms 
used informal means to accelerate the process especially with the tax inspectorate, 
labour and social security, and the municipal police.   
With regards to participation of a business association or a chamber of commerce or 
industry, 95.67 % of firms reported that they are members of an association or 
chamber of commerce or industry. However, 80.66% of firms said that it is 
mandatory to gain such membership. Moreover, 28.5 % of firms reported that the 
most important reason for participation is lobbying the government, whereas 23.66 
% of firms consider these memberships important as they provide information on 
government regulations.  
Moreover, the ICA shows that firms are sometimes required to make gifts or 
informal payment to public officials to get things done and accelerate it. On average 
firms paid 5.74 % of the total annual sales as informal payment. And, on average 
9.95% of the contract value was paid informally or as gift to secure the contract. 
5.5 Econometric analysis 
In investigating the effect of investment climate, ownership, export orientation, and 
competition on firm performance, we use the following Cobb-Douglas production 
function specification (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2006; Dethier et al., 2008 & 
Commander and Svejnar, 2010): 
 
 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, firm performance, which is measured in levels of 
sales and productivity (value added). All level variables were in logs. Total sales 
were considered as proxy for revenues. Value added was calculated as the difference 
between the value of total sales and the raw materials and fuel in that year.  We also 
try to investigate the case of dependent variables as growth measures using sales 
growth, productivity growth and labor growth
49
. 
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ICs represent investment climate indicators. Z is a vector of firm characteristics, such 
as age and ownership. C for labour, capital and other control variables and D is a set 
of dummy variables for industry and location.  
ICA provides a broad list of measures for different aspects of investment climate. 
Many of these measures explain the same theme. The selection of measures was 
based on the available number of observations over locations and industries and also 
according to the most severe problem as reported by managers
50
. Moreover, data are 
classified either as subjective, based on Likert scales reflecting the high 
managements experience and their opinions of a given theme, or objective presenting 
a real number for investment climate aspect. Dollar et al. (2006) mention that 
subjective measures have the advantage to cover many countries and to link 
investment climate to growth, but they suffer from lacking the ability to measure 
specifically the investment climate effect on firms and to determine the paramount 
aspects. Hence, they prefer to use objective data to build clearer picture and to better 
understand business environment and firm performance relationship. Carlin et al. 
(2006) use subjective measures to rank the constraints and for the ease of 
comparison between firms which is more difficult in the case of objective measures. 
Although subjective and objective measures are positively correlated, subjective 
measures are more opt to bias (Dethier et al., 2008). In this work, objective measures 
were used to construct investment climate and other firm characteristic variables. 
Firm-level data raise some econometrical concerns of multicolinearity
51
 and 
endogeneity when assessing the relationship between firm performance and 
investment climate themes. To overcome the former, we choose just one or two 
variables for each investment climate theme depending on the available number of 
observations. For example, infrastructure was measured by many questions such as: 
the losses of sales due to deficiency in transportation, electricity, water, and 
telecommunication supply and also the cost of own generator or well. Most of these 
variables are correlated. It is very difficult to choose the highest important indicator 
as proxy for infrastructure. Some authors use aggregate indicators (Bastos and Nasir, 
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 The most severe problems are electricity, corruption and workforce skills and education. 
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 Multicolinearity occurs when regressers are correlated with each other which cause the coefficients 
to be inefficient. While, endogeneity occurs when there is correlation between the regressers and the 
error term which causes inefficient and inconsistent biased estimates.  
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2004; Kinda et al., 2009). However, Beck et al. (2005); Hallward-Driemeier et al. 
(2006) and Commander and Svejnar (2010) choose to use single indicators. 
The latter problem, endogeneity, is considered a serious problem in the context of 
investment climate regressions because the causality between firm performance and 
investment climate indicators is not well established. Because better performing 
firms may be more able to choose better business environment locations; they may 
also record better investment climate measures. One more reason of endogeneity is 
the omitted variables problem which may be correlated with other regressers. Hence, 
the estimated coefficients will be overestimated.   
To tackle endogeneity problem, the conventional tool is to apply panel data approach 
and instrumental variable techniques. However, ICA data is limited to one year 
period for investment climate measures which prevents using lags of some variables 
as instruments. As most of the literature related to firm-level data and investment 
climate suggest, we apply the following solutions: we use objective measures as they 
are less affected by measurement errors and reverse causality (Kinda et al., 2009). 
We also use the location-industry averages instead of the original variables’ data; 
these averaged variables are more likely to be exogenous to the firm whose effect on 
the business environment location is very minor (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2006; 
Commander and Svejnar, 2010 & Dollar et al., 2006). In addition, we include the 
entire explanatory variables simultaneously to limit the omitted variables problem. 
Moreover, the inclusion of dummy set of industry and location would alleviate the 
effect of macro variables which may affect the firm performance and business 
environment (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2006). And finally, we apply instrumental 
variables techniques to overcome endogeneity concerns.  
The first set of variables is investment climate indicators (infrastructure, 
government-business relations, corruption and finance). Infrastructure was proxied 
by two variables, a dummy variable whether a firm has an electrical generator and by 
a dummy variable for the internet and email access as this measure broadly shows 
the advancement in infrastructure, in particular, electricity and telecommunications. 
Infrastructure, undoubtedly, is vital for encouraging new investments and easing 
business daily processes for the current firms (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2006; 
Dollar et al., 2006).  
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Government-Business relations and bureaucracy are widely covered in ICA. They 
are considered a core of any business opening or expanding as they could 
significantly raise or reduce the cost of doing business. We introduce four variables 
to investigate the quality of government administrations and bureaucratic controls. 
The variables are the log of duration of clearing exports to their final shipment from 
customs, the log of how long it did take to clear imports for customs, the log of the 
time spent by high management to deal with official inspections. This information 
reflects the quality of government administrations and bureaucratic controls and to 
what extent firms suffer from regulations burden. The last variable, the participation 
to business association, is measured as dummy variable to show the role of these 
government-business partnership effects on firm performance.   
Corruption is captured and measured by the log of the average percentage of sales 
paid as bribe to the officials.  
Finance, was measured by a dummy variable whether the firm has a loan or not, and 
also by a dummy variable whether the firm has overdraft facilities for short term or 
not. Access to finance and well-function credit market is very important for 
economic growth.  
The second set of variables was added to show the role of technological development 
impact on firm performance. It is more likely that firms adopting information 
technology tend to export and to grow faster (Goedhuys et al., 2008 & Hallward-
Driemeier et al., 2006). Two variables are used. The first one, as contracted earlier, a 
dummy variable to state whether the firm use email or not. The second one is also a 
dummy variable, product, to indicate if the firm has upgraded or brought a new 
product line during the last period.  
Moreover, other controls and characteristic variables were created. We try to 
examine the role of competition on the Syrian firm performance; a dummy variable 
indicates whether the firm has three or more competitors or not
52
. In addition, export 
orientation was captured by the log of the percentage of sales exported last year. ICA 
also provides information about foreign ownership captured by a dummy variable, 
whether part of the capital is foreign or not. 
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5.6 Results  
In estimating the above model, we try to determine what the most important factors 
behind firm performance are in Syrian economy. First, table 7 shows the estimations 
for the basic Cobb-Douglas regressions. As reported in column 1, capital and labour 
are both positive and significant and their estimations are constant return to scale
53
. 
Column 2 introduces competition which is significant at 10 percent of significance 
level. Column 3 adds export and column 5 adds foreign ownership variable. 
Although they are positive, they are insignificant. Columns 5 and 6 incorporate all 
variables; they are insignificant. In this specification, export and foreign ownership 
look insignificant and not crucial for firms in Syria. 
Turning to investment climate variables, table (8) presents the results for each 
business environment separately. Although the omitted variable problem is noticed 
here, most literature enters each variable alone to check its effect on performance 
(Commander and Svejnar, 2010). The dependent variable is the log of total sales. As 
expected, most of investment climate indicators are significant and hold the expected 
signs. Column 1 shows that electrical deficiency affects negatively firm 
performance. Moreover, column 2 shows positive and significant effect of the email 
variable which indicates the importance of technological infrastructure. Column 3 
also reports a negative but insignificant effect of longer inspection time spent to deal 
with official requirements. Moreover, the longer the time needed to clear customs the 
worse the firm’s performance as shown in columns 4-5. Likewise, participation to 
business association looks positive and insignificant as stated in column 6. 
Corruption seems to hinder the performance as presented in column 7. In terms of 
access to finance, it shows a positive and significant sign in columns 8-9 as 
measured by the firm access to overdraft facility and to credit. It shows just positive 
sign when measured by loan in column 10. Furthermore, technological development 
demonstrates insignificant coefficients as reported in columns 11. Finally, columns 
12-14 report coefficients of human capacity as measured by manager’s experience, 
workforce with university degree or higher and formal training; they are positive and 
significant. All the above results are consistent with the literature concerning firm 
performance and business environment.  
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To alleviate econometric problems, multicolinearity and endogeneity, table 9 
provides estimations by running simultaneously all specifications and also including 
dummy variables for location and industry to control for the heterogeneity between 
firms. Column 1, where the dependent variable is log of the total sales, shows that 
foreign ownership has negative and insignificant effect. These results may contradict 
most of the related literature. Commander and Svejnar (2010) clarify that ownership 
of firm lost significance many times when controlling for other variables especially 
exports and competition. In addition, exports and competition appear positive but 
insignificant. In terms of business environment themes, infrastructure as represented 
by own electrical generator would not impact sales. However, technological 
infrastructure seems very important to boost performance in firm level. These results 
are consistent with most relevant literature. In other words, while Hallward-
dreimeier et al. (2006), using objective measures, find that infrastructure does not 
affect firm performance, Dollar et al (2005) and Escibano and Guach (2005) find 
electricity deficiency and the log of the number of days to clear imports (exports) are 
harmful for growing business. Moreover, most studies report positive effect of the 
impact of internet access variable on firm performance
54
 (Hallward-dreimeier et al., 
2006; Dollar et al., 2005 & Escibano and Guach, 2005). However, Goedhuys et al. 
(2008) claim that internet would not affect firm productivity in Tanzanian 
manufacturing context. As can be shown in column 1, firms that have internet access 
would increase sales by 1.65%. 
Moreover, time spent to deal with official requirement seems insignificant. However, 
participation to business associations seems positive and insignificant. Corruption 
(bribes) circumvents sales as it appears negative and significant. The increase of 
bribe paid by one percent would reduce the sales by 0.3 percent.  Most studies stress 
that corruption in firm-level context has negative effect. Beck et al. (2005) and 
Hallward-dreimeier et al. (2006) confirm that corruption hinders firm performance.  
Access to finance show significant and positive impact when measured by overdraft 
facility gained in the short term (three months).  Firms which have financial facilities 
would increase sales by 0.62 percent. Beck et al. (2005), Hallward-dreimeier et al. 
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(2006), Commander and Svejnar (2010) and Aterido et al. (2007) state that access to 
finance is vital to do business. 
Regarding technological development, using email shows positive and significant 
signs. On the other hand, introducing new product lines or upgrading existing one is 
insignificant. Manager’s experience plays positive role in enhancing sales, but 
workforce with university or higher education seems insignificant. Column 2 
introduces formal training which is insignificant. Column 3 repeats the specification 
in column 1 but using loan as proxy for finance aspect. It shows insignificant effect 
because loan impact may take time to affect performance as will be seen in growth 
model.  
For further analysis, we also use the log of the value added as dependent variable, 
column 4 shows the same results as that of column 1 confirming the importance of 
finance for improving firm performance and the adverse effect of corruption. 
However, all other variables are insignificant. Column 5 introduces formal training 
as proxy for education which is insignificant but manager’s experience is significant. 
Moreover, Column 6 replaces overdraft by loan which shows an insignificant effect. 
In sum, the above level analysis states that technological infrastructure, finance, and 
manager’s experience are crucial and affect Syrian firms positively. On the other 
hand, corruption negatively impacts the firm performance. However, infrastructure, 
government-business relations and training are not very imperative. Finally, foreign 
ownership and competition seem not to impact firm performance. 
In table 10, a further step is done to overcome endogeneity problem; following 
Commander and Svejnar (2010) instrumental variable method was applied to show 
the effect of different business environment themes of firm performance. The 
dependent variable is the total sales of the firm. Column 1 runs the model without 
investment climate variables. It is clear that foreign ownership and competition 
affect firm performance positively and significantly. Columns 2-10 introduce 
investment climate variables one by one to investigate their role individually. Most 
of them hold the expected signs and significant. Infrastructure, technological 
infrastructure, finance and workforce education present positive effects. However, 
corruption, government-business relations (inspection time and participation with 
association) and manager’s experience are not significant. Column 11 runs 
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regression for all variables together to remove omitted variable problem
55
. Some 
variables change their sign and significance. It is clear that technological 
infrastructure, finance and workforce education are positive and significant. They 
play an important role for firm performance. However, corruption is negative and 
significant. Infrastructure, government-business relations and manager’s experience 
are still insignificant and seem not to impact sales.  
Following Commander and Svejnar (2010), the selected instruments are: the log of 
population, log of firm age, log of firm age squared, location, size of firm, industry, 
interactions between age and location, interactions between size and location, change 
of sales in the previous period and number of permanent workers. We construct other 
instruments, following Lewbel (1997), by multiplying the mean centred of the 
dependent variable (sales) by the mean centred of endogenous variables (labour and 
capital).  
A battery of tests was also run to select the relevant instruments. First, Hansen test of 
overidentification is applied to test for the validity of the instruments. A rejection of 
the null hypothesis would suggest that the instruments are not valid. As it can be 
seen in the “diagnostics” panels the null is rejected in all cases which mean that the 
instruments used are valid. Then, relevance of the instruments tests are applied to 
show that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables.  F-
test results are significant and bigger than 10. Moreover, the Anderson canonical 
correlation likelihood-ratio test (CCLR) confirms these conclusions. The null 
hypothesis is that the model is underidentified so a rejection of the null would 
suggest that the estimated models are identified. As it can be seen, this turns out to 
be the case in table 10. Moreover, endogeneity tests of one or more endogenous 
variables were implemented. The null hypothesis is that the specified endogenous 
variables can be treated as exogenous. As shown in the diagnostic panel in table 10, 
the null is rejected which confirms that the model can be run with these endogenous 
variables safely. Finally, heteroskedastity test is run, the null hypothesis is that the 
IVs are homoskedastic. The null was accepted and hence the model is well specified.  
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For robustness check, as ICA provides two years data for sales and labour variables, 
we turn to investigate the role of business environment on firm growth. Table 11 
shows the regression in the case of dependent variables are sales growth, 
productivity growth and labour growth. 
Columns 1& 2, where the dependent variable is sales growth, show the estimation of 
business environment variables. Foreign ownership and competition seem to have no 
effect in improving firm growth. Another surprising result is that export is 
insignificant. Infrastructure is insignificant, either measured by electricity deficiency 
or by email access. Moreover, burden regulations and government-business relations, 
as shown by time spent with officials and getting involved in associations, also are 
insignificant. Regarding corruption, it shows negative effect on growth (Beck et al., 
2005). Moreover, getting loans would boost firm growth, while overdraft facility 
seems insignificant. This result is in contrast when running in levels of the dependent 
variable. In terms of development of technology, email and product variables are 
positive and significant. Adopting new technologies is vital for better firm 
performance (Goedhuys et al., 2008). However, manager’s experience looks not 
important. However, Commander and Svejnar (2010) show that competition and all 
other investment climate variables are not significant.  
Column 3 & 4 show the estimations for labour growth as the dependent variable. 
Technological infrastructure is positive and significant. Finance measured by 
overdraft facility impact the labour growth. Moreover, adoption of technology is also 
important for firm growth. On the other hand, corruption is negative and significant. 
Finally, participation with business association, time spent for inspections, and 
manager’s experience present no effect on labour growth. Columns 5 & 6 set the 
estimations for value added growth variable. They confirm the role of adoption of 
technology and show that experience is important for growth. However, all other 
coefficients are insignificant.  
 In the context of firm growth, the technological advancement and access to finance 
is vital, while export, competition and regulation burden are not very important. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Investment climate has increasingly occupied an interesting place in research of firm 
performance, particularly after new available micro data were collected by World 
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Bank. Moreover, most of the literature argues that better investment climate is 
important for firm performance. Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) provides data 
for Syrian business environment in 2009. Using a dataset of 508 firms in five 
different provinces in Syria and covering mainly manufacturing sector, this chapter 
investigated the relationship between firm performance, in levels and growth, and 
ownership, export orientation, competition, technology and investment climate.   
The main findings show that firm performance, measured in levels of sales and 
productivity is positively boosted by finance and technology and hindered by poor 
investment climate. However, competition and foreign ownership seem to have no 
effect. One important issue is that competition and foreign ownership positively 
affect firm performance when applying instrument variables method. When 
performance measured in growth of sales, productivity and labour are supported by 
access to finance and technological adoption. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
 
In this chapter, I first summarize the findings from the previous chapters. I then 
provide some concluding remarks, limitations and suggest some future research.  
6.1 Conclusion: 
The introductory chapter raised the important question of the relationship between 
economic performance, measured mainly by economic growth, and corruption, 
ethnic diversity, economic reforms and business environment. This is particularly 
important because understanding economic performance and its determinants is still 
at the heart of economics. This thesis has given empirical evidence that supports the 
view that economic reform and better investment climate would boost economic 
performance in developing countries. This thesis has also shown that corruption and 
ethnic diversity would circumscribe economic performance as measured by 
economic growth. 
6.1.1 Chapter two: economic growth and corruption 
This chapter constructed a dataset of econometric studies of the relationship between 
economic growth and corruption. This data set consists of 465 coefficients of the 
effect of corruption on economic growth from 41 different empirical studies. We 
used this data set to carry out an econometric survey to investigate whether 
publication bias exists or not.  And, we try to quantitatively understand the effects of 
differences in estimation methods and econometric specification on the significance 
and magnitude of the effect of corruption on growth.  
The main finding is that although publication bias is severe, there seems to be a 
significant negative effect of corruption on growth. Importantly, we found among the 
main explanations for this effect’s direction and significance that the effect is 
stronger in academic than non-academic studies and in those studies tried to address 
the heterogeneity by using fixed effect. Moreover, corruption could affect growth 
negatively through weakening institutions and trade openness effects. Finally, we 
found some evidence in favour of the Asian paradox, but this evidence does not 
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survive for further sensitivity tests. Countries in the MENA region are likely to 
experience a more negative impact of corruption on growth than countries in any 
other regions and there is no evidence that corruption on its own has a strong 
positive impact on growth. 
6.1.2 Chapter three: economic growth and ethnic diversity 
This chapter investigated a number of questions related to the behavior of ethnic 
diversity over time and across countries and its effects in terms of economic 
performance. This research tried to address two objectives: improving diversity 
measurement and treating diversity endogenously. We constructed a unique data set 
based mostly on primary data (national censuses) to measure ethnic diversity over 
time from 1989 to 2007. Using these data, we replicated the most recent results from 
the literature and showed that static (exogenous) diversity is indeed not robustly 
correlated with economic growth. However, when applying panel data and running 
diversity as endogenous variable, we found that ethnic diversity is negatively related 
to growth and this is robust due to the use of different econometric estimators, 
specifications, and measures.  
6.1.3 Chapter four: economic reforms and economic performance 
This chapter discussed economic reforms, their impact on economic performance as 
measured by GDP growth rate and industrial value added growth rate, and the most 
influential reforms in developing countries. This study used a panel of 56 developing 
countries, over the period of 1980-2006 in order to examine the effects of economic 
reforms as determinants of economic performance. The main reforms investigated 
were external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial development, trade 
liberalization and institutional quality. The main contribution is to analyse the short-
run and long-run, effect of reforms on economic performance. It has been shown that 
in the long-run economic reform drives the economy and also boosts industry in 
developing countries. Also, institutions play an essential role in driving reforms and 
enhancing economic output either in total or in industrial sectors. Finally, the 
reforms in trade liberalization and global integration both increase industrial growth 
in developing countries. 
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6.1.4 Chapter five: firm performance and business environment 
As most of the literature argues that a good investment climate is important for firm 
performance. This chapter tried to provide evidence of the relationship between 
investment climate, competition, ownership and export and firm performance in 
Syria. Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) provides data for the Syrian business 
environment in 2009. Using a dataset of 508 firms in five different provinces in 
Syria and covering mainly the industrial private sector, this chapter investigated the 
relationship between firm performance, in levels and growth, and ownership, export 
orientation, competition, technology and investment climate. One important 
investigation was done by using the instrumental variables method. 
The main findings showed that firm performance, measured in levels of sales and 
productivity was positively boosted by finance and technology and hindered by poor 
investment climate, particularly corruption. However, competition and foreign 
ownership seem to have no effect. One important issue is that competition and 
foreign ownership positively affect firm performance when applying instrument 
variables method. Finally, when performance was measured in terms of growth of 
sales, productivity and labor, finance and technological adoption seem to have 
positive impact. 
6.2 Contribution of this research  
The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows: 
1. We applied meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis methods to study the 
relationship between economic growth and corruption. This shows that 
despite severe publication bias, there seems to be a genuine negative effect of 
corruption on growth. This impact is systematically affected by whether the 
authors are academicians and whether the study incorporates fixed effects. 
Moreover, corruption can indirectly affect growth through institutions and 
openness to trade. 
2. We used panel data to study the effect of dynamic ethnic diversity as 
endogenous variable on economic growth in transition context. Moreover, we 
constructed a unique data set based mostly on primary data (national 
censuses). Once diversity is instrumented (with lagged diversity and latitude), 
it shows a significant negative impact on economic growth. These rustles 
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were robust by applying different specifications, polarization measures, and 
econometric estimators. 
3. We used panel data to provide evidence of the role of economic reforms on 
economic performance in developing countries as measured by economic 
growth and industrial growth. This research concentrates on the analysis of 
long-run and short-run effects. Moreover, this research focuses on and 
constructs individual indicators for the following reforms: external stability, 
macroeconomic stability, financial development, trade liberalization and 
institutional quality. The main finding is economic reforms strongly support 
growth in the long-run; they mostly have mixed effects in the short-run.  
Moreover, institutions seem to drive economic performance over the long 
run.  
4. We demonstrated the relationship between business environment and firm 
performance in the Syrian industrial private sector. Performance is measured 
in level and growth variables. The main findings show that firm performance 
is positively boosted by finance and technology and hindered by poor 
investment climate. However, competition and foreign ownership seem to 
have no effect. 
6.3 Limitations of the research 
One of the main limitations of this research is that data from empirical papers on 
growth-corruption nexus is covered up to 2007. Including further issued papers 
would enrich the database and may provide other results.  
As to diversity effect on economic growth, short period of the study prevented us 
from doing all diagnostic tests for GMM estimators. 
Regarding economic reforms and economic performance, the limitation of available 
data prevented us to construct measures for total factor productivity. Other reforms 
are not included due to data restrictions, such as labor market and privatization. 
 Additionally, pooled data is not used for studying the relationship between firm 
performance and investment climate.  
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6.4 Future research 
Future research could extend the datasets provided throughout the thesis. Moreover, 
meta-analysis could be applied to study of the relationship between corruption and 
other macroeconomic variables such as FDI.  
Moreover, the effect of ethnic diversity on other regions and in different time spans 
could be studied. One important development is to develop the measurements of 
diversity. 
Furthermore, pooled or panel data to develop the study of the relationship between 
firm performance and investment climate could be used. 
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 Figures 
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Figure 1: Histogram for 465 t-values of the coefficients of corruption on growth 
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Figure 2: Funnel plot of corruption effect on economic growth using 460 estimates 
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Chapter three 
Figure 1: Ethnic Fractionalization in Transition: 1989 to 2007 
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Chapter four 
Figure 1: the relationship between GDP growth and industrial growth 
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The relationship between economic growth as measured by GDP annual growth rate and 
industrial growth as measured by industrial value added to GDP growth rate for the 62 
countries over the period 1980-2006. Each point represents one year point of time. 
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Tables 
Chapter two 
Table 1: Tests for Genuine Effect and Reporting Bias (MST and FAT-PET tests) 
  1 2 3 4 
 Ln|t| Ln|t|^ t t^ 
lndf 0.144 0.144   
  (2.54)* (2.68)**   
1/Se   0.0000463 0.0000463 
   (1.41) (0.11) 
Constant -0.042 -0.042 -1.403 -1.403 
  (-1.17) (-0.18) (-11.63)*** (-7.70)*** 
Observations 460 460 460 460 
R-squared 0.01 0.0145 0.21 0.1912 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
^ bootstrap to derive robust standard errors with 1000 replications 
 
 
 
Table 2: Tests for Genuine Effect and Reporting Bias in Published and Unpublished Papers 
(MST and FAT-PET tests) 
  Published Published, 
Bootstrap 
Unpublished Unpublished, 
Bootstrap 
  t t^ t t^ 
1/Se 0.000794 0.000720 0.0000172 0.0000219 
 (4.39)*** (4.48)*** (0.57) (0.73) 
Constant -1.720 -1.448 -1.339 -1.523 
  (-8.99)*** (-8.04)*** (-8.82)*** (-9.47)*** 
Observations 228 203 232 207 
R-squared 0.078 0.091 0.001 0.003 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
^ bootstrap to derive robust standard errors with 1000 replications 
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Table 3: Meta-regression analysis of the effect of corruption on economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS Bootstrap SEs WLS MR-RE WLS GSpecific MR-RE GSpecific 
       
pubtype  0.0229 0.0229 -0.0845** -0.0215 -0.0797*  
 (0.0511) (0.0509) (0.0429) (0.0404) (0.0411)  
authors 0.133** 0.133*** 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.160*** 0.145*** 
 (0.0593) (0.0405) (0.0466) (0.0453) (0.0462) (0.0390) 
countryregion -0.104 -0.104 -0.0820 -0.0118   
 (0.156) (0.137) (0.1000) (0.126)   
panel -0.0513 -0.0513 -0.0369 -0.0468 -0.0353 -0.0355 
 (0.0477) (0.0364) (0.0341) (0.0364) (0.0342) (0.0298) 
endo 0.0612 0.0612** 0.0708** 0.0685** 0.0732** 0.0703** 
 (0.0419) (0.0305) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0308) (0.0290) 
fixed -0.101** -0.101 -0.308*** -0.205*** -0.309*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0720) (0.0464) (0.0423) (0.0461) (0.0346) 
mid -0.00247 -0.00247 0.00545** 0.00274 0.00571** 0.00274 
 (0.00305) (0.00352) (0.00268) (0.00251) (0.00269) (0.00244) 
wb -0.0674 -0.0674 -0.0514 -0.0456   
 (0.253) (0.195) (0.189) (0.196)   
icrg -0.229 -0.229 -0.242 -0.250 -0.202** -0.106*** 
 (0.242) (0.184) (0.171) (0.188) (0.0857) (0.0356) 
ticpi -0.292 -0.292 -0.283 -0.266 -0.236*** -0.124*** 
 (0.242) (0.189) (0.173) (0.188) (0.0872) (0.0348) 
comb -0.333 -0.333* -0.290* -0.327 -0.253** -0.198** 
 (0.257) (0.188) (0.175) (0.200) (0.110) (0.0838) 
other -0.172 -0.172 -0.236 -0.158 -0.197**  
 (0.242) (0.186) (0.174) (0.188) (0.0967)  
ctc -0.0178 -0.0178 -0.132 -0.134 -0.158  
 (0.282) (0.230) (0.195) (0.222) (0.105)  
included -0.184 -0.184 -0.219* -0.195** -0.209* -0.206** 
 (0.123) (0.114) (0.132) (0.0935) (0.124) (0.0855) 
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initcond -0.0443 -0.0443 -0.138*** -0.0926* -0.137*** -0.0869* 
 (0.0650) (0.0589) (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0492) (0.0454) 
transit 0.0542 0.0542 -0.102 -0.00532 -0.113*  
 (0.0814) (0.0746) (0.0653) (0.0627) (0.0626)  
lac 0.175 0.175 0.111 0.0668   
 (0.370) (0.224) (0.198) (0.330)   
mena -0.285** -0.285* -0.341** -0.273*** -0.342** -0.254** 
 (0.131) (0.163) (0.161) (0.103) (0.157) (0.0997) 
asia 0.286 0.286** 0.391*** 0.328 0.498*** 0.363*** 
 (0.353) (0.124) (0.129) (0.315) (0.170) (0.103) 
afr 0.0840 0.0840 0.232** 0.172* 0.229** 0.164* 
 (0.120) (0.114) (0.104) (0.0939) (0.104) (0.0879) 
others -0.168** -0.168 -0.181* -0.157*** -0.181* -0.153*** 
 (0.0694) (0.103) (0.100) (0.0605) (0.0945) (0.0578) 
trade 0.129** 0.129*** 0.198*** 0.158*** 0.198*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0434) (0.0353) (0.0398) (0.0349) (0.0371) 
instit 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 
 (0.0816) (0.0563) (0.0538) (0.0620) (0.0497) (0.0550) 
human -0.0475 -0.0475 -0.0546 -0.0496 -0.0482 -0.0521 
 (0.0529) (0.0334) (0.0346) (0.0407) (0.0333) (0.0392) 
invest 0.0326 0.0326 0.0238 0.00530  0.00424 
 (0.0454) (0.0537) (0.0430) (0.0363)  (0.0331) 
political -0.0855 -0.0855 -0.0983* -0.0742 -0.0907 -0.0905** 
 (0.0594) (0.0662) (0.0581) (0.0462) (0.0572) (0.0416) 
gov -0.0706 -0.0706 -0.0361 -0.0412 -0.0399 -0.0406 
 (0.0493) (0.0549) (0.0431) (0.0387) (0.0405) (0.0363) 
Constant -0.0837 -0.0837 -0.0236 -0.0696 -0.0545 -0.226*** 
 (0.271) (0.207) (0.207) (0.210) (0.142) (0.0839) 
       
Observations 460 460 438 460 438 460 
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.448  0.447  
Notes: Dependent variable is partial correlation coefficient between corruption and growth. The bootstrap is to derive robust standard errors, with 1000 replications. WLS is weighted 
least squares with weights given by the inverse of the standard error. MR-RE is for random effects. Gspecific refers to results obtained using the general to specific method. Standard 
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errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations carried out through the metareg routine in STATA. 
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Table 4: Meta-regression analysis the effect of corruption on economic growth (sensitivity regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS Bootstrap 
SEs 
WLS MR-RE OLS bootstrap WLS MR-RE OLS bootstrap WLS MR-RE 
             
pubtype  0.00192 0.00192 -0.0821** -0.0247         
 (0.0405) (0.0361) (0.0387) (0.0324)         
authors 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.196*** 0.197***         
 (0.0470) (0.0321) (0.0359) (0.0369)         
countryregion 0.0496 0.0496 0.0441 0.0540         
 (0.0751) (0.0542) (0.0567) (0.0591)         
panel 0.0262 0.0262 0.0626* 0.0430         
 (0.0360) (0.0315) (0.0332) (0.0286)         
endo -0.000778 -0.000778 0.0382 0.0171         
 (0.0388) (0.0298) (0.0311) (0.0306)         
fixed -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.318*** -0.206***         
 (0.0381) (0.0468) (0.0496) (0.0318)         
mid -0.00147 -0.00147 0.00564* 0.00107         
 (0.00279) (0.00271) (0.00317) (0.00221)         
wb     0.00755 0.00755 0.0362 0.0167     
     (0.259) (0.196) (0.185) (0.210)     
icrg     -0.260 -0.260 -0.319** -0.310     
     (0.243) (0.180) (0.161) (0.198)     
ticpi     -0.313 -0.313* -0.379** -0.330*     
     (0.243) (0.175) (0.161) (0.197)     
comb     -0.554** -0.554*** -0.595*** -0.568***     
     (0.256) (0.175) (0.161) (0.208)     
other     -0.225 -0.225 -0.471*** -0.249     
     (0.244) (0.179) (0.180) (0.198)     
ctc     -0.0640 -0.0640 -0.109 -0.0946     
     (0.247) (0.178) (0.163) (0.200)     
 100 
 
included     -0.0347 -0.0347 0.0893 -0.00380     
     (0.0943) (0.0977) (0.143) (0.0742)     
initcond          -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0474 -0.0342 
         (0.0502) (0.0393) (0.0379) (0.0404) 
transit         0.0367 0.0367 0.0444 0.0277 
         (0.0615) (0.0482) (0.0538) (0.0483) 
lac         0.299 0.299 0.395* 0.261 
         (0.366) (0.200) (0.210) (0.337) 
mena         -0.261** -0.261* -0.358** -0.252** 
         (0.129) (0.151) (0.155) (0.106) 
asia         0.175 0.175 0.167 0.182 
         (0.357) (0.109) (0.105) (0.327) 
afr         0.0256 0.0256 0.0880 0.0451 
         (0.117) (0.104) (0.0971) (0.0935) 
others         -0.179*** -0.179* -0.233** -0.175*** 
         (0.0663) (0.104) (0.100) (0.0618) 
trade         0.156*** 0.156*** 0.265*** 0.179*** 
         (0.0445) (0.0366) (0.0423) (0.0354) 
instit         0.177*** 0.177*** 0.232*** 0.172*** 
         (0.0609) (0.0619) (0.0660) (0.0494) 
human         -0.0684 -0.0684* -0.153*** -0.0981** 
         (0.0482) (0.0354) (0.0377) (0.0389) 
invest         -0.00659 -0.00659 0.00578 -0.0233 
         (0.0416) (0.0488) (0.0411) (0.0343) 
political         0.0187 0.0187 -0.0780 0.00857 
         (0.0513) (0.0570) (0.0581) (0.0414) 
gov         -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.184*** -0.154*** 
         (0.0411) (0.0397) (0.0357) (0.0333) 
Constant -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.307*** -0.284*** 0.114 0.114 0.139 0.123 -0.172 -0.172* -0.189* -0.172* 
 (0.0593) (0.0381) (0.0431) (0.0461) (0.241) (0.173) (0.160) (0.196) (0.112) (0.0997) (0.101) (0.0904) 
             
Observations 460 460 438 460 460 460 438 460 460 460 438 460 
 101 
 
R-squared 0.071 0.071 0.264  0.082 0.082 0.144  0.116 0.116 0.302  
Notes: Dependent variable is partial correlation coefficient between corruption and growth. The bootstrap is to derive robust standard errors, with 1000 replications. WLS is 
weighted least squares with weights given by the inverse of the standard error. MR-RE is for random effects. Standard errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. All estimations carried out through the metareg routine in STATA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three 
Table 1: SUR Estimation of augmented Solow model with exogenous diversity indices (Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita GDP) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ln I/Y 0.0620 
(0.0943) 
0.0923 
(0.0989) 
0.0990 
(0.101) 
0.111 
(0.105) 
0.101 
(0.102) 
0.0848 
(0.100) 
0.0683 
(0.102) 
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Ln HK 0.128* 
(0.0688) 
0.141** 
(0.0713) 
0.142* 
(0.0725) 
0.142* 
(0.0744) 
0.143* 
(0.0732) 
0.143** 
(0.0727) 
0.112 
(0.0785) 
Ln(n+ g+ ) -0.0109 
(0.0374) 
-0.0108 
(0.0383) 
-0.0147 
(0.0389) 
-0.0213 
(0.0402) 
-0.0164 
(0.0392) 
-0.0145 
(0.0387) 
-0.00896 
(0.0412) 
Ln Initial income -0.00111 
(0.0443) 
-0.00299 
(0.0464) 
-0.00176 
(0.0471) 
-0.00141 
(0.0485) 
-0.00144 
(0.0477) 
-0.000477 
(0.0472) 
0.00272 
(0.0486) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.150 
(0.142) 
     
Ethnic Polarization 
(=0.8) 
  -0.414 
(0.379) 
    
Ethnic Polarization 
(=1.6) 
   -0.934 
(0.833) 
   
Polarization 
(MRQ) 
    -0.126 
(0.118) 
  
Ethno-linguistic-religious 
fractionalization 
     -0.006 
(0.0215) 
 
Ethno-linguistic-religious 
fractionalization (average) 
      -0.003 
(0.00217) 
Constant -0.347 
(0.497) 
-0.268 
(0.525) 
-0.267 
(0.535) 
-0.234 
(0.560) 
-0.268 
(0.542) 
-0.369 
(0.527) 
-0.258 
(0.556) 
Observations 24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
24;24 
 R-squared -0.39;0.84 
0.77;0.82 
-0.32;0.84 
0.77;0.82 
-0.33;0.84 
0.77;0.83 
-0.34;0.84 
0.76;0.83 
-0.34;0.84 
0.76;0.83 
-0.45;0.83 
0.77;0.83 
-0.31;0.83 
0.76;0.83 
Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Table 2: SUR Estimation of augmented Solow model with exogenous diversity indices and without initial income (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per 
capita) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ln I/Y 0.576*** 0.588*** 0.586*** 0.614*** 0.589*** 0.539*** 
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(0.143) (0.145) (0.146) (0.142) (0.146) (0.151) 
ln HK 0.314*** 
(0.117) 
0.304** 
(0.120) 
0.284** 
(0.119) 
0.252** 
(0.112) 
0.276** 
(0.119) 
0.294** 
(0.129) 
ln(n+ g+ ) -0.130** 
(0.0628) 
-0.121* 
(0.0643) 
-0.131** 
(0.0634) 
-0.145** 
(0.0589) 
-0.132** 
(0.0630) 
-0.131* 
(0.0669) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 -0.369 
(0.290) 
    
Ethnic 
Polarization(=0.8) 
  -0.949 
(0.724) 
   
Ethnic 
Polarization(=1.6) 
   -2.669* 
(1.377) 
  
Polarization 
 (MRQ) 
    -0.298 
(0.217) 
 
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
     -0.0552 
(0.0391) 
Constant -0.358 
(0.535) 
-0.152 
(0.558) 
-0.0972 
(0.560) 
0.146 
(0.544) 
-0.0562 
(0.560) 
-0.358 
(0.571) 
Observations 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 
R-squared -3.58;0.19 
0.16;0.32 
-3.13;0.22 
0.17;0.34 
-2.98;0.23 
0.17;0.34 
-2.87;0.25 
0.17;0.38 
-2.94;0.24 
0.17;0.34 
-2.85;0.22 
0.17;0.33 
Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 3: IV Estimation of augmented Solow model with endogenous diversity indices (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita; Instruments used are 
one-period lagged diversity and latitude) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ln I/Y 0.0197 
(0.0281) 
0.0221 
(0.0281) 
0.0257 
(0.0281) 
0.0228 
(0.0281) 
0.0208 
(0.0283) 
0.0227 
(0.0279) 
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ln HK 0.0461*** 
(0.0115) 
0.0455*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0435*** 
(0.0112) 
0.0455*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0477*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0437*** 
(0.0105) 
ln(n+ g+ ) 0.00191 
(0.00604) 
0.000989 
(0.00618) 
-0.000647 
(0.00626) 
0.000601 
(0.00622) 
0.00113 
(0.00626) 
0.00360 
(0.00606) 
Ln Initial Income  0.00498 
(0.00597) 
0.00496 
(0.00595) 
0.00380 
(0.00595) 
0.00473 
(0.00595) 
0.00456 
(0.00638) 
0.00788 
(0.00586) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.079*** 
(0.0283) 
     
Ethnic Polarization 
(=0.8) 
 -0.192*** 
(0.0706) 
    
Ethnic Polarization 
(=1.6) 
  -0.432*** 
(0.137) 
   
Polarization 
 (MRQ) 
   -0.059*** 
(0.0211) 
  
Ethno-linguistic-
religious fract.   
    -0.0106** 
(0.00416) 
 
Ethno-linguistic-
religious fract. (avg) 
     -0.00101** 
(0.000488) 
Constant -0.0922 
(0.107) 
-0.0868 
(0.107) 
-0.0553 
(0.106) 
-0.0817 
(0.107) 
-0.121 
(0.113) 
-0.103 
(0.105) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.285 0.277 0.287 0.278 0.248 0.268 
Diagnostics 
Instruments l(1).eth 
latitude 
l(1).peth08 
latitude 
l(1).peth16 
latitude 
l(1).p 
latitude 
l(1).f 
latitude 
l(1).fr 
latitude 
Sargan-Hansen 
 
2.235 
(0.1349) 
2.584 
(0.108) 
2.896 
(0.088) 
2.604 
(0.1066) 
3.824 
(0.0505) 
3.0810 
(0.081) 
Shea Partial R-sq 0.8793 0.8395 0.7982 0.8246 0.8992 0.99 
F-statistic 207.74 
(0.000) 
130.88 
(0.000) 
56.74 
(0.000) 
99.26 
(0.000) 
107.037 
(0.000) 
100000 
(0.000) 
Anderson CCLR 
         
160.70 
(0.000) 
139.06 
(0.000) 
121.64 
(0.000) 
132.31 
(0.000) 
174.42 
(0.000) 
696.85 
(0.000) 
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Pagan-Hall   2.702 
(0.2590) 
2.890 
(0.235) 
3.208 
(0.201) 
2.922 
(0.232) 
1.526 
(0.4662) 
5.259 
(0.0721) 
RESET 0.64                                
(0.4235) 
1.03 
(0.3105) 
0.89 
(0.346) 
1.03 
(0.3098) 
0.39 
(0.5312) 
1.48 
(0.2242) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients and, in the bottom panel, p-values in parentheses. * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: IV Estimation of augmented Solow model with endogenous diversity indices without initial income (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per 
capita; Instruments are lagged diversity and latitude) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln I/Y 0.0243 
(0.0169) 
0.0269 
(0.0169) 
0.0297* 
(0.0166) 
0.0275 
(0.0168) 
0.0255 
(0.0174) 
0.036* 
(0.0004) 
ln HK 0.0450*** 0.0444*** 0.0425*** 0.0444*** 0.0468*** 0.048*** 
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(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.013) 
ln(n+ g+ ) -0.000267 
(0.00528) 
-0.00130 
(0.00534) 
-0.00249 
(0.00536) 
-0.00162 
(0.00535) 
-0.000887 
(0.00544) 
0.00022 
(0.005) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.0889*** 
(0.0331) 
     
Ethnic 
Polarization(=0.8) 
 -0.216*** 
(0.0836) 
    
Ethnic 
Polarization(=1.6) 
  -0.469*** 
(0.169) 
   
Polarization 
 (MRQ) 
   -0.067*** 
(0.0254) 
  
Ethnic-linguistic-
religious fract.  
    -0.0112** 
(0.00483) 
 
Ethnic-linguistic-
religious fract. (avg)  
     -0.001 
(0.00043) 
Constant -0.0482 
(0.0569) 
-0.0423 
(0.0574) 
-0.0194 
(0.0583) 
-0.0388 
(0.0575) 
-0.0828 
(0.0594) 
-0.0332 
(0.0587) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.280 0.272 0.284 0.273 0.242 0.251 
Diagnostics 
Instruments l(1).eth 
latitude 
l(1).peth08 
latitude 
l(1).peth16 
latitude 
l(1).p 
latitude 
l(1).f 
latitude 
l(1).fr 
latitude 
Sargan-Hansen (J) 0.403 
(0.5257) 
0.558 
(0.4552) 
0.974 
(0.3236) 
0.616 
(0.4325) 
2.209 
(0.1372) 
1.529 
(0.2163) 
Shea  Partial R-sq 0.8894 0.8538 0.8208 0.8409 0.9105 0.99 
First stage F 117.5 
(0.000) 
84.61 
(0.000) 
66.8 
(0.000) 
76.59 
(0.000) 
149.71 
(0.000) 
10000 
(0.000) 
Anderson CCLR 167.33 
(0.000) 
146.15 
(0.000) 
130.67 
(0.000) 
139.72 
(0.000) 
183.4 
(0.000) 
684.60 
(0.000) 
Pagan-Hall   2.394 
(0.3022) 
2.516 
(0.2842) 
2.760 
(0.2515) 
2.552 
(0.2792) 
1.004 
(0.6053) 
2.809 
(0.2455) 
RESET 2.11 3.06 2.33 2.88 1.62 2.47 
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(0.1465) (0.0804) (0.1269) (0.0896) (0.2024) (0.1159) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients and, in the bottom panel, p-values in parentheses. * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: System GMM Estimation of augmented Solow model with exogenous diversity (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lagged growth 0.115 
(0.190) 
0.109 
(0.187) 
0.118 
(0.195) 
0.0448 
(0.132) 
0.00449 
(0.244) 
Ln I/Y 0.212 
(0.158) 
0.216 
(0.155) 
0.216 
(0.151) 
0.155* 
(0.0917) 
0.284 
(0.181) 
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Ln HK 0.0449 
(0.0594) 
0.0414 
(0.0588) 
0.0329 
(0.0640) 
0.0334 
(0.0428) 
-0.0084 
(0.105) 
Ln(n+ g+ ) 0.125 
(0.120) 
0.121 
(0.115) 
0.122 
(0.116) 
0.0715 
(0.0502) 
0.127 
(0.190) 
Ln Initial income 0.0553 
(0.0630) 
0.0574 
(0.0618) 
0.0600 
(0.0640) 
0.0480 
(0.0439) 
0.0842 
(0.135) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.415 
(0.606) 
    
Ethnic Polarization 
(=0.8) 
 0.865 
(1.257) 
   
Polarization 
(MRQ) 
  0.268 
(0.387) 
  
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
   0.0340 
(0.0262) 
 
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
(average 
    0.0118 
(0.0182) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26 
Diagnostics 
AR(1) -1.7 
(0.284) 
-1.03 
(0.301) 
-1.04 
(0.299) 
-1.04 
(0.159) 
-1.01 
(0.313) 
Note:   System GMM estimates for growth rate of GDP per capita, 26 transition economies between 1989 and 2007. In the level equation, the instrument used 
is the first difference of the lagged dependent variable. In the transformed equation, the instrument used is the second lag of the dependent variable. In the top 
panel, standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Period dummies are always included, 
not reported, and are all significant at 1% in all specifications. 
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Table 6: System GMM Estimation of augmented Solow model with endogenous diversity (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.lng1 -0.114 
(0.105) 
-0.124 
(0.102) 
-0.140 
(0.100) 
-0.123 
(0.101) 
-0.0846 
(0.112) 
-0.0868 
(0.126) 
Ln I/Y -0.00240 
(0.0210) 
0.00121 
(0.0208) 
0.0114 
(0.0196) 
0.00350 
(0.0202) 
-0.00646 
(0.0218) 
0.0180 
(0.0190) 
Ln HK 0.0603*** 0.0618*** 0.0536*** 0.0592*** 0.0665** 0.0436** 
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(0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0180) (0.0209) (0.0270) (0.0196) 
Ln(n+ g+ ) 0.00276 
(0.00645) 
-0.000391 
(0.00773) 
-0.00290 
(0.00736) 
-0.000730 
(0.00764) 
0.00260 
(0.00669) 
0.00654 
(0.00743) 
Ln Initial income 0.0126 
(0.00850) 
0.0109 
(0.00858) 
0.00665 
(0.00786) 
0.0102 
(0.00826) 
0.0101 
(0.00866) 
0.0178** 
(0.00839) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.169** 
(0.0788) 
     
Ethnic Polarization 
(=0.8) 
 -0.483** 
(0.216) 
    
Ethnic Polarization 
(=1.6) 
  -1.036** 
(0.402) 
   
Polarization 
(MRQ) 
   -0.142** 
(0.0628) 
  
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
    -.0206* 
(0.0116) 
 
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
(average) 
     -0.0013** 
(0.000557) 
Constant -0.193 
(0.122) 
-0.174 
(0.123) 
-0.0686 
(0.0991) 
-0.151 
(0.117) 
-0.257* 
(0.142) 
-0.157 
(0.122) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Number of 
countries 
26 26 26 26 26 26 
Diagnostics 
AR(1) 0.91 
(0.363) 
0.80 
(0.423) 
0.52 
(0.604) 
0.73 
(0.464) 
0.77 
(0.441) 
-0.08 
(0.940) 
Hansen test 19.78 
(0.955) 
18.69 
(0.970) 
20.08 
(0.950) 
20.29 
(0.946) 
21.29 
(0.942) 
19.48 
(0.960) 
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Note: System GMM estimates for growth rate of GDP per capita, 26 transition economies between 1989 and 2007. In the level equation, the instruments used 
are time dummies and latitude, the first differenced of the dependent variable, investment, human capital, population, and the first difference of the lagged 
fractionalization index. In the transformed equation, the instruments used are the first difference of latitude, lagged dependent variable, investment, human 
capital, population and second lag of the respective fractionalization index. In the top panel, standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Period dummies are always included, not reported, and are all significant at 1% in all specifications. 
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Chapter four 
Table 1: Between effect model, dependent variable; GDP growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg 
lngdpc0 0.0919 0.156 0.0654 0.0285 0.175 
 (1.06) (1.78) (0.72) (0.24) (1.09) 
      
lninv 3.953
***
 4.018
***
 3.291
***
 5.349
***
 3.935
***
 
 (5.03) (5.18) (3.75) (5.30) (3.70) 
      
lnh -1.178 -1.274
*
 -2.000
**
 -0.823 -1.798 
 (-1.89) (-2.01) (-2.89) (-1.00) (-2.02) 
      
lnp 1.292 2.056 1.802 1.090 1.114 
 (0.72) (1.14) (0.96) (0.48) (0.43) 
      
ES 0.946
**
     
 (3.36)     
      
MS  1.205
**
    
  (3.19)    
      
FD   0.447
*
   
   (2.40)   
      
FT    0.554
**
  
    (3.42)  
      
IICRG     0.634 
     (1.47) 
      
_cons -2.468 -1.706 4.795 -10.53 -4.929 
 (-0.44) (-0.31) (0.77) (-1.53) (-0.64) 
N 1327 1362 1386 1143 1092 
N_g 54 55 55 44 42 
t statistics in parentheses, p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Dependent variable is GDP 
growth. The explanatory variables are initial income, investment, human capital, population 
growth, and reform indicators (external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial 
development, trade liberalization and institutional quality). The estimations are done in Stata 
using xtreg command for the between effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A: Between effect model, dependent variable; GDP growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg 
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lngdpc0 0.0544 0.0911 0.0197 -0.0148 -0.0842 
 (0.58) (0.96) (0.21) (-0.11) (-0.53) 
      
lninv 3.518
***
 3.501
***
 2.747
**
 4.469
***
 1.583 
 (4.16) (4.19) (3.03) (3.69) (1.39) 
      
lnh -1.114 -1.216 -1.826
*
 -0.808 -1.624
*
 
 (-1.77) (-1.91) (-2.66) (-0.96) (-2.08) 
      
lnp 1.877 2.390 2.503 1.313 1.011 
 (0.92) (1.17) (1.21) (0.52) (0.40) 
      
_Iregion_3 0.835 0.996 1.028 0.756 2.261
*
 
 (1.23) (1.47) (1.47) (0.89) (2.55) 
      
_Iregion_4 -0.0669 0.106 -0.181 -0.240 -0.430 
 (-0.12) (0.19) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.58) 
      
_Iregion_5 -0.0176 0.626 -0.118 0.0291 0.677 
 (-0.03) (0.93) (-0.18) (0.04) (0.89) 
      
ES 0.826
**
     
 (2.83)     
      
MS  1.115
**
    
  (2.69)    
      
FD   0.408
*
   
   (2.21)   
      
FT    0.468
*
  
    (2.65)  
      
IICRG     0.987
*
 
     (2.48) 
      
_cons 0.959 1.731 8.670 -5.760 5.894 
 (0.16) (0.28) (1.33) (-0.73) (0.77) 
N 1327 1362 1386 1143 1092 
N_g 54 55 55 44 42 
t statistics in parentheses, p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Dependent variable is GDP 
growth. The explanatory variables are initial income, investment, human capital, population 
growth, and reform indicators (external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial 
development, trade liberalization and institutional quality). The estimations are done in Stata 
using xtreg command for the between effect. 
 
 
Table 2: Between effect model, dependent variable; industrial value added growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ivag ivag ivag ivag ivag 
lnivac0 0.0229 0.0311 -0.0126 -0.177 0.00698 
 (0.21) (0.28) (-0.11) (-1.09) (0.03) 
      
lninv 6.702
***
 6.648
***
 6.432
***
 7.113
***
 5.683
***
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 (6.67) (6.47) (5.75) (5.06) (3.89) 
      
lnh -0.335 -0.745 -0.952 -0.751 -1.462 
 (-0.42) (-0.91) (-1.09) (-0.65) (-1.16) 
      
lnp 3.933 5.111
*
 4.641 2.042 2.742 
 (1.55) (2.01) (1.74) (0.62) (0.77) 
      
ES 1.261
**
     
 (2.95)     
      
MS  1.253
*
    
  (2.19)    
      
FD   0.307   
   (1.22)   
      
FT    0.551
*
  
    (2.37)  
      
IICRG     1.202 
     (1.67) 
      
_cons -5.531 -0.643 0.429 -8.890 -5.417 
 (-0.74) (-0.09) (0.05) (-0.90) (-0.51) 
N 1224 1273 1280 1050 971 
N_g 51 52 52 41 38 
t statistics in parentheses, p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Dependent variable is industrial 
value added to GDP growth. The explanatory variables are initial values of industrial value 
added to GDP, investment, human capital, population growth, and reform indicators 
(external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial development, trade liberalization and 
institutional quality). The estimations are done in Stata using xtreg command for the 
between effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A: Between effect model, dependent variable; GDP growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg 
lngdpc0 0.0544 0.0911 0.0197 -0.0148 -0.0842 
 (0.58) (0.96) (0.21) (-0.11) (-0.53) 
      
lninv 3.518
***
 3.501
***
 2.747
**
 4.469
***
 1.583 
 (4.16) (4.19) (3.03) (3.69) (1.39) 
      
lnh -1.114 -1.216 -1.826
*
 -0.808 -1.624
*
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 (-1.77) (-1.91) (-2.66) (-0.96) (-2.08) 
      
lnp 1.877 2.390 2.503 1.313 1.011 
 (0.92) (1.17) (1.21) (0.52) (0.40) 
      
_Iregion_3 0.835 0.996 1.028 0.756 2.261
*
 
 (1.23) (1.47) (1.47) (0.89) (2.55) 
      
_Iregion_4 -0.0669 0.106 -0.181 -0.240 -0.430 
 (-0.12) (0.19) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.58) 
      
_Iregion_5 -0.0176 0.626 -0.118 0.0291 0.677 
 (-0.03) (0.93) (-0.18) (0.04) (0.89) 
      
ES 0.826
**
     
 (2.83)     
      
MS  1.115
**
    
  (2.69)    
      
FD   0.408
*
   
   (2.21)   
      
FT    0.468
*
  
    (2.65)  
      
IICRG     0.987
*
 
     (2.48) 
      
_cons 0.959 1.731 8.670 -5.760 5.894 
 (0.16) (0.28) (1.33) (-0.73) (0.77) 
N 1327 1362 1386 1143 1092 
N_g 54 55 55 44 42 
t statistics in parentheses, p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Dependent variable is industrial 
value added to GDP growth. The explanatory variables are initial values of industrial value 
added to GDP, investment, human capital, population growth, and reform indicators 
(external stability, macroeconomic stability, financial development, trade liberalization and 
institutional quality). The estimations are done in Stata using xtreg command for the 
between effect 
Table 3: PMG model, dependent variable; GDP growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 D.gdpg D.gdpg D.gdpg D.gdpg D.gdpg 
EC      
ES 0.00566     
 (0.02)     
      
MS  1.930
***
    
  (882696.15)    
      
FD   0.120
***
   
   (34947.08)   
      
FT    1.156
***
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    (7.25)  
      
IICRG     0.684
**
 
     (3.16) 
SR      
EC -0.871
***
 -0.853
***
 -0.845
***
 -0.892
***
 -0.897
***
 
 (-24.85) (-26.07) (-25.88) (-23.54) (-22.88) 
      
LLNGDPC -5.118
**
 -5.882
***
 -3.782
**
 -6.899
***
 -4.895
***
 
 (-2.94) (-4.36) (-2.78) (-4.46) (-3.53) 
      
D.LNINV 8.176
***
 7.894
***
 8.604
***
 10.78
***
 10.08
***
 
 (5.08) (5.83) (5.11) (6.04) (5.77) 
      
D.LNP -29.18 -36.81 -24.45 -16.21 -35.13 
 (-0.76) (-1.00) (-0.80) (-0.43) (-0.82) 
      
D.LNH -17.37 -24.02
**
 -19.08
*
 -19.02 -23.84
**
 
 (-1.93) (-2.67) (-2.54) (-1.77) (-2.82) 
      
D.ES 3.319
***
     
 (4.48)     
      
D.MS  0.528    
  (0.89)    
      
D.FD   -2.832
**
   
   (-3.27)   
      
D.FT    -1.102  
    (-1.51)  
      
D.IICRG     1.957
*
 
     (2.55) 
      
_cons 116.6
**
 137.8
***
 88.84
**
 158.8
***
 116.3
***
 
 (3.20) (4.72) (2.94) (4.55) (3.65) 
N 1286 1307 1341 1098 1050 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Estimations are done by using 
(xtpmg) routine in Stata. Sample excludes oil countries due to missing data in these 
countries. All estimations are PMG. Hausman test show that there is no difference between 
PMG and MG estimators. While the first panel (LR) shows long-run effects. The second 
panel reports both short-run effects (SR) and the speed of adjustment (ec). The lag structure 
is ARDL (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1) and the order of variables is: GDPG, LNGDPC, LNINV, LNP, 
LNH, reform indicator. 
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Table 4: PMG model, dependent variable; industrial value added growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 D.ivag D.ivag D.ivag D.ivag D.ivag 
EC      
ES 1.842
***
     
 (4.51)     
      
MS  1.275
**
    
  (3.25)    
      
FD   -0.657
*
   
   (-2.57)   
      
FT    0.764
***
  
    (3.80)  
      
IICRG     0.786
***
 
     (3.35) 
SR      
 118 
 
EC -0.888
***
 -0.884
***
 -0.877
***
 -0.947
***
 -0.923
***
 
 (-22.16) (-20.53) (-22.27) (-20.08) (-21.96) 
      
D.lninv 13.29
***
 12.45
***
 13.18
***
 15.48
***
 13.28
***
 
 (5.07) (4.76) (4.83) (5.31) (4.77) 
      
D.lnp 51.33 215.9 26.32 135.1 155.6 
 (0.54) (0.79) (0.29) (0.73) (0.82) 
      
D.lnh 28.66 63.54 31.40 97.79 43.76 
 (0.83) (0.81) (0.66) (0.95) (0.68) 
      
D.ES 2.671     
 (1.33)     
      
D.MS  2.678
*
    
  (2.52)    
      
D.FD   -2.079   
   (-1.61)   
      
D.FT    0.462  
    (0.42)  
      
D.IICRG     3.645
***
 
     (4.43) 
      
_cons 4.872
***
 6.340
*
 5.453
***
 2.654 3.136 
 (3.90) (2.28) (3.71) (0.78) (1.47) 
N 1229 1261 1281 1043 990 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Estimations are done by using 
(xtpmg) routine in Stata. Sample excludes oil countries due to missing data in these 
countries. All estimations are PMG. Hausman test show that there is no difference between 
PMG and MG estimators. While the first panel (LR) shows long-run effects. The second 
panel reports both short-run effects (SR) and the speed of adjustment (ec). The lag structure 
is ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and the order of variables is: IVAG, LNINV, LNP, LNH, reform 
indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5, Hausman test for homogeneity and comparison between TPMG and MG estimators 
 GDP growth rate Industrial growth rate 
ES 0.17 (0.6772) 0.17 (6782) 
MS 2.07 (0.1498) 1.69 (0.1934) 
FD 1.29 (0.2558) 0.29 (0.5905) 
FL 1.07 (0.3016) 0.64 (0.4239) 
IICRG 0.22 (0.6375) 0.34(0.5233) 
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Hausman test performs to check the homogeneity on the long run for each regression. The 
null that there is no difference between the above two estimators and hence PMG is 
preferable.  The number is x
2 
results and p-value between brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: IV model, dependent variable; GDP growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg 
     
L.lngdpc 0.198
*
 0.265
**
 0.00639 0.249
**
 
 (2.02) (3.22) (0.05) (3.02) 
     
lninv 4.671
***
 4.221
***
 2.433
*
 5.278
***
 
 (7.91) (7.16) (2.25) (10.44) 
     
lnh -0.273 -0.529 -1.224
*
 -0.488 
 (-0.87) (-1.67) (-2.12) (-1.44) 
     
lnp 0.398 1.196 1.778 1.323 
 (0.28) (0.92) (0.99) (1.01) 
     
ES 0.548
**
    
 (3.22)    
     
MS  1.184
***
   
  (4.49)   
     
FD   2.121
**
  
   (3.11)  
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FT    0.432
***
 
    (4.19) 
     
_cons -13.27
***
 -10.29
**
 5.709 -15.73
***
 
 (-3.43) (-2.64) (0.67) (-4.39) 
Observations 1008 1019 999 1007 
F 18.67 18.35 20.79 33.40 
Hansen test  
(P-value) 
0.366 0.845 0.136 0.968 
Anderson CCLR  
(P-value) 
3.54e-249 4.35e-308 2.62e-13 0 
Anderson-Rubn  
(P-value) 
0 0 1.11e-13 0 
Excluded 
instruments 
L.ES  
L.IICRG 
L.MS  
L.IICRG 
L.FT  
L.IICRG 
L.FT  
L.IICRG 
t statistics in parentheses p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 A. IV model, dependent variable GDP growth rate  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 gdpg gdpg gdpg gdpg 
L.lngdpc 0.0705 0.174
*
 0.218
*
 0.158 
 (0.69) (2.03) (1.99) (1.76) 
     
lninv 4.083
***
 3.828
***
 3.475
***
 4.744
***
 
 (6.31) (5.87) (4.33) (8.24) 
     
lnh -0.163 -0.472 -0.865 -0.410 
 (-0.52) (-1.47) (-1.63) (-1.17) 
     
lnp 0.469 1.092 1.860 1.365 
 (0.31) (0.80) (1.14) (0.98) 
     
_Iregion_3 1.295
*
 1.023 -1.464 0.903 
 (2.28) (1.87) (-1.37) (1.72) 
     
_Iregion_4 -0.185 0.0164 -0.767 -0.271 
 (-0.37) (0.03) (-1.33) (-0.60) 
     
_Iregion_5 0.280 0.643 -1.834
*
 0.0213 
 (0.51) (1.15) (-2.17) (0.04) 
     
ES 0.540
**
    
 (3.14)    
     
MS  1.161
***
   
  (4.28)   
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FD   1.592
**
  
   (2.82)  
     
FT    0.411
***
 
    (3.87) 
     
_cons -8.831
*
 -7.715 -2.839 -11.97
**
 
 (-2.17) (-1.88) (-0.51) (-3.10) 
Observations 1008 1019 999 1007 
F 19.16 18.05 16.46 24.06 
Hansen test  
(P-value) 
0.161 0.438 0.0354 0.667 
AndersonCCLR  
(P-value) 
2.86e-244 2.99e-293 3.23e-19 0 
Anderson-Rubn  
(P-value) 
0 0 4.99e-20 0 
Excluded instruments L.ES   
L.IICRG 
L.MS  
L.IICRG 
L.FT  
L.IICRG 
L.FT  
L.IICRG 
t statistics in parenthese 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table 7:  IV model, dependent variable; industrial value added growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ivag ivag ivag ivag 
     
L.lnivac -0.573 0.210 -0.105 0.177 
 (-1.70) (1.39) (-0.55) (1.18) 
     
lninv 7.377
***
 6.701
***
 3.401 6.735
***
 
 (8.27) (8.06) (1.94) (8.35) 
     
lnh -0.121 -0.828 -2.064
*
 -1.008 
 (-0.22) (-1.54) (-2.18) (-1.76) 
     
lnp -3.275 3.441 2.440 2.470 
 (-0.89) (1.49) (0.88) (1.08) 
     
ES 3.571
*
    
 (2.11)    
     
MS  1.774
*
   
  (2.07)   
     
FD   2.552
*
  
   (2.16)  
     
FT    0.410
*
 
    (2.12) 
     
_cons -13.91
*
 -9.094 10.49 -12.85
*
 
 (-1.99) (-1.45) (0.82) (-2.11) 
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Observations 920 928 932 940 
F 16.21 15.79 13.92 17.08 
Hansen test 
(P-value) 
0.518 0.911 0.517 0.753 
Anderson CCLR 
(P-value) 
2.13e-16 4.70e-61 4.85e-11 0 
Anderson Rubn 
(P-value) 
4.99e-17 4.67e-71 2.62e-11 0 
Excluded 
instruments 
IICRG   
FT 
IICRG   
FT 
IICRG   
FT 
IICRG   
FT 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7A:  IV model, dependent variable; industrial value added growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ivag ivag ivag ivag 
L.lnivac -0.744
*
 0.0993 0.0152 0.00415 
 (-2.12) (0.59) (0.09) (0.03) 
     
lninv 6.770
***
 6.182
***
 4.621
***
 5.890
***
 
 (6.78) (6.45) (4.10) (6.40) 
     
lnh -0.0723 -0.852 -1.530
*
 -0.890 
 (-0.14) (-1.48) (-1.97) (-1.50) 
     
lnp -1.490 3.628 3.548 2.952 
 (-0.45) (1.61) (1.36) (1.31) 
     
_Iregion_3 3.928
**
 1.790
*
 -0.249 2.352
**
 
 (3.17) (2.10) (-0.16) (2.84) 
     
_Iregion_4 2.145 0.672 0.111 0.396 
 (1.73) (0.78) (0.13) (0.52) 
     
_Iregion_5 2.420 1.344 -1.105 1.018 
 (1.83) (1.29) (-0.81) (1.14) 
     
ES 3.367
*
    
 (2.02)    
     
MS  1.868
*
   
  (2.06)   
     
FD   1.904
*
  
   (2.19)  
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FT    0.372 
    (1.87) 
     
_cons -5.855 -5.282 4.987 -6.068 
 (-0.84) (-0.80) (0.60) (-0.96) 
N 920 928 932 940 
F 13.94 13.71 11.99 14.49 
Hansen test 
 (P-value) 
0.531 0.598 0.393 0.217 
Anderson 
CCLR  
(P-value) 
7.97e-18 1.14e-58 6.06e-20 0 
Anderso 
Rubn 
 (P -value) 
1.41e-18 7.37e-68 6.92e-21 0 
Excluded 
instruments 
IICRG   
FT 
IICRG   
FT 
IICRG   
FT 
IICRG   
FT 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001
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Chapter five 
Table 1: The distribution of firm according to their legal status and economic activity 
 LEGAL STATUS 
Sector  Cooperative 
(tadhamun) 
Limited 
partnership 
(Tawsyia 
baseeta) 
Mixed 
company 
(mushtarika) 
Shareholding 
company 
(musahama) 
Holding 
company 
(qabidha) 
Sole 
proprietorship 
(fardyia) 
Partnership 
company 
(ta'awunyia) 
Other Total 
Food processing 37 12 1 2 0 22 0 5 79 
Textiles 19 12 3 0 0 28 0 2 64 
Garments 21 4 4 0 0 19 1 4 53 
Chemicals 12 7 0 1 0 14 0 2 36 
Plastics & rubber 4 3 3 3 0 4 0 0 17 
Non metallic mineral 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 11 
Basic metals 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Fabricate metal product 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 
Electronics (31 & 32) 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 8 
Machinery and equipment 6 2 2 1 0 6 0 2 19 
Other manufacturing 18 5 1 1 1 21 0 4 51 
Construction 3 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 11 
Wholesale 12 7 1 1 0 13 0 3 37 
Retail 3 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 10 
Other services 15 9 7 2 0 25 1 13 72 
IT 3 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 8 
Tourism 6 2 0 0 1 11 0 1 21 
Total 169 70 24 14 2 185 2 42 508 
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Table 2: The distribution of firm according to their legal status and size 
 SAMPLING SIZE 
Legal status small medium large Total 
Cooperative (tadhamun) 52 65 52 169 
Tawsyia baseeta 18 34 18 70 
Mixed company (mushtarika) 10 8 5 23 
Shareholding company 
(musahama) 
1 5 8 14 
Holding company (qabidha) 2 0 0 2 
Sole proprietorship (fardyia) 85 75 25 185 
Partnership company (ta'awunyia) 1 0 1 2 
Other 15 15 12 42 
Total 184 202 121 507 
 
 
Table 3: The distribution of firm according to their size and economic activity 
SAMPLING SIZE 
Sector  small medium large Total 
Food processing 21 37 21 79 
Textiles 14 29 21 64 
Garments 12 25 16 53 
Chemicals 9 12 15 36 
Plastics & rubber 1 8 7 16 
Non metallic 
mineral 
2 6 3 11 
Basic metals 2 1 3 6 
Fabricate metal 
product 
2 1 2 5 
Electronics (31 & 
32) 
5 1 2 8 
Machinery and 
equipment 
7 9 3 19 
Other manufacturing 22 17 12 51 
Construction 4 5 2 11 
Wholesale 25 9 3 37 
Retail 5 4 1 10 
Other services 38 27 7 72 
IT 3 3 2 8 
Tourism 12 8 1 21 
Total 184 202 121 507 
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Table 4: Deficiency in infrastructure 
 OBSERVATION AVERAGE 
HOURS 
MIN MAX TOTAL 
LOST 
SALE% 
Power outage 
 
431 2.7 1 40 9.85 
Insufficient 
water supply 
49 12 1 48 7.28 
Unavailable 
main phone 
line  
101 13.34 0 99 3.88 
Transport 
failures 
164 6.70 0 99 8 
 
 
Table 5: Time needed to gain access to main permits and government services 
EXPERIENCE NOT 
APPLICABLE 
MEAN* MIN MAX GIFT/PAYMENT 
% OF FIRMS 
Mainline 
telephone 
connection 
278 33.3 1 
 
160 
 
36.36 (156) 
Electrical 
connection 
293 15.9 1 
 
60 
 
28.46 (113) 
Water 
connection 
308 4.42 1 7 
 
9.33 (32) 
Construction 
permit 
254 76.17 1 
 
180 25.76 (93) 
Import license 261 7.46 1 20 25.21 (92) 
Operating 
license 
282 38.7 2 90 25.20 (96) 
(    ) number of observation. *for 90% of observations report a delay to remove the outliers 
 
Table 6: Time spent for different inspections with officials’ requirements 
 HOW MANY 
INSPECTIONS 
AVERAGE 
DURATION OF 
MEETING 
(HOUR) 
THE PROCESS 
ACCELERATED 
USING ANY 
INFORMAL 
MEANS? 
Tax Inspectorate 3.75 1.84 70 
(233) 
Labour and Social Security 6.15 1.14 70 
(271) 
Fire and Building Safety 2.13 0.97 37.50 (12) 
Sanitation/Epidemiology 8 1.23 53.49 
(69) 
Municipality 
 
11.54 1 81.21 (242) 
Municipal Police 14 1 86.60 (181) 
Environmental 6.62 1.2 52.83 (84) 
(    ) number of observation 
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Table 7: Effect of ownership, export, competition on firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 sales sales sales sales sales sales 
capital 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.210*** 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 
 (4.36) (4.64) (4.20) (4.29) (4.21) (4.20) 
       
labour 0.760*** 0.762*** 0.752*** 0.764*** 0.752*** 0.753*** 
 (10.53) (10.97) (10.28) (10.53) (10.21) (10.26) 
       
lnpop  0.0932 0.109 0.111 0.0940 0.0954 
  (0.68) (0.74) (0.75) (0.62) (0.63) 
       
lnage  -0.0837 -0.0163 -0.0186 -0.0941 -0.103 
  (-0.28) (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.28) (-0.31) 
       
lnage2  0.00521 -0.00315 -0.00340 0.00716 0.00843 
  (0.09) (-0.05) (-0.05) (0.11) (0.13) 
       
compet3  0.506*   0.487 0.480 
  (1.80)   (1.12) (1.09) 
       
export   0.0486  0.0441 0.0444 
   (1.23)  (1.14) (1.14) 
       
foreign    -0.159  -0.0957 
    (-0.54)  (-0.33) 
       
_cons 11.13*** 9.315*** 9.503*** 9.462*** 9.355*** 9.355*** 
 (14.50) (4.03) (3.91) (3.89) (3.82) (3.82) 
N 349 349 349 349 349 349 
R
2
 0.522 0.527 0.525 0.523 0.529 0.529 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dummy variables are 
included for location and industry
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Table 8: Effect of ownership, export, competition, technology and investment climate on firm level performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales 
capital 0.237*** 0.190*** 0.212*** 0.204*** 0.201*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.200*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.199*** 0.211*** 
 (4.69) (4.05) (4.21) (3.83) (3.96) (4.17) (4.22) (4.26) (3.91) (4.16) (4.18) (4.19) (4.07) (4.29) 
               
labour 0.742*** 0.663*** 0.746*** 0.774*** 0.790*** 0.749*** 0.715*** 0.685*** 0.725*** 0.752*** 0.756*** 0.767*** 0.700*** 0.703*** 
 (9.76) (9.58) (9.94) (9.99) (10.55) (10.20) (9.82) (8.65) (9.73) (10.23) (10.18) (10.52) (9.39) (9.72) 
               
generator -0.453*              
 (-1.91)              
               
email  1.352***             
  (4.27)             
               
inspection   -0.0611            
   (-0.69)            
               
expclear    -0.200           
    (-1.21)           
               
impclear     -0.267**          
     (-2.44)          
               
assoc      0.870         
      (1.08)         
               
lnbribe       -0.338**        
       (-2.24)        
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overdraft        0.736***       
        (2.82)       
               
credit         0.479***      
         (2.83)      
               
loan          0.0983     
          (0.35)     
               
product           -0.0591    
           (-0.23)    
               
experience            0.389*   
            (1.78)   
               
uni_workforce             0.874***  
             (2.64)  
               
train              0.649*** 
              (2.64) 
               
_cons 12.30*** 9.973*** 10.04*** 8.338*** 9.227*** 8.259*** 10.36*** 8.207*** 8.948*** 9.210*** 9.384*** 8.546*** 8.916*** 9.269*** 
 (6.11) (4.13) (3.85) (2.89) (3.19) (3.05) (4.12) (3.28) (3.70) (3.72) (3.82) (3.42) (3.57) (3.86) 
N 349 349 349 290 277 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 
R
2
 0.476 0.559 0.530 0.556 0.608 0.532 0.538 0.541 0.540 0.529 0.529 0.534 0.539 0.539 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dummy variables are included for location and industry. foreign compet3 export lnpop lnage 
lnage2 variables also included in regressions and their coefficients omitted for space limit. 
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Table 9: Effect of ownership, export, competition, technology and investment climate on 
firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 sales sales sales lnva08 lnva08 lnva08 
capital 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.178*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.163*** 
 (3.97) (4.05) (3.88) (3.36) (3.39) (3.26) 
       
labour 0.571*** 0.574*** 0.621*** 0.543*** 0.547*** 0.592*** 
 (7.16) (7.31) (8.37) (6.62) (6.79) (7.50) 
       
foreign -0.251 -0.257 -0.182 -0.483 -0.503 -0.430 
 (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.64) (-1.57) (-1.61) (-1.35) 
       
compet3 0.521 0.533 0.501 -0.179 -0.183 -0.173 
 (1.21) (1.25) (1.18) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.51) 
       
export 0.0273 0.0232 0.0280 0.0339 0.0315 0.0356 
 (0.71) (0.60) (0.73) (0.79) (0.73) (0.83) 
       
lnpop 0.133 0.121 0.0857 0.276 0.260 0.220 
 (0.81) (0.75) (0.52) (1.53) (1.46) (1.18) 
       
lnage -0.122 -0.0923 -0.114 -0.174 -0.151 -0.126 
 (-0.35) (-0.26) (-0.33) (-0.48) (-0.41) (-0.34) 
       
lnage2 -0.000336 -0.00665 -0.00192 0.0250 0.0197 0.0173 
 (-0.01) (-0.10) (-0.03) (0.36) (0.28) (0.24) 
       
generator 0.124 0.146 0.0884 0.302 0.317 0.279 
 (0.54) (0.63) (0.38) (0.99) (1.05) (0.91) 
       
email 1.165*** 1.239*** 1.178*** 0.546 0.616* 0.584 
 (3.51) (4.00) (3.49) (1.49) (1.75) (1.54) 
       
inspection 0.0546 0.0519 0.0605 0.0167 0.0134 0.0302 
 (0.69) (0.67) (0.76) (0.17) (0.14) (0.32) 
       
assoc 0.342 0.236 0.596 0.0572 -0.0448 0.375 
 (0.48) (0.35) (0.74) (0.07) (-0.06) (0.44) 
       
lnbribe -0.341** -0.300** -0.401*** -0.335** -0.303* -0.407** 
 (-2.30) (-1.99) (-2.71) (-2.00) (-1.67) (-2.40) 
       
overdraft 0.621** 0.568**  0.639** 0.611**  
 (2.44) (2.16)  (2.12) (2.01)  
       
product -0.143 -0.191 -0.186 -0.155 -0.189 -0.197 
 (-0.53) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.49) (-0.60) (-0.63) 
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experience 0.346 0.383* 0.292 0.412 0.445* 0.339 
 (1.56) (1.71) (1.29) (1.60) (1.77) (1.28) 
       
uni_workforce 0.407  0.425 0.329  0.334 
 (1.21)  (1.23) (0.87)  (0.86) 
       
train  0.366   0.244  
  (1.39)   (0.74)  
       
loan   0.127   0.0608 
   (0.44)   (0.21) 
       
_cons 7.922*** 8.164*** 8.657*** 6.393* 6.750** 7.181** 
 (2.77) (2.92) (3.03) (1.96) (2.13) (2.17) 
N 349 349 349 310 310 310 
R
2
 0.584 0.585 0.577 0.483 0.483 0.475 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Dummy variables are 
included for location and industry.  
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Table 10: Effect of ownership, export, competition, technology and investment climate on firm performance (IV estimations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales sales 
labour 0.460*** 0.613*** 0.464*** 0.481*** 0.416*** 0.439*** 0.518*** 0.401*** 0.469*** 0.542*** 0.503*** 
 (3.80) (4.61) (3.82) (3.87) (3.56) (3.95) (4.43) (3.28) (3.80) (4.32) (5.21) 
            
capital 0.498*** 0.538*** 0.506*** 0.507*** 0.481*** 0.400*** 0.424*** 0.444*** 0.520*** 0.547*** 0.243*** 
 (4.35) (4.63) (4.32) (4.32) (4.42) (3.65) (3.96) (3.63) (4.17) (4.66) (3.56) 
            
foreign 3.057*** 2.480** 3.036*** 2.668** 2.350** 1.360 2.504*** 3.729*** 2.997*** 3.191*** 1.855** 
 (2.73) (2.17) (2.71) (2.30) (2.11) (1.18) (2.64) (2.91) (2.64) (2.81) (2.31) 
            
compet3 0.815** 0.706** 0.801** 0.748** 0.830*** 0.710** 0.595* 0.500 0.845** 0.823** 0.357 
 (2.48) (2.12) (2.42) (2.22) (2.66) (2.34) (1.90) (1.53) (2.50) (2.47) (1.21) 
            
generator  -1.41***         0.271 
  (-2.88)         (0.81) 
            
inspection   0.0577        0.0281 
   (0.36)        (0.27) 
            
assoc    -3.146**       -1.005 
    (-2.21)       (-1.07) 
            
email     0.782*      0.595* 
     (1.79)      (1.74) 
            
uni_workforce      1.797***     0.789* 
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      (3.05)     (1.94) 
            
experience       0.100    0.141 
       (0.27)    (0.58) 
            
overdraft        1.411***   1.058*** 
        (2.82)   (3.37) 
            
lnbribe         0.168  -0.443** 
         (0.48)  (-2.36) 
            
product          -0.852*** -0.469 
          (-3.18) (-1.64) 
            
_cons 6.619*** 6.543*** 6.370*** 9.484*** 6.455*** 7.028*** 7.644*** 7.641*** 5.961*** 5.912*** 10.99*** 
 (3.85) (3.78) (3.43) (4.34) (3.95) (4.44) (3.81) (4.26) (2.70) (3.36) (7.16) 
N 349 349 349 349 349 349 275 341 349 349 341 
R
2
 0.337 0.328 0.335 0.305 0.404 0.441 0.424 0.355 0.325 0.316 0.504 
F 52.17 42.65 41.52 40.62 46.03 50.25 38.73 43.61 40.88 42.28 25.39 
jp 0.351 0.782 0.310 0.641 0.328 0.565 0.144 0.701 0.335 0.884 0.389 
Idp 0.00624 0.00566 0.00435 0.00468 0.0104 0.0594 0.00662 0.0457 0.0169 0.00470 0.9998 
Endog 0.0022 0.0002 0.0051 0.0001 0.0271 0.0290 0.0404 0.0055 0.0027 0.0003 0.0612 
Ivhettest 0.4401 0.1393 0.4323 0.4825 0.6457 0.1744 0.4039 0.7581 0.5143 0.3912 0.9641 
JP is the P-value of Hansen test for overidentification. Idp is the P-value of weak instrument test. Endog is P-value of endogeneity test. Ivhettest is P-value for 
hetroscdasticity test. 
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Table 11: Effect of ownership, export, competition, technology, and investment climate on 
firm growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SGD SGD LG LG VAG VAG 
sales07 -0.111*** -0.104***   -0.0482 -0.0400 
 (-3.93) (-3.77)   (-1.51) (-1.30) 
       
lnl07    -0.112*** -0.0958*** -0.0197 -0.0172 
   (-5.08) (-4.67) (-0.42) (-0.36) 
       
foreign 0.0875 0.0768 0.00624 0.0222 -0.136 -0.130 
 (0.40) (0.35) (0.05) (0.16) (-0.71) (-0.68) 
       
compet3 0.443 0.438 0.190** 0.198** 0.204 0.203 
 (1.00) (0.99) (2.36) (2.50) (1.28) (1.31) 
       
export -0.0104 -0.0130 0.00788 0.00748 -0.00743 -0.00854 
 (-0.50) (-0.62) (0.75) (0.70) (-0.35) (-0.39) 
       
lnpop -0.0582 -0.0511 -0.0291 -0.0418 0.0635 0.0481 
 (-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.72) (-0.99) (0.66) (0.49) 
       
lnage -0.0990** -0.0976** -0.0656*** -0.0639*** -0.128** -0.126** 
 (-2.54) (-2.52) (-2.90) (-2.80) (-2.59) (-2.55) 
       
generator 0.0910 0.0881 -0.0142 -0.0344 0.128 0.126 
 (0.83) (0.81) (-0.21) (-0.50) (0.96) (0.96) 
       
email 0.352 0.356 0.217*** 0.232*** 0.114 0.116 
 (1.38) (1.40) (2.67) (2.67) (0.72) (0.71) 
       
overdraft 0.140  0.213***  0.150  
 (1.22)  (3.04)  (1.22)  
       
product 0.399** 0.391** 0.240*** 0.237*** 0.231* 0.234* 
 (2.47) (2.41) (2.97) (2.87) (1.66) (1.67) 
       
lnbribe -0.00662** -0.00698** -0.00253** -0.00252** -0.00643 -0.00657 
 (-2.39) (-2.51) (-1.99) (-2.00) (-1.29) (-1.33) 
       
inspection -0.0579 -0.0611 -0.0184 -0.0200 -0.0199 -0.0185 
 (-1.43) (-1.53) (-0.75) (-0.80) (-0.48) (-0.43) 
       
assoc 0.00833 -0.0389 0.0199 0.0679 -0.154 -0.122 
 (0.03) (-0.15) (0.14) (0.49) (-0.44) (-0.34) 
       
experience -0.000717 -0.0197 -0.00945 -0.0317 0.259** 0.243* 
 (-0.01) (-0.18) (-0.22) (-0.72) (2.03) (1.93) 
       
loan  0.280**  0.0938  0.116 
  (2.02)  (1.38)  (0.57) 
       
_cons 2.723** 2.625** 0.849 1.036 -0.315 -0.197 
 (2.00) (2.03) (1.20) (1.40) (-0.19) (-0.12) 
N 339 339 341 341 297 297 
R
2
 0.165 0.170 0.239 0.218 0.117 0.115 
SGD: sales growth. LG: labour growth. VAG: value added growth. 
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variable name Definition 
size effect t-value of the coefficient 
authors Dummy, if all authors from academia=1. 
panel Dummy, if the model use cross section=1. 
endo Dummy, if the model control for endogenity=1. 
fixed Dummy, if the regression account for fixed effects 
 or country dummy=1.  
pubtype  Dummy, if the study published on journal=1. 
wb Dummy, if corruption measured by one of world bank corruption 
measure s=1. 
icrg Dummy, if corruption measured by International Country Risk 
Guide measure of corruption =1.  
ticpi Dummy, if corruption measured by Transparency international 
measure=1. 
comb Dummy, if corruption measured by different organizations, or 
combined of (WB, ICRG, TI) =1. 
other Dummy, if corruption measured by the authors’ measure=1. 
ctc. Dummy, if corruption measured by Control to Corruption 
measure=1. 
cpc Dummy, if model uses corruption measure constructed by 
principal components=1 
trade Dummy, if the study contains trade or openness variable=1.  
instit Dummy, if the study contains institutional variable=1. 
human Dummy, if the study contains human capital or population 
variable=1. 
invest Dummy, if the study contains investment variable=1. 
political Dummy, if the study contains political or democracy variable=1. 
gov Dummy, if the study contains governmental intervention 
 or public spending variable=1. 
transit Dummy, if the study contains transition countries=1. 
lac Dummy, if the study contains Latin American countries=1. 
mena Dummy, if the study contains Middle East and North Africa 
countries=1. 
asia Dummy, if the study contains Asian countries=1. 
afr Dummy, if the study contains African countries=1. 
others Dummy, if the study contains other countries not specified 
above=1. 
size effect t-value of the coefficient 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics. 
 Obs Mean Sd. Min Max Freq Percent 
DF 460 101.37 173.06 0 1498 - - 
AUTHORS 460 0.82 0.38 0 1 378 82.00 
COUNTRYREGION 460 0.07 0.26 0 1 36 7.74 
PANEL 460 0.53 0.50 0 1 249 53.55 
ENDO 460 0.33 0.47 0 1 151 32.47 
FIXED 460 0.35 0.48 0 1 160 34.41 
MID 460 9.54 6.21 0 20 - - 
PUBTYPE 460 0.50 0.50 0 1 228 49.03 
WB 460 0.03 0.17 0 1 13 2.8 
ICRG 460 0.28 0.45 0 1 130 27.96 
TICPI 460 0.36 0.48 0 1 165 35.48 
COMB 460 0.03 0.18 0 1 16 3.44 
OTHER 460 0.20 0.40 0 1 94 20.22 
CTC. 460 0.09 0.29 0 1 45 9.68 
INCLUDED 460 0.03 0.17 0 1 14 3.01 
TRADE 460 0.32 0.47 0 1 149 32.04 
INSTIT 460 0.09 0.29 0 1 43 9.25 
HUMAN 460 0.73 0.45 0 1 337 72.63 
INVEST 460 0.33 0.47 0 1 155 33.33 
POLITICAL 460 0.18 0.39 0 1 84 18.06 
GOV 460 0.40 0.49 0 1 185 39.78 
TRANSIT 460 0.86 0.34 0 1 401 86.24 
LAC 460 0.93 0.26 0 1 430 92.47 
MENA 460 0.86 0.34 0 1 401 86.24 
ASIA 460 0.93 0.26 0 1 431 92.69 
AFR 460 0.91 0.28 0 1 424 91.18 
OTHERS 460 0.87 0.34 0 1 403 86.67 
INITIAL 
CONDITION 
460 0.78 0.41 0 1 361 77.63 
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Appendix 4: Quality of research impact (Citation of Scholar Google) 
 
Table 3A: the effect of Quality of research on the relationship between growth and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS bootstrap WLS MR WLS Specfic MR Specfic 
       
cite 0.000114* 0.000114 0.000255*** 0.000157*** 0.000250*** 0.000143*** 
 (6.81e-05) (7.34e-05) (5.88e-05) (5.19e-05) (5.61e-05) (5.06e-05) 
Typeof 
publication 
0.0111 0.0111 -0.101** -0.0370 -0.0996**  
 (0.0515) (0.0538) (0.0420) (0.0403) (0.0404)  
authors 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.203*** 0.169*** 0.195*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0497) (0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0456) (0.0397) 
countryregion -0.134 -0.134 -0.132 -0.0545   
 (0.156) (0.147) (0.0996) (0.126)   
panel -0.0634 -0.0634* -0.0643** -0.0623* -0.0699** -0.0538* 
 (0.0481) (0.0352) (0.0320) (0.0364) (0.0326) (0.0302) 
endo 0.0531 0.0531* 0.0480 0.0574* 0.0530* 0.0622** 
 (0.0421) (0.0288) (0.0304) (0.0316) (0.0298) (0.0288) 
fixed -0.120** -0.120 -0.328*** -0.233*** -0.325*** -0.227*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0784) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0429) (0.0348) 
mid -0.00250 -0.00250 0.00470* 0.00276 0.00500* 0.00268 
 (0.00305) (0.00367) (0.00253) (0.00248) (0.00255) (0.00241) 
wb -0.0550 -0.0550 -0.0190 -0.0284   
 (0.253) (0.201) (0.192) (0.194)   
icrg -0.203 -0.203 -0.194 -0.213 -0.181** -0.0757** 
 (0.242) (0.186) (0.170) (0.186) (0.0876) (0.0368) 
ticpi -0.276 -0.276 -0.250 -0.242 -0.233*** -0.103*** 
 (0.241) (0.189) (0.173) (0.186) (0.0889) (0.0352) 
comb -0.313 -0.313* -0.265 -0.299 -0.252** -0.183** 
 (0.257) (0.188) (0.175) (0.198) (0.110) (0.0832) 
other -0.177 -0.177 -0.239 -0.163 -0.221**  
 (0.241) (0.184) (0.174) (0.186) (0.0993)  
ctc 0.00532 0.00532 -0.0865 -0.0994 -0.177  
 (0.282) (0.232) (0.195) (0.220) (0.108)  
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included -0.231* -0.231** -0.323*** -0.258*** -0.345*** -0.270*** 
 (0.126) (0.111) (0.100) (0.0948) (0.0922) (0.0877) 
initialcondition -0.0602 -0.0602 -0.158*** -0.114** -0.162*** -0.109** 
 (0.0656) (0.0603) (0.0495) (0.0503) (0.0487) (0.0456) 
transit 0.0349 0.0349 -0.126* -0.0335 -0.117*  
 (0.0820) (0.0807) (0.0645) (0.0626) (0.0611)  
lac 0.202 0.202 0.159 0.108   
 (0.370) (0.228) (0.196) (0.327)   
mena -0.296** -0.296* -0.357** -0.293*** -0.357** -0.272*** 
 (0.131) (0.155) (0.157) (0.102) (0.154) (0.0990) 
asia 0.290 0.290** 0.398*** 0.330 0.545*** 0.385*** 
 (0.352) (0.121) (0.126) (0.312) (0.168) (0.102) 
afr 0.0818 0.0818 0.216** 0.170* 0.226** 0.169* 
 (0.120) (0.116) (0.101) (0.0928) (0.102) (0.0870) 
others -0.177** -0.177* -0.195* -0.169*** -0.185* -0.160*** 
 (0.0694) (0.106) (0.0999) (0.0600) (0.0943) (0.0573) 
trade 0.131** 0.131*** 0.195*** 0.164*** 0.195*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0525) (0.0458) (0.0342) (0.0394) (0.0340) (0.0368) 
instit 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.246*** 0.237*** 0.267*** 0.261*** 
 (0.0817) (0.0602) (0.0535) (0.0616) (0.0496) (0.0552) 
human -0.0503 -0.0503 -0.0618* -0.0537 -0.0537 -0.0555 
 (0.0528) (0.0348) (0.0353) (0.0403) (0.0336) (0.0389) 
invest 0.0240 0.0240 -0.00476 -0.0107  -0.00862 
 (0.0456) (0.0561) (0.0451) (0.0363)  (0.0331) 
political -0.120* -0.120* -0.165*** -0.125** -0.162*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0629) (0.0720) (0.0528) (0.0486) (0.0530) (0.0453) 
gov -0.0530 -0.0530 -4.97e-05 -0.0190 -0.000455 -0.0215 
 (0.0503) (0.0530) (0.0410) (0.0389) (0.0388) (0.0366) 
Constant -0.0801 -0.0801 -0.0165 -0.0632 -0.0480 -0.235*** 
 (0.270) (0.217) (0.206) (0.207) (0.143) (0.0831) 
       
Observations 460 460 438 460 438 460 
R-squared 0.190 0.190 0.478  0.476  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cite is the number of citation of the paper on Google Scholar at 2007. 
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     Table 4A: the effect of Quality of research on the relationship between growth and corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS bootstrap WLS MR OLS bootstrap WLS MR OLS bootstrap WLS MR 
             
cite 5.97e-05 5.97e-05 6.84e-05 7.06e-05 2.71e-05 2.71e-05 0.000131* 3.63e-05 2.60e-05 2.60e-05 0.000109** 5.78e-05 
 (5.75e-05) (5.03e-05) (6.11e-05) (4.51e-05) (5.96e-05) (6.28e-05) (6.92e-05) (4.78e-05) (5.83e-05) (5.21e-05) (5.22e-05) (4.69e-05) 
typeofpublication -0.00456 -0.00456 -0.0890** -0.0323         
 (0.0410) (0.0367) (0.0391) (0.0327)         
authors 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.204*** 0.206***         
 (0.0477) (0.0328) (0.0375) (0.0373)         
countryregion 0.0510 0.0510 0.0460 0.0558         
 (0.0751) (0.0541) (0.0569) (0.0590)         
panel 0.0203 0.0203 0.0559 0.0360         
 (0.0365) (0.0314) (0.0341) (0.0289)         
endo -0.00572 -0.00572 0.0328 0.0113         
 (0.0391) (0.0290) (0.0309) (0.0307)         
fixed -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.320*** -0.207***         
 (0.0381) (0.0473) (0.0496) (0.0317)         
mid -0.00127 -0.00127 0.00583* 0.00130         
 (0.00279) (0.00284) (0.00319) (0.00222)         
wb     0.00769 0.00769 0.0366 0.0168     
     (0.259) (0.193) (0.185) (0.210)     
icrg     -0.258 -0.258 -0.311* -0.308     
     (0.244) (0.178) (0.161) (0.198)     
ticpi     -0.313 -0.313* -0.376** -0.329*     
     (0.243) (0.173) (0.161) (0.197)     
comb     -0.557** -0.557*** -0.611*** -0.572***     
     (0.256) (0.174) (0.162) (0.208)     
other     -0.230 -0.230 -0.491*** -0.256     
     (0.244) (0.178) (0.182) (0.198)     
ctc     -0.0631 -0.0631 -0.105 -0.0934     
     (0.247) (0.175) (0.163) (0.200)     
included     -0.0468 -0.0468 0.0219 -0.0205     
     (0.0981) (0.0884) (0.102) (0.0774)     
initialcondition         -0.0533 -0.0533 -0.0497 -0.0361 
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         (0.0503) (0.0390) (0.0382) (0.0404) 
transit         0.0349 0.0349 0.0350 0.0231 
         (0.0617) (0.0494) (0.0531) (0.0484) 
lac         0.310 0.310 0.444** 0.289 
         (0.367) (0.211) (0.213) (0.337) 
mena         -0.264** -0.264* -0.370** -0.260** 
         (0.129) (0.150) (0.156) (0.106) 
asia         0.170 0.170 0.142 0.171 
         (0.357) (0.108) (0.105) (0.327) 
afr         0.0234 0.0234 0.0779 0.0402 
         (0.117) (0.103) (0.0968) (0.0935) 
others         -0.183*** -0.183* -0.249** -0.185*** 
         (0.0670) (0.110) (0.101) (0.0623) 
trade         0.157*** 0.157*** 0.272*** 0.182*** 
         (0.0446) (0.0380) (0.0424) (0.0355) 
instit         0.176*** 0.176*** 0.223*** 0.172*** 
         (0.0610) (0.0659) (0.0625) (0.0494) 
human         -0.0704 -0.0704* -0.161*** -0.103*** 
         (0.0484) (0.0362) (0.0383) (0.0391) 
invest         -0.00911 -0.00911 -0.0104 -0.0304 
         (0.0420) (0.0478) (0.0425) (0.0348) 
political         0.0134 0.0134 -0.0957 -0.00465 
         (0.0528) (0.0585) (0.0597) (0.0427) 
gov         -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.177*** -0.150*** 
         (0.0413) (0.0402) (0.0353) (0.0334) 
Constant -0.270*** -0.270*** -0.311*** -0.289*** 0.113 0.113 0.135 0.121 -0.166 -0.166 -0.163 -0.159* 
 (0.0595) (0.0369) (0.0433) (0.0461) (0.242) (0.172) (0.160) (0.196) (0.112) (0.103) (0.101) (0.0909) 
             
Observations 460 460 438 460 460 460 438 460 460 460 438 460 
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.268  0.082 0.082 0.154  0.116 0.116 0.309  
                          Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cite is the number of citation of the paper on Google Scholar at 2007. 
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Chapter three 
Appendix 1: Correlation matrix. 
 
 Log 
(n+ g+ ) 
Log Human 
Capital 
Log 
Investment 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Ethnic 
Polarization 
(=0.8) 
Ethnic 
Polarization 
(=1.6) 
Polarization 
(MRQ) 
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
Log Human Capital -0.0985 
 
       
Log Investment -0.0906 
 
0.2606       
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.0727 0.0057 -0.0982      
Ethnic 
Polarization(=0.8) 
-0.0140 0.0042 -0.0477 0.9771     
Ethnic 
Polarization(=1.6) 
-0.1021 -0.0179 0.0170 0.8629 0.9319    
Polarization 
 (MRQ) 
-0.0404 0.0096 -0.0302 0.9619 0.9962 0.9553   
Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
-0.0292 0.0824 -0.0723 0.9174 0.9108 0.8301 0.9028  
Growth rate 
GPD per capita 
-0.1110 0.1981 0.0059 -0.3788 -0.3657 -0.3710 -0.3605 -0.2457 
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION, SOURCE 
Asia Dummy variable for transition countries in ASIA Armenia,          
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
Balkans Dummy variable for countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Moldova and Romania 
Bank Bank Sector Reform index, period average, EBRD Transition 
Reports 
Batlitcs Dummy variable for countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
bmp Black market premium, DDGT (97) 
Bur Dummy variable for countries Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. 
cis Dummy for CIS countries 
Civil Liberties Index of civil liberties, period average, Freedom House 
Completion Competition Policy index, period average, EBRD Transition 
Reports 
Corruption ICRG corruption index 
Democracy Democracy-autocracy index, period average, Polity IV 
ebrd Overall ebrd reform index,  EBRD Transition Reports 
enterprise Enterprise reform index, period average, EBRD Transition 
Reports 
ETH Ethnic fractionalization index, restricted data 
ethun Ethnic fractionalization index, unrestricted data 
F Ethno-linguistic-religious fractionalization (pca) 
Fiscal Fiscal surplus/GDP: period average of ratio of general 
government surplus (deficit) to GDP, period average, EBRD 
Transition Reports 
FR Ethno-linguistic-religious fractionalization (average)  
Growth of per 
capita GDP 
Growth rate of PPP-adjusted GDP. WEO (WDI), UNDP, CIA, 
PWT 
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 
(NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD) WDI 
Illiteracy Adult illiteracy rate, data 2008, Human Development Reports, 
UNDP, data is due availability from1995 to 2005 
Infant Mortality Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), period average. 
Transmonee database 
Infrastructure Index on infrastructure reform, EBRD Transition Reports 
Investment I/GDP, EBRD Transition Reports 
latitude The value of the latitude of the country, CIA 2000 
Legal System Dummy for legal system: civil law 
Log GDP per capita Logarithm of ppp-adjusted GDP per capita, period average, 
WEO (WDI), UNDP, CIA, PWT 
ling Linguistic Index 
Ln (schooling) Ln General upper secondary education (ISCED 3A) enrolments 
(gross enrolment ratio). Transmonee database 
Financial depth Financial depth: log of ratio of broad money to GDP, period 
average. EBRD Transition 
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logpop89 Logarithm of population of the country in 1989, in thousands, 
Large-scale 
privatization 
Large-scale privatization index, period average, EBRD 
Transition Reports 
natural resources natural resources Calculated as Fuel exports (% of merchandise 
exports) WDI,  
Polarization (MRQ) Polarization (MRQ) Index 
Ethnic Polarization 
(=0.8) 
Ethnic Polarization (=0.8) Index 
EthnicPolarization 
(=1.6) 
Ethnic Polarization (=1.6) Index 
Phone Telephones per capita, period average  EBRD DATA & UN 
Statistical Yearbook  
Price liberalization Price liberalization index, period average, EBRD Transition 
Reports 
School Upper-secondary education (ISCED 3, all programmes) 
enrolments (gross enrolment ratio). Transmonee database 
Small-scale 
privatization 
Small-scale privatization index, EBRD Transition Reports 
Trade and foreign 
exchange 
liberalization 
Trade and foreign exchange liberalization index, period average, 
EBRD Transition Reports 
Visegrad Dummy variable for countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
Ln of Initial Income Ln of real per capita GDP calculated at the beginning of each 
period, WDI &  EBRD Transition Reports 
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Chapter four 
Appendix 1: Sample countries 
ALGERIA DJIBOUTI 
IRAN, ISLAMIC 
REP. 
SRI LANKA 
Argentina Dominica Jamaica St. Kitts and Nevis 
Belize Dominican Republic Jordan St. Lucia 
Bhutan Ecuador Malaysia 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Bolivia Egypt, Arab Rep. Mauritius Sudan 
Botswana El Salvador Mexico Suriname 
Brazil Fiji Morocco Swaziland 
Cameroon Gabon Nicaragua Syrian Arab Republic 
Cape Verde Grenada Panama Thailand 
Chile Guatemala Paraguay Tonga 
China Guyana Peru Tunisia 
Colombia Honduras Philippines Turkey 
Congo, Rep. India Seychelles Uruguay 
Costa Rica Indonesia South Africa Venezuela, RB 
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Chapter five 
Appendix 1: definitions of the variables 
Variable name Definition 
Capital Log of the sum of net book value of capital stock of 
machinery and land and building.  
Labour Log of total labour (permanent + temporary) in 2008 
Sales Log of total sales in 2008 
Sales07 Log of total sales in 2007 
Lnl07 Log of total labour (permanent + temporary) in 2007 
Lnpop Log of population city 
Lnva08 Log of value added in 2008 
Lnage Log of firm age 
Lnage2 (Log of firm age) squared 
Compet3 dummy equal 1 if  number of competitors>=3 
Export log of (Direct exports as Last year percent of sales+1) 
Foreign dummy equal 1 if part of the capital is foreign-owned 
Generator dummy equal 1 if the firm has an electrical generator  
Email dummy equal 1 if the firm has access to email  
Expclear Log of the average number of days to clear exports in 
customs 
Impclear Log of the average number of days to clear imports in 
customs 
Assoc dummy equal 1 if the firm being member of a business 
association 
Lnbribe Log of percent of total annual sales paid as informal 
payment 
Overdraft dummy equal 1 if the firm has overdraft facility 
Credit dummy equal 1 if the firm has credit facility 
Loan dummy equal 1 if the firm has loan 
Product dummy equal 1 if the firm has developed or upgraded 
product line 
Experience Log of the number of the years of  the firms’ managers 
experience 
Uni_workforce dummy equal 1 if the firm has workforce with Some 
university or higher education 
train dummy equal 1 if the firm provides formal training for 
permanent workers 
  
